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Chapter 1
General Introduction
From Uncoordinated to Coordinated
Urban-Rural Development?
2 Chapter 1. General Introduction
Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, urban-rural relations
have always been at the core of the national development strategy (Lin, 2002).
With the adoption of an urban-centered industrial development strategy in the 1950s, China
began implementing numerous policies favoring the industrial sector and cities at the expense
of agriculture and the countryside. It was then assumed that industrialization was exclusively
an urban phenomenon and that it could therefore be achieved by exclusively focusing on the
development of cities (Mc Gee, 2008). Indeed, it was considered that achieving rapid and
widespread industrialization required investing all economic resources, including those from
rural areas, in urban areas.
During the reform era, and particularly since the mid-1980s, the government has carried on
its urban-centered industrialization strategy and has continuously favored cities over rural areas.
Indeed, while comparative advantages and eﬃciency were considered to be the cornerstones of
the reforms, Deng Xiaoping announced that Eastern provinces and cities “should be allowed to
get rich ﬁrst”. It was promised that once Eastern provinces and cities achieved a suﬃcient level
of economic development, growth would spread to other regions so that “in the end everyone
will get rich”.
As might be expected, this national development strategy has led to a surge in urban-rural
inequalities which, since the early 2000s, has constituted a major threat for China’s stability
(Renard, 2006). As a result, the political discourse and the national development strategy have
been progressively re-oriented from the single-minded pursuit of urban-led economic growth to
the aim of achieving more equity by supporting less developed areas. Since the early 2000s,
the government has implemented several policies to promote rural development and to reach
“coordinated urban and rural development”. To realize this enormous task, the government
has given priority to a number of lines of action. Among them, and consistent with Deng
Xiaoping’s statement, a number of initiatives attempt to strengthen linkages between urban
and rural areas so that cities may promote rural development. However, until now, very little
is eﬀectively known about the role of cities on rural development in the very speciﬁc context of
China. This issue is of primary importance given that rural development, as well as promoting
urbanization, are both high on China’s policy agenda. After having been favored for decades,
are cities today able in turn to promote rural development?
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1.1 Pre-reform era (1949-1978)
1.1.1 Development strategy in the Mao era: the root of the urban-rural
divide
Soon after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the country followed the
economic model of the Soviet Union by implementing a centrally planned heavy-industry-based
development strategy. As industry traditionally takes place in cities, the country adopted an
urban-centered industrialization strategy, which favored the development of heavy industry and
cities at the expense of agriculture and the countryside1. In other words, to achieve rapid and
extensive industrialization, virtually all resources, including those resulting from agriculture,
were directed toward urban capital-intensive industries.
To carry out this heavy-industry-priority development strategy, China was turned into a
centrally-planned economic system. Almost all urban work units were placed under state own-
ership and became subject to government planning and control. As urban work units were na-
tionalized, urban residents were progressively granted access to a wide range of state-sponsored
goods and services (such as grain supplies, housing, health and education). In 1955, land in rural
China, which had until 1955 been under private ownership, was collectivized and agricultural
collectives began to take charge of the management of the farm economy. Within agricultural
collectives, rural residents were given equal access to farmland. Moreover, agricultural collectives
provided public goods and services to their members but were not given any national resources
to do so and thus, these provisions heavily depended on whether collectives generated resources
from the sale of agricultural surpluses (Naughton, 2007). As a result, urban residents beneﬁted
from a much higher level of access to social services and public goods than rural dwellers (Huang
et al., 2008). In addition, two major policies were established to extract resources and surpluses
from rural areas and peasants and invest them in industry and cities: the procurement policy
and the “price scissor” (Yang, 1999; Chan et al., 2008). In 1953 the government established a
procurement policy forcing peasants to sell part of their production to the state, at very low
set prices. In addition, once the quotas were fulﬁlled, agricultural surpluses could be sold on
the market, but again at very low prices. Indeed, the prices of agricultural produce were set
1China underwent rapid industrialization over the Mao era. Speciﬁcally, the industrial production increased
from 14,180 to 133,720 million of yuan. While in 1952 primary and secondary industries represented 51% and
21% of GDP respectively, when Mao died in 1976 they represented 33% and 45% of GDP respectively (data is
from the China Data Online website).
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artiﬁcially low, leading to a distorted price structure favoring cities and the industrial sector
(“price scissor”). Thus, cities sold their expensive industrial goods to rural areas whereas the
latter sold their low-priced agricultural and primary products to cities.
This system obviously favored urban residents, who beneﬁted from both higher incomes and
a higher provision of public goods than rural residents. As a result, farmers had incentives to
migrate to urban areas and, consequently, a large number of rural residents began migrating
to cities at the end of the 1950s (Naughton, 2007). To keep the system functioning, i.e. in
order to retain the large agricultural labor force in the countryside so that it could produce the
necessary agricultural products for the small urban industrial labor force, the government used
the household registration system or hukou (Lin, 2002)2. In 1958, the government issued the
Regulations of Hukou Registration to strictly control labor mobility from rural to urban areas
(Cai et al., 2008). Speciﬁcally, every individual leaving his permanent place of residence for
more than three months was required to provide justiﬁcation to the government and receive
authorization to migrate by both the origin and destination local governments (Xu, 2008).
1.1.2 Urban-rural dualism at the dawn of the reform era: legacy of the Mao
era
The urban-biased policies implemented during the Mao era have erected“invisible walls”between
cities and the countryside. Cities, where heavy industry was concentrated, were considered by
the government as “upper-class places” (Ma, 2005) while agriculture and the countryside were
sacriﬁced to support the urban-centered industrialization, which led to a very strong increase
in urban-rural inequalities in the pre-reform period, both in terms of individual earnings and
productivity (Yang, 1999). Peasants remained poor, were deprived of state-sponsored beneﬁts
available to urban residents and were stuck in the agricultural sector. In the countryside,
agricultural productivity remained low as the collective production system and the price scissors
gave peasants very few incentives to produce foods and primary products (Fan, 1997). Moreover,
capital and agricultural surpluses were directed to industrial investments, which prevented the
agricultural sector from modernizing.
2At the beginning, the hukou was established as a tool to register the Chinese population. There are two
features in the hukou: the registration according to the location (the household’s “permanent” place of residence)
and the registration nature or type (agricultural or non-agricultural). Moreover, every individual inherits the
household status of his mother (Xu, 2008). Since 1958, the hukou has been used to strictly control migration,
especially from rural to urban areas and from smallest to largest cities (Chan et al., 2008).
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1.2 Reform era
1.2.1 Rural reforms at the beginning of transition (1978-mid 1980s)
At the beginning of the economic transition, the government implemented a set of rural reforms,
leading to an increase in rural income.
From 1978 to 1983, the household responsibility system was implemented in the countryside.
This reform consisted in replacing the former agricultural collective system with a new system,
in which households were the main decisional unit and the residual claimant of proﬁts, raising
farmers’ incentives as well as their decision making authority (de Brauw et al., 2004). Moreover,
in 1979 and in 1983, the government signiﬁcantly increased procurement prices for major crops:
in 1979 the average procurement prices of major crops increased by 22.1% (Lin, 1992). Both
of these agricultural reforms strongly incited farmers to provide labor eﬀorts and thus, resulted
in a substantial increase in agricultural productivity (Lin, 1992)3. In addition to agricultural
reforms, from 1985 to 1992, rural areas beneﬁted from rural industrialization with the rapid
development of township and village enterprises (Cai et al., 2008). Thus, beginning in the
early 1980s, rural residents were allowed to “leave the land without leaving the village”, which
enabled them to engage in local non-agricultural activities. Finally, rural laborers beneﬁted
from a certain relaxation of constraints on labor mobility. Indeed, the household registration
system was also progressively liberalized, allowing an increasing number of workers to work in
cities.
As a consequence of these reforms, rural income increased signiﬁcantly at the beginning of
the economic transition, resulting in a decrease in the urban-rural gap: the income ratio of urban
residents to rural residents decreased from 2.9 in 1978, to 2.2 in 1985 (Yang, 1999). However,
this trend was very short-lasting. Indeed, after the mid-1980s, rural income growth stopped
and the urban-rural gap began to increase again because additional urban-biased policies were
implemented (Riskin, 1997; Christiansen and Zhang, 2009).
3More precisely, agricultural reforms have been implemented in two broad phases. From 1978 to 1984, reforms
increased farmers’ incentives as well as their decision-making power, especially through the implementation of
the household responsibility system. From 1985 to 1995, a signiﬁcant market liberalization was implemented,
leading to an increased number in market exchanges (de Brauw et al., 2004).
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1.2.2 Development strategy in the reform era and increase in the urban-rural
divide (mid 1980s-1990s)
The reform era did not break with the urban-bias policies implemented in the 1950s, quite
the contrary. First of all, the government stood by its intention to rapidly industrialize the
country4. Thus, it continued to extract the maximum resources possible from agriculture and
the countryside in order to invest these resources in industry and cities. Second, the reform era
has marked an ideological turning point, which has resulted in the implementation of additional
policies favoring cities. From the early 1980s, the government has considered that eﬃciency and
comparative advantages should be the cornerstones of the reforms5. The government oﬃcially
stated that it would carry out an uneven economic strategy by implementing reforms selectively
and gradually, i.e. by implementing reforms ﬁrst in locations endowed with a comparative
advantage. Quite naturally, cities, and especially coastal cities, beneﬁted from favorable policies
contrary to rural areas, which were not endowed with a comparative advantage (Lin, 2002).
To legitimize this uneven development strategy, party leaders relied on the concept of the
“primary stage of socialism” and on the “ladder-step theory” (Fan, 1997). In 1987, the Chinese
communist party oﬃcially recognized the concept of the“primary stage of socialism”, established
in 1979 by Su and Feng6. According to this concept, the classical Marxist theory was established
for more mature and developed economies than China. Thus, as China was at a “primary
stage of socialism”, it was necessary for the country to go through a transitional period and to
develop a “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. According to party leaders, this transitional
period had to be carried out following the precept of the “ladder-step theory” (tidu lilun) (Wei,
1999). This Chinese theory has been deeply inﬂuenced by Western development theories as it
closely revisits the growth pole theory of Perroux (1950; 1970), the spread/backwash or trickle-
down/polarization concepts of Myrdal (1957) and Hirschman (1958), and the inverted-U theory
of Williamson (1965). According to the ladder-step theory, for China, which has only limited
resources, the only way to achieve rapid economic growth consists in exclusively focusing on the
4China has continued its rapid industrialization during the reform period. Thus, the industrial production has
increased from 174,520 to 23,531,860 million yuan from 1978 to 2012. Over the period, the share of the secondary
industry has remained stable (45%) while the share of the primary industry has decreased from 28% to 10% of
GDP (data is from the China Data Online website).
5This ideological shift can be attributed to the observation that the Maoist policies were unable to generate
rapid growth, as well as to the increasing inﬂuence of Western theories, as China has progressively opened up
(Fan, 1997).
6Su and Feng’s (1979) paper is only available in Chinese. Fan (1997) provides a comprehensive description of
the concept of the “primary stage of socialism”.
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development of locations endowed with a comparative advantage. Once these locations have
been developed, it is expected that they will spread economic growth to the less developed
parts of the country, thus removing inequalities. Any state intervention to limit inequalities,
would only squander the few resources the country possesses, and would result in undermining
economic growth. According to the ladder-step theory, the increase in inequalities is thus more
of a necessary stage along the path of development than a problem; this theory clearly enabled
party leaders to legitimize the increase in inequalities (Fan, 1997). The uneven development
strategy is perfectly summarized in the famous words pronounced by Deng Xiaoping in 1980,
when he advocated to “use our comparative advantages, avoid using our disadvantages and
accept the fact of economic disparities. (...) Some people and some regions should be allowed
to get rich ﬁrst and in the end everyone will get rich” (Lin et Liu, 2006).
Since the 1990s, one of the major strategies of the government has consisted in promoting
Coastal provinces and cities as growth poles expected to lead national and regional development.
To achieve this, the government began implementing a wide range of preferential policies in
these locations. To summarize, as we have already stated, in the reform era the government
has pursued the urban-bias policy initiated during the Mao period, which has reinforced the
urban-rural divide7.
1.2.3 Urban-biased policies
First of all, the transition has not destroyed the “invisible walls” separating urban areas from
rural areas erected in the pre-reform period. As before the economic reforms, the government
has continued to pursue its “extractive practices” to develop the urban-centered industrial sector
by sacriﬁcing both agriculture and the countryside. The“price scissor”between agricultural and
industrial products has remained. Moreover, in spite of several changes in the grain procurement
policy, especially in 1985 (Lin, 1992), procurement contracts have remained. In addition, while
the hukou system has been liberalized, rural migration to cities still remains constrainted8.
7The present chapter focuses on rural-urban relationships and thus, on urban-biased policies. However, the
government has also implemented favorable policies in Coastal provinces. It was assumed that once Coastal
provinces achieved a suﬃcient level of economic development, they would produce spillover eﬀects on Interior
provinces. See Brun et al. (2002) and Renard (2002).
8Since the 1990s, although the liberalization of the hukou system has made it much easier for rural migrants
to work in cities without the local urban hukou, it has not made the obtention of an urban hukou much easier in
practice (Naughton, 2007). Moreover, in 2005 the central government oﬃcially announced that migrant workers
should be allowed to live and work in cities and should beneﬁt from social services. However, in spite of this
oﬃcial announcement, most rural migrants are still denied urban hukou and thus access to education and health
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Because of the hukou system, rural migrants can only engage in low-paid, often informal jobs
in cities where they are perceived as highly exploitable laborers (Naughton, 2007; Christiansen
and Zhang, 2009).
In addition to these already existing urban-biased policies, additional extractive practices
have added up, still with the aim of promoting the development of urban-centered industry.
The requisitioning of rural farmland by authorities constitutes a meaningful example of new
extractive practices. Since the 1990s, with the rapid industrial and urban development, local
governments have increasingly requisitioned rural lands, even if farmlands are under leases9.
While these practices generate huge ﬁnancial gains for local authorities, farmers are usually
informed with short notice, obtain unfair compensation and have a high probability of falling
into poverty after losing their farmland. In 2009, it was estimated that between 40 and 50
million people had lost their farmland due to urban expansion and about 10 million of them
became unemployed (Christiansen and Zhang, 2009).
In addition to these extractive practices, the government has implemented a range of prefer-
ential policies to spur the development of cities, and especially of coastal cities endowed with a
comparative advantage. In 1984 the government opened several cities for trade by establishing
14 open coastal cities. These preferential policies are in practice deregulation policies as they
enable ﬁrms to operate in a free-market environment (De´murger et al., 2002). In 1992, the
Open Door Policy was further extended to inland China with the creation of new open eco-
nomic zones in major cities along the Yangtze River as well as in all capital cities of provinces
and autonomous regions in inland China. In addition, cities have beneﬁted from many more
ﬁnancial resources than rural areas. The tax sharing reform of 1994 has led richer regions, with
highly developed nonfarming sectors, to obtain signiﬁcantly more tax revenues than agricultural
regions. Indeed, local government revenues mainly depend on some major taxes, such as the
value-added tax and the personal income tax, which are considerably higher, the higher the de-
velopment level of the secondary and tertiary sectors (Tsui, 2005). In addition, the tax sharing
services, as well as eligibility for several types of employment, in cities (Chan and Buckingham, 2008). In 2012
China established new rules for migrants to apply for an urban hukou (except in the 40 largest cities). In spite
of that, most migrants remain tolerated in cities but are unable to acquire an urban registration. See Kam
Wing Chan, “China’s Hukou System Stands in the Way of its Dream of Prosperity”, South China Morning Post,
January 19, 2013.
9Even if farmers have leases which give them the right to use their land (often for a period extending up to
50 years), the land ownership remains collective. As a result, in practice the local authorities decide what to do
with the farmland even if it is under lease. Thus, local authorities often requisition farmland to convert it for
more lucrative non-agricultural uses (Naughton, 2007).
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reform has hampered the development of the non-agricultural sector in rural regions (Zhang,
2006). Indeed, regions with a low industrial base that cannot obtain much tax revenues, must
impose a much higher tax rate on ﬁrms in order to pay for the expenses of the local administra-
tion. Moreover, once the expenses of the local administration have been paid, these regions have
no additional resources to ﬁnance local public goods, such as infrastructure. As a result, rural
regions impose a high ﬁscal burden on ﬁrms and oﬀer poor quality infrastructure, which creates
a very unattractive environment for potential investors. On the contrary, cities, thanks to their
highly developed industrial sector, manage to get enough tax revenues to ﬁnance local public
goods and to pay for local administration, even by imposing a low tax burden on ﬁrms. In addi-
tion, the government’s ﬁnancial transfer program has been biased in favor of cities. Diﬀerences
in the ﬁnancing of infrastructure is a striking example. While urban infrastructure was mainly
ﬁnanced by the state budget, there was almost no state investment in rural infrastructure until
the 2000s (Shen et al., 2012). As a result, the provision of infrastructure was mainly ﬁnanced
by towns, villages, communities and even by farmers, leading to huge disparities between ur-
ban and rural areas in infrastructure networks. Last but not least, rural areas face much more
diﬃculty obtaining ﬁnancial resources and thus, often impose a high tax rate on local dwellers
to ﬁnance local expenses; this has lead to a huge increase in the “peasant burden”. According
to a survey carried out in Hubei in 1997, Li (2003) estimates that the annual charges paid by
peasants to their village and local authorities accounted for as much as 20% of the net income
of rural households.
Finally, not only have cities as locations beneﬁted from policies favoring their development,
their inhabitants and oﬃcials have also beneﬁted from numerous perks. Urban residents have
beneﬁted from huge welfare privileges, especially in terms of housing, health insurance, pension
and education. On the contrary, rural residents have suﬀered from under-developed and poor
quality welfare services which, in addition, are unaﬀordable for most rural dwellers10. Finally,
local oﬃcials in cities also beneﬁt from several advantages such as a larger government, higher
oﬃcial rank and higher salary (Li, 2011).
10Indeed, the dismantling of the collective in 1978 (see Section 1.2.1) has led to the collapse of the communal
social provision system. After that, the quality and availability of welfare services in rural China has continuously
been degraded until the 2000s (Naughton, 2007).
10 Chapter 1. General Introduction
1.2.4 Urban biased administrative system: making cities the new actor in
local development
To promote the development of cities and to allow them to become engines of growth for the
rest of the country, the government has undertaken two types of policies. First, as described in
Section 1.2.3, it has implemented a range of preferential economic policies in cities. Second, it
has carried out a number of administrative measures to empower cities. The restructuring of
the administrative organization during the economic transition, is thus a direct consequence of
the aim of the government to turn cities into growth poles (Ma, 2005; Li and Wu, 2012).
Before the economic reforms, provinces and counties were the two major players at the local
level11. During the economic transition, a profound administrative restructuring has occurred
in order to turn cities into integral players in the administrative system. Speciﬁcally, three mea-
sures have been implemented: “turning prefectures into cities” (di gai shi)12, “turning counties
into cities” (xian gai shi)13, and “turning cities and counties into urban districts” (xian shi gai
qu)14 (Chung and Lam, 2004). These measures, which we will describe in more detail in Chapter
2, have had several major implications. First, they have led to a sharp increase in the number of
designated cities and to an enlargement of the urban administrative area of cities. Second, the
administrative area of cities (and thus their power) has been expanded well beyond the urban
core as a result of allowing cities to administer nearby rural counties. On the whole, during
the economic transition, cities have appeared as an integral level in the Chinese administrative
system and, in addition, as the main players in local development. Cities have been given much
more autonomy to manage local development, for example in terms of setting tax rates and
formulating local development strategy and economic plans (Li and Wu, 2012). Cities have
thus beneﬁted from increased administrative powers and ﬁnancial resources, favorable to their
own local development and aimed at enhancing the diﬀusion of development at the regional
11Chapter 2 describes the Chinese administrative divisions system.
12Also known as “city administering counties”, this measure has allowed cities to administer neighboring rural
counties. It has thus led to the appearance of city-centered regions, in which the central city has under its
jurisdiction several administered rural counties. This measure was expected to enhance interactions between
urban and rural areas by reducing administrative barriers and to facilitate planning at the regional level (Ma,
2005).
13Also known as “converting entire counties to cities”, this measure upgraded entire rural counties to the rank
of county-level cities in the expectation that once counties converted to cities, they would beneﬁt from a more
prestigious reputation, leading to more investment (Chung and Lam, 2004).
14Also known as “annexation of suburban counties by cities”, this measure has consisted in administratively
converting one or several counties (or county-level city) into urban districts of prefecture or provincial-level cities
with the goal of enabling cities to more easily expand and to facilitate the decentralization of industry.
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level.
However, in practice such administrative measures have led to empowering cities at the
expense of rural areas, thus enhancing the urban bias. The “turning prefectures into cities”
measure has generated new conﬂicts between the central cities and the newly administered rural
counties. Indeed, decisions within the entire administrative area are taken by city oﬃcials and
thus, tend to favor the city core at the expense of administered counties. As a result, ﬁnancial
resources are usually disproportionately allocated to the city. The measure has also enabled
cities to obtain low-priced resources from their administered counties, especially in terms of food
grains and raw materials (Vogel et al., 2010), leading many to call the “turning prefectures into
cities”measure the“city extorting counties”, “city squeezing counties” or “city blocking counties”
measure (Ma, 2005). The other two measures have also led to negative eﬀects for agriculture
and the countryside. For example, the “turning counties into cities” has led oﬃcials to focus on
the development of the more remunerative nonfarming sector and to neglect agriculture once
city status has been obtained. The “turning cities and counties into urban districts” has also led
to a loss of administrative autonomy for suburban counties and to signiﬁcant loss of farmland.
1.2.5 Urban-rural inequalities since the mid-1980s: increase and multidi-
mensionality
There is a large consensus that urban-rural disparities are very high and have soared since the
mid-1980s15. While the inequality level commonly increases during the economic development
process of a country (Kuznets eﬀect), the widening in the urban-rural gap in China has resulted
to a large extent from the urban-biased development strategy (Ye, 2009).
The literature provides various estimates of the urban-rural income gap. To our knowl-
edge, Sicular et al. (2007) provide the most reliable estimate of the gap by: (i) using a full
measure of income (housing-related components of urban income are included), (ii) adjusting
the urban-rural income ratio for diﬀerences in cost of living between urban and rural areas
and (iii) including rural-to-urban migrants in their sample. In this way, the authors take into
account the factors which are regularly omitted and which may underestimate (omission of the
housing-related components of urban income) or overestimate (omission of controls for spatial
diﬀerences in living costs; exclusion of migrants) the urban-rural income gap. Although the au-
15Kanbur and Zhang (1999) is a notable exception. According to the authors, urban-rural inequality accounts
for a very large share of total regional inequality but has remained relatively constant over time.
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thors highlight that the urban-rural gap is often over-estimated in other studies, they conclude
that it remains large in China even when controlling for usually omitted factors. According
to their calculations, the income ratio of urban residents to rural residents was 2.12 in 2002,
accounting for about 25% of overall inequality16. Since the beginning of the 2000s, the income
ratio of urban residents to rural residents has continued to increase and was about 3.20-3.33 in
200717 (Christiansen and Zhang, 2009; Liu et al., 2009).
In addition, urban-rural disparities go beyond income inequality. Rural residents also suﬀer
from lower education and health conditions as highlighted in the 2005 Human Development
Report of the United Nations: in 2003 while the Human Development Index for China as a
whole was 0.755, the index for urban China was 0.814 but only 0.673 for rural China (UNDP,
2005).
Finally, to some extent rural households have become increasingly vulnerable because they
currently face new risks in addition to the traditional problem of potential crop failure (Chris-
tiansen and Zhang, 2009). For example, migrants are typically engaged in jobs that individuals
with urban hukou do not want. Thus, they are conﬁned to low remunerated jobs, mainly in
the informal sector, and that usually take place in dangerous or toxic environments. As a re-
sult, a large number of migrants return to their home village hurt or sick, which represents an
additional ﬁnancial burden for rural households. According to Christiansen and Zhang (2009),
since the economic transition, rural households have suﬀered from new forms of impoverishment,
especially due to additional health problems and increased land requisitioning.
At the end of the 1990s, the huge increase in the urban-rural and industry-agriculture
gaps, the ever increasing number of land requisitioning and the worsening of environmental
degradation has led to widespread criticism and major social tensions. Researchers, in particular
the Professor Wen Tiejun, began warning about the three rural issues (sannong wenti): problems
regarding agriculture (nongye), rural areas (nongcun) and farmers (nongmin).
16The ratio is equal to 3.18 when the authors do not control for living costs diﬀerences and do not include
migrant workers.
17Obviously, this ratio is much higher than the 2.12 obtained by Sicular et al. (2007) partly because inequality
has increased but also because the authors do not control for all the necessary factors as in Sicular et al. (2007).
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1.3 Rural areas: a new target of the government since the 2000s
1.3.1 Coordinating urban and rural development
Since the early 2000s, policy makers have increasingly recognized the ever increasing problems
facing rural areas and have started rethinking the national development strategy, until then
strongly biased in favor of urban areas and industry. The early 2000s marks a turning point in
the Chinese economic transition, with the appearance of new notions in the oﬃcial discourse,
such as “coordinating urban and rural development”, “urban-rural integration” or “balanced
urban-rural development”, which means tackling urban-rural dualism (Christiansen and Zhang,
2009). As a result, the national development strategy is being re-oriented, from the single-
minded pursuit of eﬃciency and economic growth, to the aim of achieving more equity by
supporting less developed areas.
In 2002, it was oﬃcially announced at the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist
Party that prosperity could not be achieved without developing rural areas. It was also stated
that economic and social development must incorporate both urban and rural areas (Ye, 2009).
The aim of developing rural areas has become more concrete since 2004, as the annual Number
One Policy Document of the central government has constantly been devoted to rural issues.
This is particularly meaningful as this document establishes the government’s priorities for the
year to come. Every year since 2004, this document has deﬁned a series of measures to enhance
rural and agricultural development as well as urban-rural integration (Ye, 2009)18. Speciﬁcally,
a number of measures increase public spending in rural areas in order to develop infrastructure,
to give “equal access to basic urban and rural public services” and to ensure that the “social
insurance system will cover both urban and rural areas”. In addition, the government has
explicitly indicated that the urban-biased policy will progressively be re-oriented, promising
to “give more and take less” and announcing that the new policy implemented will consist of
“getting industry to support agriculture and cities to support the countryside”.
1.3.2 Break or continuity with Deng Xiaoping?
It is interesting to ponder whether these new policies truly mark a break with Deng Xiaoping’s
ideology or, on the contrary, whether they ﬁt into the continuity of the policies he initiated.
18A detailed summary of the Number One Policy Documents published from 2004 to 2011 is provided in Li
and Wu (2012); see their Table 3.
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In fact, even if the recent policies emphasize new notions, such as equity, they appear to be
much more in line, than in conﬂict, with Deng Xiaoping’s ideology. First, although these new
policies prioritize less developed areas, eﬃciency remains one major criteria in the way policies
are implemented (Li and Wu, 2012). Second, for now, the policies implemented do not interfere
with the economic management of the most developed areas (Naughton, 2008). That is to say,
the new policies have not led to a complete reversal of the urban-biased policy, which would have
led the government to extract resources generated by cities and industry in order to increase
spending in rural areas and agriculture. As Naughton (2008) highlights, the most developed
areas “are left alone to prosper”. Finally, it seems in fact that these new policies indicate that in
the early 2000s, China entered the “second phase” foreseen by Deng Xiaoping. In other words,
while until the 2000s policy makers followed Deng’s recommendation to “use our comparative
advantages, avoid using our disadvantages and accept the fact of economic disparities”, since the
early 2000s, the new policies prioritize less developed areas to ensure that “in the end everyone
will get rich”. As China has reached a relatively high income level and faces huge inequalities,
the government both can and must enter into the “second phase” foreseen by Deng, namely to
enhance the development of less developed regions.
While Deng Xiaoping very precisely detailed that the initial increase in inequalities was
unavoidable, he remained vague on the way according to which “in the end everyone will get
rich”. Two main options were evoked by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1990s: (i) the diﬀusion
of economic development from developed to less developed areas; (ii) place-based policies (or
policies targeting rural areas). First, as described in Section 1.2.2, the government legitimized
its policies using the ladder-step theory, which is built on the concepts of growth poles, spread
and backwash and the inverted-U theory. Thus, it was assumed that once cities achieved a
suﬃcient level of development (leading to an initial increase in inequality), they would become
growth poles and spread economic development to the countryside, for example through industry
decentralization (reducing income inequality). Second, in 1993 Deng Xiaoping acknowledged
that the state may have to intervene to reduce inequalities once the country had reached a
suﬃcient level of living. Interestingly, Deng Xiaoping situated this period of time at the end of
the 20th century (Fan, 1997).
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1.3.3 Achieving rural development by relying on cities as growth-poles
So far, it seems that these two strategies evoked by Deng Xiaoping have both been considered
by the government in order to drive rural development and achieve coordinated urban and rural
development.
First, the government has intervened by boosting spending and improving access to public
services in rural areas. Among the most famous policies is the launch of the New Cooperative
Medical Scheme in 2002 which gives the rural population access to primary health care. The
agricultural tax was also revoked and the minimum living standards guarantee, which was
limited to urban areas until 2007, has been extended to rural China (Christiansen and Zhang,
2009). A wide range of policies have been implemented or are currently being implemented.
The present dissertation does not study the eﬀects of such policies, each of them would require
an entire dissertation19.
Second, since recently a number of initiatives, especially at the local level, have attempted to
promote cities as growth poles for nearby rural areas. The multiplication of “one-hour economic
zones”, also known as “100 km economic zones”, provides a meaningful illustration. Many
provincial governments have started creating economic zones, composed by one (several) central
city(ies) at the center and by the rural areas located within approximately one hour by bus (Ke,
2010; Ke and Feser, 2010). The idea is to create a large region, in which the core urban
area will spread economic development to rural areas located within the economic zone. The
recent regional division of Chongqing into “One Circle and Two Wings” reveals particularly
well the government’s desire to turn cities into growth poles, driving the regional economic
development (Chongju and Lifen, 2009). The size of Chongqing municipality is relatively similar
to that of the smallest Chinese provinces, such as Ningxia province20. Chongqing municipality’s
administrative area is divided into several urban districts (the urban core) and twenty-nine rural
counties. In the early 2000s, to orient the economic development and planning of Chongqing,
the municipality was divided into three distinct economic zones: the “Developed Municipal
Economic Circle”, which included the urban core, the“Western Chongqing Economic Circle”and
the “Three Gorges Ecological Economic Zone”. However, in the mid-2000s, it was decided to re-
arrange Chongqing into “One Circle and Two Wings” so that urban districts within Chongqing
19See for example Pe´lissier (2012) on the New Cooperative Medical Scheme.
20A map of Chinese provinces is given in Appendix 1.4
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Figure 1.1: Chongqing: “One Circle and Two Wings”
municipality could enhance economic development in nearby rural counties. Speciﬁcally, the
“Developed Municipal Economic Circle” and the “Western Chongqing Economic Circle” were
merged into “One Circle”. The rest of the territory was re-arranged into “Two Wings”, namely
the “Northeastern Three Gorges Reservoir Area” and the “Southeastern Folk Area”. Figure 1.1
presents the division of Chongqing municipality into one-circle (districts and counties colored
in red) and two wings (purple and green area)21. The areas encompassed by the “Two Wings”
are areas suﬀering from poor ecological environments that face very speciﬁc challenges in terms
of environmental protection. On the other hand, the “One Circle” is an example of one of the
numerous “one-hour economic circles” recently established in China. The circle is composed of
several urban districts (the city core) at the center and by the rural counties located within
one-hour’s driving distance from the city center. The creation of the economic circle has been
accompanied by huge investments in rural infrastructure in order to enhance linkages between
urban and rural areas within the circle.
21The map is from the website: http://en.investincq.com/index.html [as seen on 02.04.2013].
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1.4 Aim of the thesis
1.4.1 Understanding the role of cities in rural development
The aim of this thesis is to study whether rural areas can beneﬁt from urban proximity. In other
words, can“cities support the countryside”by producing positive eﬀects on nearby rural areas, or
can rural development only be achieved by redistributive policies targeted at rural development?
In the current context of China, where rural development and coordinated urban-rural develop-
ment are listed high on the policy agenda, it is of primary importance to understand whether
or not cities support rural areas. This issue is even more important given that the government
has reaﬃrmed simultaneously that urbanization continues to be one of its priorities22.
It is worth noting that our goal is to understand whether promoting linkages between urban
and rural areas can be a means to achieve rural development and coordinated urban-rural
development. Under any circumstances, the present thesis aims at demonstrating the existence
of positive urban eﬀects on rural areas in order to justify the implementation/continuation of
urban-biased policies. According to several studies carried out in other countries (Sole´-Olle´ and
Viladecans-Marsal, 2004; Barkley et al., 2006), as cities are growth poles, it may be rational
to implement policies favoring cities. However, such a recommendation cannot be suggested
for the case of China, where rural areas have already been far too sacriﬁced. In contrast, this
thesis aims at understanding the role of cities in rural development because this may have direct
implications for the design of rural development policies. If cities foster rural and agricultural
development, an optimal policy could consist of generalizing the implementation of “one-hour
economic zones” and reducing restrictions between rural and urban areas. Moreover, if rural
areas close to cities beneﬁt from positive urban eﬀects, then public spending should focus on
remote rural areas. On the contrary, if cities produce insigniﬁcant or backwash eﬀects on rural
areas, this would clearly demonstrate that enhancing urban-rural linkages cannot achieve rural
development and inequality reduction, considered as priority issues by the Chinese government
in its project to build a “harmonious society”. In this case, rural development, as well as
urban and rural coordinated development, would be more likely achieved by relying on rural-
based policies, rather than on regional-level policies, and by protecting rural areas from nearby
extractive cities. In addition, providing evidence of urban eﬀects on nearby rural areas could
22As stated in the 12th Five Year Plan, the government foresees to increase the urbanization rate from 47.5%
to 51.5% over the period 2011-2015 (Casey and Koleski, 2011).
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shed additional light on intra-rural inequalities in China.
1.4.2 Do cities enhance rural development in China? First insights
Cities seem to have played an increasingly important role on the economic development of
nearby rural areas during the economic transition. In the pre-reform period, rural areas were
quite homogeneous across the country: they remained poorly developed agrarian economies
with a collectivized agricultural sector. However, since the beginning of the economic reforms
a new picture of rural China has emerged, featuring two main characteristics (Mohapatra et
al., 2006; Long et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2009). First, diﬀerent rural development models have
appeared so that rural China has become very heterogeneous both in terms of earning levels
and economic structure. Thus, across rural China diﬀerent models of development currently
co-exist: subsistence farming, commercial farming, rural industry, private micro-enterprises and
amenities-based development types. Second, the development path taken by a given rural area
strongly depends on external forces and especially on urban proximity. For example, rural areas
close to cities beneﬁt from locational advantages and thus, are much more likely to engage in
an industrial-based development type.
The literature on rural inequalities and rural poverty gives some interesting insight on the
role played by cities on rural development. On the whole, the literature agrees that intra-rural
inequality has soared since the mid-1980s and has attained a very high level (Rozelle, 1994; Wan
and Zhou, 2005; Ye and Wei, 2005; Liu, 2006; World Bank, 2009). For instance, according to
the data issued by the State Statistical Bureau, the Gini coeﬃcient for rural areas raised from
0.21 in 1978 to 0.36 in 2002 (Fan and Chan-Kang, 2008).
In addition, it seems that location, and especially urban proximity, plays a very signiﬁcant
role in explaining the level of rural development. According to the nationally representative
2002 survey of the Chinese Household Income Project, per capita net income was 43% higher
in rural areas located in the vicinity of cities than in other rural areas in 2002. Consistently,
in spite of China’s huge performance in reducing poverty since 1978, many rural people remain
poor and a striking fact is that remote rural areas suﬀer the most from poverty (World Bank,
1992; Knight and Song, 1993; Jalan and Ravallion, 2002; Long et al., 2009). Similarly, Glauben
et al. (2012) have recently estimated that rural households in villages close to cities have a lower
probability of suﬀering from persistent poverty. Moreover, according to some estimates, village
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location (which captures the eﬀect of urban proximity but also that of natural endowments)
is one major determinant of intra-rural inequality, accounting for about 30-40% of intra-rural
inequality in the early 2000s (Wan and Zhou, 2005; Benjamin et al., 2008). Consistently, relative
to the rural population as a whole, the rural poor are more likely to live in mountainous areas and
in villages far away from the nearest county town23 (World Bank, 2009). On the whole, it seems
that the spatial pattern of inequality has evolved since the beginning of the economic reforms.
While in 1978 the development gap broadly favored developed cities over poor rural counties, the
spatial pattern of inequalities has become more complex with the transition. Indeed, some rural
counties, especially those beneﬁting from locational advantages, have beneﬁted from signiﬁcant
economic development. As a result, the current development gap not only exists between cities
and rural counties but also between some city-regions (including cities and nearby counties) and
more peripherical areas (see Ye and Wei (2005) for the case of Zhejiang province). Thus, cities
may have become growth poles for nearby rural areas during the economic transition.
According to some authors, however, even if location remains one major determinant of
intra-rural inequality and rural poverty, it has played a decreasing role in explaining them since
the beginning of the economic reforms (Riskin, 1997; Wan and Zhou, 2005; Benjamin et al.,
2008). Thus, while rural poverty remains concentrated in remote areas, it is no longer exclusively
conﬁned to remote areas (World Bank, 2009).
Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3 provide additional insight on the role of cities on rural development
in China. Both maps represent China’s county-level divisions, which correspond to the third
level of administrative divisions in China, under the central government and the provinces.
There are three diﬀerent types of county-level divisions: (i) urban districts under prefecture
and provincial-level cities, (ii) county-level cities and (iii) counties. While urban districts under
prefecture and provincial-level cities as well as county-level cities are considered as urban areas,
counties are classiﬁed as rural areas (even if they have towns under their administrative juris-
diction)24. In both maps, cities are represented in grey, and city size, measured by city GDP, is
represented by blue circles.
23Based on the 2003 Rural Household Survey, the World Bank estimates that while 26% of the total rural
population lived in mountainous areas, as much as 51% of the rural poor lived in mountainous areas. Similarly,
while 39% of the total rural population lived more than 10 km from the nearest county town, about 50% of rural
poor were located more than 10 km from the nearest county town.
24Chapter 2 describes in more detail the administrative division systems of China and discusses the deﬁnition
of urban and rural areas.
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Figure 1.2 represents the county-level divisions oﬃcially designated as “poverty county”
at the national level25. Several observations arise from the map. First of all, urbanization
demonstrates a strong regional pattern: most (large) cities are concentrated in Eastern China.
As pointed out by Zhu et al. (2012), the diﬀerence in urbanization is the largest between Eastern
and Interior China26. Second, poverty also demonstrates a strong regional pattern: most poor
counties are located in inland provinces whereas very few counties are designated as poor in the
richest eastern provinces. Third, on the whole (large) cities are mainly surrounded by counties
not designated as poor counties. However, the pattern is less clear in several cases. For example,
in spite of the proximity to Beijing and Tianjin, many counties in Hebei are designated as poor
counties. However, this should not be a surprise given that Hebei is highly populated and suﬀers
from land scarcity and land degradation27 (especially due to pollution). Consequently, many
farmers in Hebei lack farmland and are unable to generate agricultural income. Moreover, we
can also ask whether this is the result of Beijing and Tianjin’s backwash eﬀects on rural counties
in Hebei provinces. The relationship between urban proximity and poverty designation is also
less straightforward in Xinjiang and in Inner Mongolia, where in spite of the small number of
cities, relatively few counties are designated as “poverty counties”. As for Hebei, this particular
pattern may arise from land availability and quality, which heavily determine rural incomes.
For example, most poverty counties in Xinjiang are located in the South, which is an arid area
(Taklamakan Desert). On the contrary, other counties in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia may not
be designated as poor as they beneﬁt from large amounts of farmland and usually specialize in
livestock farming and wool production, which are much more remunerative than ordinary crop
production.
Even if the geographical repartition of poor-designated counties provides interesting insights,
there are two main shortcomings. First, counties with a large population from ethnic minorities
or located in old revolutionary bases are more likely to be designated as poor counties (de la
25Since 1986, the State Council’s Leading Group Oﬃce of Poverty Alleviation and Development has issued
a list of designated “poverty counties”. To date, on the 2,853 total county-level divisions in China, 592 are
designated as poverty counties, which entitles them to receive alleviation funds. Oﬃcially, counties are des-
ignated as poor according to their level of rural net income per capita (in 1986, every county with a rural
net income per capita below 150 yuan was designated as poor). The list of “poverty counties” is available at
http://www.cpad.gov.cn/publicﬁles/business/htmlﬁles/FPB/fpyw/201203/175445.html [as seen on 31.03.2013].
26According to the authors’ calculations, in 2000, while the urbanization rate was 54.2% in Eastern China, it
was only 36.4% and 28% respectively in Central and Western China.
27As estimated by the World Bank (2009), owning low productivity land signiﬁcantly increases the probability
of being poor. Indeed, while 25% of the whole rural population have low productivity land, as much as 56% of
the rural poor have low productivity land.
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Rupelle and Li, 2012). Moreover, as nearly no Eastern counties are designated as poor, it does
not enable us to discuss the potential role of cities on rural development in Eastern China.
Figure 1.3 may provide a better illustration of the role of cities on rural development. The
map provides information on the annual per capita net income level of rural households for
rural counties28. The richest fourth rural counties (annual per capita net income level of rural
households higher than the third quartile) are represented in red. On the contrary, the poorest
fourth rural counties (annual per capita net income level of rural households lower than the
ﬁrst quartile) are represented in dark green. In addition, to erase diﬀerences in development
between Eastern, Central and Western China, quartiles have been calculated for these three
macro regions respectively29. Thus, for example in Eastern China, red counties represent the
richest rural counties among Eastern rural counties.
In Eastern China, the richest counties are exclusively located close to (large) cities. On
the contrary, the poorest counties are located in more remote places, especially in Hainan and
Guangxi provinces. As was the case in Figure 1.2, many rural counties in Hebei are among
the poorest counties of Eastern China in spite of the proximity to Beijing municipality, which
probably arises from land scarcity and land degradation.
Regarding Central China, the relationship between urban proximity and rural development is
less straightforward. On the one hand, in Henan, Hubei, Hunan and Anhui provinces, the richest
counties are mainly concentrated around cities, and especially around the provincial capitals30
(Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Changsha and Hefei). On the other hand, in Northeastern provinces (Jilin
and Heilongjiang), the pattern is less clear as both the richest and poorest counties are located
close to cities. Finally, when comparing Inner Mongolia and Shanxi provinces, it appears once
again that land availability and quality play a very signiﬁcant role in driving rural income. These
two neighbor provinces are both characterized by relatively few cities. However, Inner Mongolia
beneﬁts from large areas of farmland enabling farmers to breed cashmere goats whereas Shanxi
suﬀers from the same land scarcity and land degradation problems as Hebei province. This may
explain why many counties in Inner Mongolia are among the richest counties of Central China
whereas Shanxi contains many of the poorest counties of Central China31.
28Data is from the China data center website (University of Michigan).
29This is more relevant to capture the eﬀect of cities on rural counties. Otherwise, the most developed counties
are concentrated in Eastern China. A map representing the four quartiles of annual per capita net income of
rural households is given in Appendix 1.5.
30A map of the provincial capital cities is given in Appendix 1.6.
31Consistently, the World Bank (2009) has highlighted that land scarcity in Central China is one major deter-
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In Western China, the largest cities are often surrounded by the richest rural counties. This
is particularly striking in the case of Chengdu (the capital of Sichuan province) and Chongqing
cities. The same pattern is also observed in the vicinity of other provincial capitals, such as
Xi’an in Shaanxi province and Kunming in Yunnan. Once again the pattern is less clear in
Xinjiang province, even if the capital city, U¨ru¨mqi, appears to play a role. Consistently, the
poorest counties in Western China are often located in the more remote areas, such as in the
west of Sichuan province.
To summarize, these two maps have provided some interesting insights on the relationship
between urban proximity and rural development. On the whole, the richest rural counties are
more likely to be located in the vicinity of cities. However, the relationship seems to vary
both across city size and regions. Indeed, the richest counties are more likely to be concen-
trated around the largest cities. In addition, the relationship appears much stronger in Eastern
China. Interestingly, cities in Eastern China, which are more developed and already face several
congestion eﬀects such as high factor prices, may be more likely to generate spread eﬀects on
nearby rural counties (for example through ﬁrm relocation) than inland cities. The existence
of stronger urban spread eﬀects in Eastern China could help to explain several results obtained
in previous studies and to our knowledge until now not explained. First, stronger urban spread
eﬀects in Eastern China could explain why the urban-rural gap is lower in Eastern China than
in other regions. Indeed, according to Sicular et al. (2007), the urban-rural income ratio in
Eastern, Central and Western China was 1.89, 2.23 and 3.49, respectively, in the year 2002.
Second, stronger urban spread eﬀects in Eastern China could explain why the determinants of
rural poverty vary across Chinese regions. Indeed, while the distance to the nearest county town
is one of the three most important determinants of rural poverty in Coastal and Northeastern
China, it has a much lower impact on rural poverty in Western China (World Bank, 2009). Fi-
nally, while it appears that cities may play a positive role on rural income, we certainly cannot
infer from these maps any causal relationship. The rest of the thesis tries to provide a thorough
analysis of the eﬀects of urban areas on rural development in China.
minant of rural poverty.
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1.4.3 Overview of the dissertation
The present thesis aims at answering a number of fundamental questions in order to thoroughly
understand the eﬀect of urban areas on rural development.
1. What is the eﬀect of urban areas on the diﬀerent economic sectors of nearby rural areas
(agricultural and non-agricultural sectors)?
2. Beyond the economic impact of urban areas, do cities enhance rural development?
3. Are urban eﬀects on rural areas homogeneous across Chinese regions?
4. Do diﬀerent cities produce diﬀerent eﬀects on rural areas?
To answer these questions, the thesis is organized into the following six chapters.
First of all, investigating whether urban areas aﬀect rural development requires us to begin
by clearly deﬁning what we mean by“urban”and“rural”areas. That is why Chapter 2 presents
in detail the very complex Chinese administrative divisions system as well as the deﬁnition of
urban and rural areas. We also describe how some administrative changes implemented during
the economic transition have progressively blurred the deﬁnition of urban and rural areas.
Finally, in the light of the issues raised in the chapter, we discuss the relevant scale of analysis
to empirically investigate whether urban areas aﬀect rural development in China.
Chapter 3 provides a critical analysis of the literature regarding urban eﬀects on rural
areas. First, we present the general transmission channels by which cities can aﬀect economic
development in nearby rural areas and describe the results obtained by empirical analyses.
Second, as the literature has mainly been conceived to study urban eﬀects in the context of
developed countries, we discuss the compatibility of these western theories with the Chinese
realities. This discussion will help us to highlight some key elements to be taken into account
when empirically investigating urban eﬀects on rural areas in the speciﬁc context of China.
The ﬁrst two chapters constitute a solid base, which enables us to carefully implement in
the rest of the thesis three successive empirical analyses to investigate the eﬀects of urban areas
on the countryside in China.
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As agriculture remains a major component of the rural economy, the ﬁrst empirical analysis
test the role of urban areas on the agricultural sector of nearby rural areas (Chapter 4).
First, we highlight that improving technical eﬃciency constitutes one of the major challenges
currently facing China’s agriculture. That is why the rest of the chapter provides a comprehen-
sive analysis of how cities can aﬀect agricultural technical eﬃciency in the hinterland.
After discussing the potential mechanisms by which cities can aﬀect agricultural eﬃciency,
I empirically assess the role of cities on agricultural eﬃciency by using Chinese county-level
agricultural data for 19 provinces over the period of 2005-2009. The empirical analysis provides
important insights on urban spillover eﬀects on agricultural eﬃciency. First, cities are found
to produce very signiﬁcant positive eﬀects in the most developed Eastern provinces but have
no signiﬁcant eﬀects in the least developed Western provinces, which conﬁrms the ﬁrst insights
that we observed with Figures 1.2 and 1.3. Second, urban eﬀects not only vary across regions
but also across the urban hierarchy. Indeed, we estimate that provincial-level cities have a
deteriorating impact on technical eﬃciency, while lower-level cities enhance technical eﬃciency
in most regions. This highlights that the current policies that favor provincial-level cities is much
less able to enhance rural development than a policy favoring the development of a network of
medium-sized cities scattered across the territory.
After having investigated the eﬀect of cities on the agricultural sector of nearby rural areas,
we analyze the eﬀect of urban areas on the rural non-agricultural sector (Chapter 5). Specif-
ically, we assess the eﬀect of cities on rural non-agricultural employment, which is of primary
importance because it is widely recognized that rural non-agricultural employment helps rural
households in developing countries to get out of poverty.
While the existing literature has focused on the eﬀect of urban proximity on the access
to rural non-agricultural employment, the chapter investigates whether urban proximity also
enhances rural non-agricultural wages. The goal of the chapter is thus to investigate whether
rural workers close to cities manage to get better remunerated non-agricultural employment.
Using micro-level data, we ﬁnd robust evidence that rural workers in the vicinity of cities and
towns beneﬁt both from higher employment opportunities and from higher wages in the non-
agricultural sector. Consistent with Chapter 4, we also ﬁnd evidence that diﬀerent types of cities
produce diﬀerent eﬀects on rural areas by highlighting that workers close to the largest cities
beneﬁt from the highest wage premium (urban hierarchy eﬀects). In addition, we investigate
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why workers are paid higher wages in villages close to cities. We conclude that workers close to
cities are paid higher wages for two reasons. First, they are more likely to commute to the city,
where they engage in better paid jobs. Second, villages located close to urban areas beneﬁt from
higher market potential and from some localization economies leading to higher productivity
and thus, to higher wages in these villages. To our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to highlight that
Chinese villages surrounding urban areas beneﬁt from signiﬁcant agglomeration eﬀects. In this
context, we emphasize that it may be diﬃcult for rural policies to attract new industries or
relocate existing ones to peripheral rural areas. This issue is extremely serious given that non-
agricultural employment strongly determines rural earnings and welfare. Finally, this chapter
provides some evidence on the geographical reach of urban spillover eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, we
ﬁnd that most agglomeration eﬀects occur in the close vicinity of the county seat. As urban
eﬀects seem to disappear quite rapidly over space, we can wonder whether relying on cities as
growth pole is an eﬃcient strategy for enhancing rural development. Would it be preferable to
concentrate on the implementation of policies targeting rural areas? Would it be desirable to
reduce barriers between urban and rural areas in order to increase the geographical reach of
urban eﬀects?
After having dedicated two chapters to the study of the economic impact of cities on nearby
rural areas, the last analysis focuses on the eﬀect of cities on rural development (Chapter 6).
Speciﬁcally, if on average rural areas close to cities may beneﬁt from economic advantages (more
eﬃcient agricultural sector, access to better remunerated non-agricultural employment), do not
they suﬀer from other disadvantages such as higher pollution, insecurity, land requisitioning and
even from cultural destruction? Thus, if urban proximity may enhance economic performance
in nearby rural areas, it may also increase rural vulnerability. This issue is crucial because
harmonious and coordinated urban and rural development cannot be achieved without dealing
with developmental issues. Given the dramatic environmental degradation that has accompa-
nied China’s spectacular economic performance, and the signiﬁcant increase of pollution in rural
areas over the recent period, we have decided to focus on the link between urban proximity and
pollution.
In this last chapter, we investigate which Chinese counties suﬀer the most from pollution.
To do this, we empirically study the location choices of polluting ﬁrms within Hebei province.
Our estimation results suggest that being close to a prefecture-level city signiﬁcantly increases
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the probability of attracting polluting ﬁrms. Interestingly, this eﬀect arises both from a “pure
urban market eﬀect” and from the deliberate intention on the part of polluting ﬁrms to avoid
more stringent urban environmental regulations. Thus, if urban proximity may have positive
impact on the economic performance in nearby rural places, its impact on rural development
and quality of life is much more uncertain.
The general conclusion draws on the diﬀerent analyses carried out in the thesis and asks
whether, or under which circumstances, relying on cities to enhance rural development could
be an eﬀective strategy (Chapter 7).
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2.1 Introduction
Investigating whether urban areas aﬀect rural development ﬁrst requires to clearly deﬁning
what we mean by “urban” and “rural” areas. This task is not straightforward in the case of
China where the concept of urban areas has evolved over the reform era as a result of three
administrative measures: “turning prefectures into cities”, “turning counties into cities” and
“turning cities and counties into urban districts” (Chung and Lam, 2004).
First, by “turning prefectures into cities”, the central government has signiﬁcantly aﬀected
the administrative boundaries of cities. In the pre-reform era, “cities” corresponded to built-
up areas with high population density and relatively developed industries (functional concept
of cities or “city proper” concept). In the reform era, in an attempt to empower cities, the
government has allowed them to place rural counties under their administrative jurisdiction.
Thus, the concept of cities has progressively changed from a functional to an administrative
concept. Nowadays, there is a mismatch between the current designation of cities, which refers
to their entire administrative area, and the functional concept of cities, which includes only the
city proper (namely the urban administrative area).
Second, in the reform era the central government has weakened the criteria for designating
a settlement as urban by implementing additional administrative measures (“turning counties
into cities” and “turning cities and counties into urban districts”). As a result, the number
of cities has increased, but these newly created cities remain in large part genuinely rural.
Moreover, the urban area of large cities has grown and is increasingly composed of large areas
with rural economic structures and landscapes. Thus, the Urban Administrative Area of cities
is increasingly composed of genuinely rural areas and therefore, corresponds less accurately to
the “city proper” concept than at the beginning of the economic reforms.
The present chapter has four main objectives, each corresponding to the successive sub-
sections of the chapter. The ﬁrst objective is to present the complex administrative structure
of China and to understand the hierarchical relationships between the diﬀerent administrative
levels (Section 2.2). Second, we will attempt to make a clear distinction between the adminis-
trative and functional concepts of cities (Section 2.3). Third, we will discuss how the weakening
of the criteria for designating a settlement as urban has progressively eroded the relevancy of
the urban administrative area of cities and thus, of city-level data (Section 2.4). Finally, in the
light of the previously raised issues, we will discuss the relevant scale of analysis to investigate
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whether urban areas aﬀect rural development in China (Section 2.5).
2.2 Current administrative divisions structure
2.2.1 A hierarchical structure
As stated by Article 30 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1982), there are
three de jure levels of administrative divisions in China below the central government, which
are from top to bottom: (1) province, (2) county and (3) township levels. However, de facto
ﬁve levels of administrative divisions are commonly distinguished: (1) province, (2) prefecture,
(3) county, (4) township and (5) village levels.
In this administrative system, higher-level units have jurisdiction over the lower-level units
located within their administrative area. Oﬃcially, a given administrative unit can only directly
interact with the units immediately below and above it in the administrative hierarchy. For
example, a township-level unit cannot directly interact with the central government but must
deal with the county-level unit to which it belongs (Ma, 2005). In addition, the higher in the
hierarchy the administrative rank, the higher the political and administrative powers. In fact,
even if since the 1980s’ lower-level governments have been given substantial powers to develop
their local economies, the political power remains strongly hierarchically structured from top
to bottom as higher-level governments still play a very signiﬁcant role in appointing lower-level
governors in their jurisdictions (Chan, 2010). Moreover, higher administrative units have a
higher number of government oﬃces and higher-ranking oﬃcials. They are also allocated more
ﬁscal resources and public investment, and more easily acquire or convert land for housing
and industrial development. As a result, the level of economic development is signiﬁcantly
and positively correlated with the administrative rank (Ma, 2005). In this context, lower-
level administrative units have strong incentives to climb the administrative ladder, i.e. to be
upgraded to higher administrative level units (Chan et al., 2008).
2.2.2 Administrative divisions
Directly under the central government are provincial-level units. There are 33 divisions in-
cluding 22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, 4 municipalities and two special administrative
regions (Hongkong and Macao). Figure 2.1 below represents the provincial-level units in China
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(Hongkong and Macao are not represented).
Figure 2.1: Provincial-level divisions
Figure 2.2 represents the whole administrative hierarchical structure in China. As indicated,
provincial-level units, with the exception of municipalities, are in turn divided into prefectures1
and prefecture-level cities. Prefectures are themselves composed of counties2 and county-level
cities while prefecture-level cities are composed of counties, county-level cities and urban dis-
tricts. As prefecture-level cities, provincial-level cities are composed of both urban districts3
and counties. However, contrary to prefecture-level cities, there are no county-level cities under
the jurisdiction of provincial cities as the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China forbids
provincial cities from administering other cities. Finally, all county-level divisions are divided
1Includes autonomous prefectures and leagues.
2Includes autonomous counties as well as the banners and autonomous banners of Inner Mongolia.
3City-administered districts under provincial cities are in practice prefecture-level units (Ma, 2005).
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into three potential township-level divisions: urban subdistrict (jiedao), town (zhen) and town-
ship (xiang). Counties are only divided into towns and townships whereas county-level cities
and urban districts can be divided into urban subdistricts, towns and townships.
Appendix 2.A provides data on the number of administrative units at the prefecture, county
and township-level for China as a whole and by province in 2011. At the end of the year 2011,
in China there were:
• 332 prefecture-level divisions, of which 284 are prefecture-level cities
• 2,853 county-level divisions, of which 857 are urban districts, 369 are county-level cities
and 1,573 are counties
• 40,466 township-level divisions
2.2.3 Urban areas within the administrative structure
According to the National Bureau of Statistics, there are two oﬃcially designated urban units
in China: the city (shi) and the town (zhen)4. First, cities are found at three levels of the
administrative hierarchy: at the provincial-level, at the prefecture-level and at the county-level
(see Figure 2.2)5. The higher the administrative rank of the city, the larger the extent of its
administrative jurisdiction and the wider its sphere of inﬂuence (Fan, 1999). Second, the town
is a township-level unit under the jurisdiction of cities or counties. Therefore, cities are larger
in size and at a higher-level in the administrative hierarchy than towns. In practice, a town is
a small place in which most of the county’ non-agricultural activities are located. Among cities
and towns, cities are the main urban unit in China.
4It was in 1955 when for the ﬁrst time the State Council released the criteria to classify areas as urban
(Kojima, 1995). An area was then granted city status if: (1) it had a permanent population of more than 100,000
inhabitants or (2) if it had a population of more than 20,000 inhabitants and was the county-seat. Moreover,
every area with (1) more than 2,000 inhabitants and at least 50% of its population classiﬁed as non-agricultural
or (2) between 1,000 and 2,000 inhabitants and at least 75% of its population classiﬁed as non-agricultural, was
granted the town status. These criteria have been readjusted several times, ﬁrst in a more stringent way (in
1963) and later in a more permissive way (in 1984). Xu (2008) provides a very comprehensive description of the
criteria a community must meet to be granted the administrative statute of city or town (see Xu (2008) on pages
41-43).
5In practice there are two additional types of cities between provincial and prefecture-level cities, namely
deputy-provincial cities and provincial capitals. According to the de jure classiﬁcation, these cities are considered
as prefecture cities.
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2.3 Appearance of a city-centered system during the economic
reforms
Section 2.2.2 presents the current administrative divisions system, which diﬀers from that of
the pre-reform period. Indeed, while the economic reforms have not removed the hierarchical
administrative structure, they have led to a restructuring of the administrative units. The main
feature is the emergence of cities as new independent administrative units within the hierarchy, a
direct consequence of the“turning prefectures into cities”measure implemented at the beginning
of the 1980s6.
2.3.1 Turning prefectures into cities (di gai shi)
In the pre-reform era, cities did not constitute a proper administrative unit. At this period
of time, there were only the four following government levels: provinces, prefectures, counties
and townships. If a given prefecture was composed of one prefecture-level city and several rural
counties, there were then two governments in the same prefecture (the prefecture-level city,
which administered the urban areas, and the prefecture government, which administered the
rural counties). Thus, urban and rural areas were separately governed and duplicate (rural
and urban) governments existed at every ladder of the administrative hierarchy (Chung and
Lam, 2004). This system was then characterized by very few horizontal linkages among rural
and urban areas within the same prefecture. Many administrative roadblocks prevented urban-
rural interaction. For example, as highlighted by Ma (2005), it was not possible for a city to
directly interact with a nearby village. Instead, the city had to interact with the village’s county
government.
To facilitate urban-rural interactions and to empower cities, the state began implementing
the “turning prefectures into cities” measure in the early 1980s (Ma, 2005). Speciﬁcally, cities
were authorized to administer their neighboring counties and they became an independent ad-
ministrative unit in the administrative hierarchy. In other words, rural counties, which had
previously been under the jurisdiction of the provinces7, were placed under the jurisdiction of
the nearby prefecture or provincial-level city, and thus provincial and prefecture-level divisions
6This policy is also known as the “city administering counties” or as the “city-leading-county” system (Ma,
2005).
7Indeed, the prefecture does not represent a formal level in the administrative hierarchy.
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were restructured into provincial and prefecture-level cities. The“turning prefectures into cities”
policy has led to the appearance of city-centered regions, in which the central city has under
its jurisdiction several administered counties. It was expected that the reform would facilitate
urban-rural interactions as city leaders could now take decisions for the whole integrated ad-
ministrative area. By increasing the administrative and economic powers of central cities, as
well as their area of inﬂuence, the central government aimed at allowing large cities to enhance
regional economic development within their new administrative area8.
The “turning prefectures into cities” measure was implemented in three diﬀerent ways, ac-
cording to the situation prevailing before the reform. First, if there was already a prefecture-
level city in the prefecture, the prefecture-level city was simply merged with the prefecture. In
this case, the counties located in a given prefecture (and thus, formerly administered by the
province) were placed under the jurisdiction of the prefecture-level city. This method, which
was predominant in the ﬁrst years of the policy’s implementation, resulted in a signiﬁcant drop
in the number of prefectures, from 170 in 1982 to 66 in 1998. Consistently, the number of
prefecture-level cities increased and in 2000, prefecture-levels cities accounted for 78% of Chi-
nese prefecture-level entities (Chung and Lam, 2004). Second, if there were no prefecture-level
cities but rather county-level cities, the prefecture was abolished and one of the prefecture’s
county-level cities was upgraded to the rank of prefecture level-city. Naturally, the counties
which were located in the prefecture were then placed under the jurisdiction of the newly es-
tablished prefecture-level city. Third, in the cases where the prefecture was only composed of
counties, one of them was directly upgraded to the rank of prefecture-level city and the re-
maining counties of the prefecture were placed under the jurisdiction of the newly established
prefecture-level city9. Finally, some prefectures have not been turned into prefecture-level cities.
At this time, there are still 48 prefectures in China.
8If the policy was widespread implemented during the reform era, some counties were already administered
by large cities in the 1950s to provide the urban population stable supplies of foodstuﬀ.
9As stated in the general introduction of this thesis, the city-leading-county system has often led central cities
to sacriﬁce counties. To solve this problem, in 2005 the government suggested reorganizing the city-leading-
county administrative system into a province-leading-county administrative system (Li and Wu, 2012). In 2009,
the “Directive on Promoting the Province-Leading-County Fiscal Reform” was issued by the Fiscal Ministry in
order to give more power back to counties and county-level cities, especially in terms of taxation and ﬁscal
distribution, as well as regarding the elaboration of budgetary schemes and the reception of provincial subsidies.
This new administrative system, which is currently still under experimentation, is an attempt to separate the
ﬁscal system of counties from that of prefecture and provincial-level cities as counties would have to directly
report to the province and no longer to the city. In other words, in this new system counties and county-level
cities would be upgraded to the same administrative rank as prefecture-level cities.
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2.3.2 Consequence for the concept of cities: entire administrative area vs
urban administrative area
As shown in Figure 2.2, in the current administrative hierarchy, prefecture and provincial-
level cities not only have urban districts under their administrative jurisdiction but also rural
counties (as well as county-level cities in the case of prefecture-level cities). This is a direct
consequence of the reform era’s “turning prefectures into cities” measure, which has changed
the concept of cities from a functional concept (as cities before the reform era consisted of
built-up areas) to an administrative concept. As a result, it is of primary importance to make
a clear distinction between the “city” as an entire administrative area and the “city” as an
urban administrative area. Administratively speaking, provincial and prefecture cities refer to
every area administrated by the city, which includes both urban districts and counties (as well
as county-level cities in the case of prefecture-level cities). In practice, this corresponds to a
region and not to a city. Strictly speaking, the Urban Administrative Area (hereafter UAA) of
prefecture and provincial-level cities is only composed of their urban districts10 (Chan et al.,
2008). In turn, urban districts are composed of a built-up area (chengqu) and suburban area
(jiaoqu).
Confusion between the administrative jurisdiction of cities and their UAA abound, leading
to sometimes inaccurate claims. Thus, as Chan (2007) observed, in 2005 Time magazine issued
an article claiming that “Chongqing has become the largest city not only in China but in
the world”11. Although Chongqing accommodates the highest number of residents within its
administrative jurisdiction, strictly speaking Shanghai city remains the largest city in China.
In addition, when using the most accurate measure of urban population, Chongqing is only
the seventh largest city in China according to the 2000 Census (Chan, 2007). The author
provides numerous additional examples of confusion between a city’s administrative area and
a city’s UAA created by the media, scientiﬁc researchers and governmental and international
organizations, including the US Government’s trade website and the United Nations.
Figure 2.3 provides an illustration of the mismatch between“city as the entire administrative
10Prefecture and provincial-level cities are large cities and thus, their urban area is subdivided into urban
districts. Therefore, the UAA of such large cities is composed of all of the diﬀerent urban districts under the
jurisdiction of the city. On the contrary, county-level cities are smaller and thus, their urban area is not further
divided into urban districts. As a result, a given county-level city’s UAA is composed of its entire administrative
circumscription.
11Spencer Davidson “The World’s Largest City”, Time, April 18, 2005.
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area” and “city as UAA” in the case of a typical provincial or prefecture-level city. In this ﬁgure,
we assume that a given provincial or prefecture-level city administers three urban districts and
ﬁve counties12. Administratively speaking, the city corresponds to the whole area colored in
green and orange. However, strictly speaking, the city refers to its Urban Administrative Area
which only includes the three urban districts (orange part). In the rest of the dissertation,
by city we refer to the UAA of the city and not to the entire administrative area under its
jurisdiction.
Figure 2.3: Typical large city in China: entire vs urban administrative area
12To simplify, we assume that there is no county-level city under the jurisdiction of this city.
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To summarize, the following areas are administratively classiﬁed as urban in China:
• The UAA of cities (county-level divisions):
– the urban districts under the provincial cities
– the urban districts under the prefecture cities
– the entire administrative circumscription for county-level cities
• The designated towns (zhen) under the jurisdiction of counties (township-level divisions)
Most oﬃcial data on Chinese urban areas are published in the City Statistical Yearbooks,
which provide indicators based on the UAA of both provincial, prefecture and county-level cities
(Chan et al., 2008). Although urban districts are composed of a built-up area (chengqu) and of
a suburban area (jiaoqu), the City Statistical Yearbooks do not provide desegregated data for
these areas (Fan, 1999). Figure 2.4 below represents the Urban Administrative Areas of cities
and rural areas in China13. As presented in Appendix 2.A, there are 4 provincial cities (Beijing,
Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing), 284 prefecture cities and 369 county-level cities. In addition
to the UAA of the diﬀerent cities, counties and their equivalent (banners) constitute the rural
division at the county-level in China (colored in green in Figure 2.4). Counties and banners are
primarily rural areas and thus, at the county-level, it is considered that they are rural areas,
even if they have towns (zhen) under their administrative jurisdiction.
13Due to the diﬃculty in ﬁnding an accurate map with current administrative divisions, I have digitalized the
map presented according to the 2010 administrative divisions (which corresponds to the last release of county-
level statistics). Moreover, as statistics for most provincial and prefecture-level cities are given at the aggregated
level (i.e. for the whole urban districts under each city), I have aggregated the urban districts belonging to each
provincial or prefecture city together (i.e. belonging to the same UAA).
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2.4 Additional administrative conversions and relevance of city
data based on the UAA criteria
Strictly speaking, cities are made up of their UAA and not by their entire administrative juris-
diction. As explained in the previous section, the UAA of prefecture and provincial-level cities
is made by their urban districts while the UAA of county-level cities corresponds to their entire
administrative circumscription.
While the UAA may have ﬁt the “city proper” concept well at the dawn of the economic
transition, since then the UAA of cities has increasingly covered non-genuine urban areas for
the following two reasons. First, due to the “turning counties into cities”measure, most county-
level cities created during the 1980s-1990s are not genuinely urban. Second, due to the “turning
cities and counties into urban districts” measure, the UAA of prefecture and provincial-level
cities increasingly encompasses large areas with rural landscapes and economic structures.
As city-level data is provided by the City Statistical Yearbooks and as these yearbooks
release data based on the UAA criteria, the loss of relevance of the UAA raises problems for
obtaining accurate city-level data.
2.4.1 Turning counties into cities (xian gai shi)
In the pre-reform era, county-level cities were created by designating a developed and urban-
ized part of a county as city. In other words, only the most urbanized portion of a county
was upgraded to the rank of county-level city. However, such an administrative arrangement
generated conﬂicts as counties were strongly opposed to being deprived of their most urbanized
and developed territories. Moreover, this led to an increase in the number of county-level units
and thus, increased bureaucracy.
From 1983, to spur urbanization and to solve the previously mentioned problems, the state
promoted the growth of small cities by upgrading entire rural counties to the rank of county-
level cities. Turning entire counties into county-level cities was achieved through a loosening of
the criteria for the designation of cities14.
Oﬃcial criteria to turn counties into cities ﬁrst appeared in 1983 but were oﬃcially an-
nounced by the State Council in 1986 (Ma, 2005). Although more stringent requirements were
14This measure is also known as “converting entire counties to cities”.
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issued in 1993, the requirements remained very low and many counties were then eligible to
be turned into county-level cities. Speciﬁcally, to be granted county-level city status, a rural
county had to meet three weak requirements in terms of industrialization level, urbanization
level and ﬁscal strength. Moreover, contrary to the usual rule for obtaining city designation,
low population density counties had to meet lower requirements. The precise 1993 requirements
are given in Appendix 2.B.
In addition to these weak requirements, the city designation system suﬀers from two ad-
ditional problems. First, counties applied for city designation using inaccurate data regarding
their industrialization and urbanization levels. Speciﬁcally, as counties had strong incentives
to be upgraded to the rank of county-level city, data were largely inﬂated15 (Ma, 2005). Sec-
ond, not only the requirements were weak but also, in practice, many rural counties which did
not meet the requirements still managed to gain county-level city status. Indeed, in practice a
county’s economic performance proved to be the main determinant explaining how a county was
reclassiﬁed as a county-level city (Li, 2011). This “turning counties into cities” policy has then
enabled a very large number of growing rural counties to be entirely turned into county-level
cities, even if they remained fundamentally rural economies.
Due to the weak requirements and their poor enforcement, the number of county-level cities
surged over the 1980s and in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s. The number of county-level cities
increased from 144 in 1983 to 430 in 1999 (Ma, 2005). However, on the whole, the newly
created cities were quite diﬀerent from the cities already established prior to the 1980s. Thus,
the “turning counties into cities” measure has led to the emergence of a new type of area,
oﬃcially designated as a county-level city but which may include large areas whose landscape
and functions remain fundamentally rural (Ma, 2005). Because of the diﬃculties raised by this
policy in terms of measurement of the urban population, the “county-to-city upgrading” policy
was stopped in 199716. As turning counties into cities is the only way to create new county-level
cities in China, since then only prefecture-level cities have been created, especially by upgrading
15When counties are reclassiﬁed as county-level cities, they remain at the same ladder of the hierarchical
structure. However, the term “upgrading” is often used to highlight that reclassiﬁcation from a rural to an urban
area increases political and administrative powers, as well as ﬁscal autonomy, accessibility to resources, and ability
to attract investment (Fan, 1999). A list of such beneﬁts is given in Table 2 in Li (2011) and explains why rural
areas have strong incentives to be granted an urban designation.
16Similar to the idea that cities lead the development of counties was the idea that towns lead the development
of the countryside. Thus, in 1984 the State Council also relaxed the requirements of designating a community
as a town. This, associated with the rural industrialization of the countryside, resulted in a very large number
of conversions of townships (xiang) into towns (zhen) and the number of towns increased from 2,781 in 1983 to
about 9,000 in 1987 (Chan, 1994).
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a county-level city to the rank of prefecture-level city (Fan et al., 2009).
2.4.2 Turning cities and counties into urban districts (xian shi gai qu)
The last administrative measure implemented to empower cities in the reform era consists
in “turning county-level cities and counties into urban districts”17. While this administrative
measure has been implemented throughout the reform era, it has been increasingly used since
the mid-1990s, in particular to provide a solution to increased demand for land in large cities
(Chung and Lam, 2004).
This measure consists in administratively converting one or several counties (or county-
level cities) into urban districts. As the UAA of cities is composed of urban districts, this
administrative measure has led to an increase in the urban scale of cities. Note that this
measure has only increased the urban scale of prefecture and provincial-level cities, which have
urban districts under their jurisdiction, but not the urban scale of county-level cities, which do
not.
This administrative measure has been used in some large prefecture-level cities, leading to
the re-designation of both counties and county-level cities as urban districts. In provincial-
levels cities, this administrative measure has been largely used and has always consisted in
re-designating counties into urban districts. For example, while Beijing administered 9 counties
in 1982, it only administers 2 counties nowadays (Ma, 2005). A similar trend has been observed
in the three other municipalities, and administrative conversions have led to a huge increase in
the urban area of the municipality. Chongqing municipality constitutes an extreme example.
Due to the administrative conversion of several counties into urban districts, the UAA of the
municipality currently expands over more than 150km. Thus, Shuangqiao district is located
about 160 km away from other districts18 (Chung and Lam, 2004).
On the whole, this administrative measure has led to a signiﬁcant increase both in the
number of urban districts and in the urban area of cities. However, there have been no oﬃcial
requirements set to convert counties into urban districts. As a result, many counties have been
administratively re-designated as urban districts, even though they remain genuinely rural in
17This measure is also known as “annexation of suburban counties by cities” or as “abolishing county and
establishing [city-administered] districts”.
18Shuangqiao district no longer exists as it was merged with Dazu county in 2011 to form Dazu district.
Nevertheless, the same observation remains: Dazu district is located very far away from other urban districts of
the municipality, indicating that Chongqing’s UAA expands over a very large area.
54 Chapter 2. The Chinese Spatial System
terms of landscape and economic structure. Thus, similarly to the “turning counties into cities”
measure, the re-designation of counties into urban districts has led to inﬂated urbanization.
Finally, in practice, this measure has enabled cities to secure land resources for its expansion,
resulting in an increase in the rate of conversion of farmland and in the number of landless
farmers. This has led the government to reduce the number of conversions of counties into
suburban districts since the year 2004.
2.4.3 Consequence for the relevance of city-level data based on the UAA
criteria
Both the “turning counties into cities” and the “turning counties into urban districts” measures
have led to administratively converting rural counties into urban areas, even though some coun-
ties were anything but urban. First, the “turning counties into cities” has led to converting
entire rural counties into county-level cities by applying weak requirements. This administra-
tive arrangement has led to the creation of new county-level cities, which are not genuinely
urban areas, but which are administratively and statistically considered as entirely urban based
on the UAA-criteria. Second, the “turning counties into urban districts” has led to converting
counties (and cities) into urban districts of large cities, even if some of them remain genuinely
rural. This administrative arrangement has led to “artiﬁcially” increasing the UAA of large
cities, as a result of embracing rural areas.
Because of these administrative measures, while the UAA of a city very relevantly covered
the city proper in the pre-reform period, it has progressively lost relevancy over the reform-
period. Nowadays, the UAA is likely to over-bound cities because recent increases in UAA
reﬂect not only the urbanization process but also administrative arrangements (Chan, 1994).
The problem of over-bounded UAA has raised major problems, especially for measuring
the urban population and thus, for providing relevant data on urbanization in China. As
a result, since the 1990 Census new criteria have been introduced to measure the Chinese
urban population and to better deﬁne urban areas. Speciﬁcally, smaller settlements (residents’
committees and villagers’ committees, which are under township-level divisions) are used to
provide more accurate data on urban population. In this way, it is possible to exclude from
the city’s UAA areas which remain genuinely rural. Thus, according to the 2000 Census, the
following are considered as rural: (1) villagers’ committees in county-level cities and towns;
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(2) villagers’ committees in prefecture-level cities and above, if the district has an average
population density of less than 1,500 persons per sq.km. Moreover, a “contiguous built-up area”
criterion has also been added to consider as urban the nearby townships if the built-up area
to nearby urban centers is contiguous (see Chan and Hu (2003) for a detailed presentation of
the criteria of the 1990 and 2000 censuses). These new criteria rely more on urban physical
characteristics than on administrative boundaries and thus, more precisely diﬀerentiate between
urban and rural areas than the UAA (Chan, 2007). On the whole, researchers consider that
these criteria are reasonable for deﬁning urban areas since NBS-deﬁned urban areas ﬁt the city
proper concept quite well. In the rest of this dissertation, the urban areas deﬁned according to
the 2000 Census criteria are designated as “NBS-deﬁned urban areas”.
Comparing Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.5 provides an illustration of the diﬀerence between the
city’s UAA and the NBS-deﬁned urban areas within the UAA. According to the UAA, the
city’s urban area is composed of its urban districts (Figure 2.3). The criteria used in the 2000
Census are more restrictive and thus, urban districts may include several areas considered as
rural according to the NBS-deﬁned urban areas (Figure 2.5).
The new criteria implemented since the 1990 Census enable us to provide accurate data on
the urban population. However, most indicators at the city-level (such as GDP) provided by the
City Statistical Yearbooks are based on the likely “over-bounded” UAA-criteria (Chan, 2007).
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Figure 2.5: NBS-deﬁned urban area within urban districts
2.5 Unit of analysis in the present dissertation
As the Chinese spatial structure has been presented, we can now discuss the relevant scale of
analysis to empirically investigate whether urban areas stimulate rural economic development.
In our view, there are two interesting options: county-level and village-level analyses.
2.5.1 County-level analysis
A ﬁrst option to investigate whether urban areas enhance rural development is to test the eﬀect
of cities on counties by using county-level data. As shown in Figure 2.6, in this case urban areas
refer to cities’ UAA whereas rural areas correspond to counties.
Carrying out a county-level analysis is the most obvious option because this scale of analysis
is consistent with the scale of growth poles as speciﬁed in theory (Ke and Feser, 2010). That
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is why most empirical studies on urban spillover eﬀects on rural areas have been carried out at
the county level. In addition, carrying out a county-level analysis seems particularly relevant
given that inequality between counties accounts for most of rural inequality in China (Knight
and Song, 1993; Gustafsson and Li, 2002). Finally, this will enable us to beneﬁt from annual
data for quite a large part of the Chinese territory.
However, there are also several inherent drawbacks to county-level analyses. First, as raised
in the present chapter, the UAA tends to over-bound cities, which raises concerns about the
accuracy of city-level data. More importantly perhaps, using city-level data based on the UAA
can lead to over-estimation of the size of some cities. Indeed, although there is a diﬀerence
between the UAA and the NBS-deﬁned urban area for most cities, the diﬀerence is much larger
for some cities than for others. For example, as shown in Table 2.1, using population data based
on UAA leads to over-estimating the size of Chongqing by a much higher proportion than that
of Shanghai or Shenzhen. Second, as the UAA includes some NBS-deﬁned rural areas we are
not able to assess the eﬀect of urban areas on their closest rural areas with county-level data
(these rural areas are represented in dark green in Figure 2.5). Finally, one may also wonder
about the quality of oﬃcial Chinese data (Rawski, 2001).
Table 2.1: De Facto Population (in million) of Selected Large Cities in China (2000 Census)
UAA NBS-deﬁned urban area Diﬀerence†
Shanghai 14.35 13.46 1.07
Beijing 11.51 9.88 1.16
Chongqing 9.69 6.17 1.57
Guangzhou 8.52 7.55 1.13
Shenzhen 7.01 6.48 1.08
Note: De facto population includes temporary migrants.
† Diﬀerence calculated by dividing population within the
UAA by population within the NBS-deﬁned urban area.
Source: based on Chan (2007).
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2.5.2 Village-level analysis
Given the previously mentioned drawbacks that may tarnish county-level studies, it can be
interesting to carry-out a village-level analysis in addition to a county-level analysis. Indeed,
using micro-level data overcomes the main drawbacks inherent in county-level analysis as the
micro-level survey we will use follows the 2000 Census classiﬁcation of urban/rural areas19.
First, by using survey data we are thus able to consider as rural every village that belongs to a
city’s UAA but which genuinely remains rural (represented in dark green in Figure 2.5). This
is more relevant because it enables us to investigate the eﬀect of cities on their most nearby
villages. Second, as stated in Section 2.3.2, there are two urban units in China: cities (the main
urban entity) and towns. The NBS-deﬁned urban areas encompass towns within rural counties
whereas in county-level analysis, counties are entirely considered as rural (see Figure 2.6). In
other words, while using county-level data enables us to investigate whether cities enhance the
development level of counties, using village-level data enables us to asses the eﬀect of both
cities and towns on the rural economy. Investigating the impact of proximity to towns seems
particularly relevant. Indeed, rural non-agricultural activities as well as new technologies and
ideas are concentrated in towns; thus, towns are likely to play a very signiﬁcant role on nearby
rural areas, by reducing agricultural labor surplus and by modernizing the countryside (Lin,
2002).
On the whole, it seems that county-level and village-level analyses constitute interesting
and complementary scales of analysis to empirically investigate whether urban areas drive rural
development in China. Thus, I will provide both county-level and village-level analyses in
the present dissertation in order to provide the most thorough analysis possible. Speciﬁcally,
Chapters 4 and 6 provide county-level studies (cities correspond to their UAA) while Chapter
5 provide a micro-level analysis (urban areas correspond to NBS-deﬁned urban areas).
2.6 Conclusion
While the central government did not remove the hierarchical administrative structure during
the economic transition, it has implemented three main administrative measures to empower
cities and to spur urbanization.
19As described in Chapter 5, we use the 2000 rural survey of the Chinese Household Income Project.
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First, in the early 1980s, the central government authorized cities to administer counties.
This administrative measure, which led to an increase in the administrative jurisdiction of cities,
has had direct implications for the concept of cities. While in the pre-reform era cities refer
to built-up areas (functional concept of cities), nowadays cities have become an administrative
concept as they include urban districts (the UAA) as well as counties and lower-level cities. We
have highlighted in this chapter the necessity of clearly understanding the diﬀerence between
the city as an entire administrative area and the city as an urban administrative area. In the
rest of the dissertation, we will refer to cities as Urban Administrative Areas.
In addition, during the reform era the criteria to designate a settlement as urban were
weakened. First, this led to the conversion of entire rural counties into county-level cities
during the 1980s and the mid-1990s. However, counties have been upgraded to the rank of
county-level cities more as a consequence of a loosening in criteria to designate a settlement as
urban than because of a genuine urbanization of counties. Second, many counties and county-
level cities were converted into urban districts throughout the transition. As a result, the UAA
of prefecture-level and above cities has increased but the new urban districts remain in large
part rural entities. Thus, the UAA of prefecture-level and above cities has been changed from
a genuine urban area to a hybrid entity, including both strongly urbanized areas and portions
of rural areas. On the whole, the weakening of the criteria to classify entities as urban has
progressively eroded the relevancy of the UAA to cover the city proper. This is a serious issue
that must be kept in mind given that city-level data, which are provided by the City Statistical
Yearbooks, are based on the UAA criteria.
Figure 2.7 summarizes the impact of the three previously described administrative measures
on the number of administrative divisions. Consistently, the “turning prefecture into cities”
measure led both to an increase in the number of prefecture-level cities and to a decrease in the
number of prefectures in the two ﬁrst decades of the reforms. Moreover, the “turning counties
into cities”measure led to a sharp increase in the number of county-level cities until 1997, when
the policy ended. Since then, the number of county-level cities has declined because some of
them have been converted into urban districts. The “turning counties and cities into urban
districts” has also led to an increase in the number of urban districts since the reforms began.
Consistently, as counties were turned into county-level cities and urban districts, their number
decreased during the whole reform era. On the whole, most administrative changes occurred
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during the 1980s-1990s and despite the increase in the number of urban districts until 2004,
administrative divisions have remained essentially unchanged since 2000.
Figure 2.7: Administrative changes thorough the reform era
Source: Li and Wu (2012)
Finally, in light of the previously discussed issues, we have wondered about the relevant
scale of analysis to empirically assess urban inﬂuence on rural economic development. The
obvious answer is to carry out county-level studies as this approach is directly derived from the
theory and as it is the most widely used scale in empirical works on urban spillover eﬀects on
rural areas. However, we believe that it is interesting to complement county-level studies with
a micro-level analysis to overcome some drawbacks inherent to county-level analyses carried
out in the Chinese context. The present dissertation will thus provide both county-level and
micro-level studies to empirically assess the eﬀects of urban areas on the hinterland in China.
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3.1 Introduction
Since the beginning of China’s economic reforms, more than 500 million people have got out
of poverty (World Bank, 2009). However, as stated in the general introduction of this thesis,
many rural people remain poor and the fact that remote rural areas suﬀer the most from poverty
(Jalan and Ravallion, 2002; Glauben et al., 2012) is a striking one. Studies on other developing
countries (Bird and Shepherd, 2003) and on the United States (Partridge and Rickman, 2008;
Kilkenny, 2010) also highlight that poverty increases with remoteness from urban centers. As
noted by Wu and Gopinath (2008), as a result, there are signiﬁcant spatial disparities not only
between urban and rural areas but also within rural areas. Moreover, according to the authors,
remoteness from urban centers is the primary cause of spatial disparities across US counties.
One primary explanation for such a phenomenon may be that, contrary to rural areas
surrounding cities, remote areas do not enjoy agglomeration externalities and urban spread
eﬀects (Partridge and Rickman, 2008).
As emphasized by the New Economic Geography (NEG), ﬁrms tend to concentrate in desti-
nations with good market and supplier access in order to save on transport costs. That is why
rural areas close to cities are much more attractive destinations for proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms than
remote areas (pecuniary externalities). Moreover, ﬁrms are also more likely to set up in areas
close to cities where they can also beneﬁt from production externalities (Wu and Gopinath,
2008). For example, producers close to large and diversiﬁed urban areas can more easily access
a wide range of complementary services, such as maintenance. Thus, rural ﬁrms close to cities
can specialize their production, leading to productivity gains (through learning-by-doing) and
to a reduction in costs (as workers do not have to switch tasks) (Duranton and Puga, 2004).
Firms close to cities can also beneﬁt from knowledge spillovers and may more easily access
information about demand conditions, thus increasing their productivity level.
As pecuniary and production externalities decrease with distance from the urban center,
a higher distance to the urban center is expected to be associated with a lower level of rural
development. Distance to urban centers, for any given city size and city’s growth rate, would
thus have a negative impact on rural development; this is known as the “pure distance eﬀect”
(Pole`se and Shearmur, 2004) or as the “Urban Distance Discount” (Partridge et al., 2007a). It
is worth noting that in general larger urban centers provide higher orders of services (Central
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Place Theory) and higher market opportunities so that pecuniary and production externalities
are likely to be higher close to larger urban centers; this is known as “urban hierarchy eﬀects”.
In addition to the eﬀects of distance and city size, the growth pole theory has emphasized
that growth in the center also matters for development in the periphery (Perroux, 1950). For
example, due to inter-industry linkages, growth in the center can lead to an increase in the
demand for natural-resource-based commodities produced in the nearby periphery. In this case,
urban growth stimulates rural growth; this phenomenon is known as “spread eﬀects” (Myrdal,
1957) or “trickling-down eﬀects” (Hirschman, 1958)1. However, urban growth can also reduce
rural growth. For example, growing cities may lure scarce resources such as workers and capital
from nearby rural areas, resulting in “backwash eﬀects” (Myrdal, 1957). Similarly, while urban
growth will generate “trickling-down eﬀects” through inter-industry linkages when the center
and the periphery are complementary, urban growth will lead to “polarization eﬀects”when the
center and the periphery are not (Hirschman, 1958)2.
Given the existence of agglomeration externalities and urban spillover eﬀects, understanding
rural development requires taking into account surrounding urban areas (Barkley et al., 1996;
Partridge et al., 2007a; Kilkenny, 2010).
The present chapter provides an overview of the literature on urban eﬀects on the hinterland.
Following this introduction, in Section 3.2 we highlight the general mechanisms mentioned in the
literature to explain how cities can aﬀect the level of economic development in the periphery. In
Section 3.3, we will review the empirical results obtained in the literature on urban eﬀects on the
hinterland. As most studies have focused on developed countries, in Section 3.4 we will provide
a critical analysis of the existing framework to assess the applicability of Western theories in the
Chinese context. We will also present the few empirical studies on urban eﬀects in China and
investigate the relevant measure of urban inﬂuence in the Chinese context. Finally, in Section
3.5, we will conclude by highlighting how this chapter enables us to guide the empirical analyses
carried out in the last three chapters of the thesis.
1The notions of spread and backwash eﬀects ﬁrst appeared in the international trade theory (Myrdal, 1957)
and have been subsequently used to describe how urban growth aﬀects growth in rural areas (Gaile, 1980).
2Usually urban growth generates both spread and backwash eﬀects on the hinterland so that spread and
backwash eﬀects usually refer to the net eﬀects of urban growth on the periphery.
72 Chapter 3. Literature Review
3.2 How can cities aﬀect the economic performance of the hin-
terland?
Studies on urban eﬀects on the hinterland have overwhelmingly focused on the eﬀect of cities
on rural employment and rural population. As Renkow (2003) underlines, given the decline
of traditional enterprises in rural areas, it is of primary importance to understand the deter-
minants of rural employment, which is the key to revitalizing the rural economy. Moreover,
rural population (employment) growth results from household location choices (ﬁrm location
decisions) and thus, is an indicator of the relative well-being (proﬁt) obtained in a given area.
The present section discusses how urban proximity (including distance alone, city size and city
growth) can enhance rural employment (Section 3.2.1) and population (Section 3.2.2). Next,
we will describe how cities can, on the contrary, hinder rural development in nearby rural areas
(Section 3.2.3) and in remote areas (Section 3.2.4).
3.2.1 Positive impact on rural employment
Rural areas close to cities are likely to beneﬁt from a higher demand for rural labor. First, rural
workers beneﬁt from more job opportunities because they can commute to the nearby urban
area. Second, rural workers usually beneﬁt from a higher number of job opportunities directly
in their own rural community because: (i) of inter-industry linkages between cities and nearby
rural areas; (ii) pecuniary and production externalities attract new ﬁrms in rural areas close to
cities; and, (iii) as cities grow, urban ﬁrms that ﬂee high production costs in cities relocate to
rural areas close to cities.
3.2.1.1 Commuting opportunities
Thanks to the development of road infrastructures and transportation systems, it has become
possible to dissociate one’s place of work from one’s place of residence. Nowadays cities provide
numerous job opportunities to residents of neighboring rural places and a high number of them
hold jobs in the nearby city. For example, in North-Carolina as much as 20% of workers living in
rural counties commute every day to work in the adjacent metropolitan county (Renkow, 2003).
Obviously, residents of rural areas far way from cities do not beneﬁt from such job opportunities
as the distance is too large to be traveled daily.
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Given that cities provide jobs to a very signiﬁcant share of neighboring rural residents,
urban growth may spread to nearby rural economies by providing to their residents additional
job opportunities. This is expected to beneﬁt rural areas close to cities in two ways: by reducing
unemployment of current residents and by attracting new residents (in-migrants), resulting in
an increase in the county population. Such a phenomenon is far from being negligible. In the
U.S., it is estimated that when the number of available jobs increases in metropolitan counties,
as much as 50% of the new jobs are ﬁlled by in-commuters who reside in nearby rural places
(Renkow, 2003).
Khan et al. (2001) provide evidence on the geographical reach of this phenomenon in
the U.S.3 They estimate that a county’s economic growth not only provides new employment
opportunities to the residents of the own county but, because of commuting ﬂows, also provides
new jobs to residents of the adjacent county and to those two counties away. As a result,
economic expansion in a county raises employment opportunities and population (through in-
migration) within a three-county radius. Finally, it is worth noting that urban proximity, by
making commuting possible, enhances both rural labor demand and the level of wages earned
by rural residents. Indeed, commuting not only enables rural residents to beneﬁt from more
employment opportunities but also enables them to get access to better remunerated jobs, as
the level of wages is higher in urban areas than in rural areas (Hanson, 2000)4.
While rural workers close to cities may commute to nearby urban areas, they also usually
beneﬁt from a higher number of job opportunities directly in their own rural community.
3.2.1.2 Inter-industry linkages
Urban and rural economic activities are usually connected through inter-industry linkages. Rural
industries, producing primary products and natural-based-commodities, are often input suppli-
ers of urban industries (forward linkages). Thus, rural areas close to cities beneﬁt from higher
urban demand, which encourages the development of the local economy. Moreover, growth
in the center can lead to an increase in the demand for natural resource-based commodities
produced in the nearby periphery, and thus, to an increase in rural employment (Hugues and
3The authors do not exactly consider the eﬀect of economic growth in the city on population growth in rural
counties. Instead, they look at the eﬀect of economic growth in one county on population growth in nearby
counties.
4This issue will be empirically addressed in Chapter 5 of the thesis.
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Holland, 1994). On the other hand, even when remote areas are well-endowed with natural
resources, transport costs are so high that urban growth usually does not entail an increase in
demand in remote areas.
3.2.1.3 Productive advantages and ﬁrms’ location choices
There is extensive evidence that the number of ﬁrms locating in a given region (and thus demand
for labor) is an increasing function of urban proximity (Arauzo-Carod et al., 2010). One major
explanation is that production and pecuniary externalities are much higher close to cities, which
make rural areas close to cities much more attractive destinations for proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms,
compared with remote areas (Wu and Gopinath, 2008).
By setting up close to cities, ﬁrms can beneﬁt from productive advantages through a number
of mechanisms. First, for example, ﬁrms close to cities may more easily access the complemen-
tary services (such as maintenance) oﬀered in large and diversiﬁed urban areas. This may enable
ﬁrms to specialize their production without providing all required services. And, as known since
Adam Smith, increase in specialization leads to productivity gains. Second, rural areas close
to cities usually beneﬁt from a much more developed infrastructure and input supplier network
than remote ones. Thus, by locating in these areas, ﬁrms can share some indivisible goods
and facilities, such as physical infrastructure (Duranton and Puga, 2004; Tveteras and Battese,
2006). In this way, urban proximity enables ﬁrms to save on investments in indivisible inputs
that are necessary for production but usually not fully utilized. Diversiﬁed urban environments
also enhance the generation of knowledge (Jacobs, 1969) so that rural areas close to cities may
beneﬁt from diﬀusion of knowledge. Given that this requires face-to-face interaction, knowledge
diﬀusion from cities to neighboring rural areas is expected to be reinforced particularly through
commuting. In addition, by locating in rural areas close to cities, ﬁrms enjoy lower transport
costs to reach their suppliers and consumers, compared with ﬁrms in remote areas.
A number of studies have estimated the geographical reach of these productive advantages,
usually referred to as “agglomeration economies”5. Most works in urban economics ﬁnd that
5Agglomeration economies (or external economies) refers to the productive beneﬁts that ﬁrms obtain when
locating close to each other. Traditionally, a distinction is made between localization and urbanization economies.
Localization economies refers to the beneﬁts that a ﬁrm accrues when locating near other ﬁrms in the same
industry (Marshall, 1890). Urbanization economies refers to the beneﬁts that a ﬁrm accrues when locating near
ﬁrms in diﬀerent industries, typically in a large and diversiﬁed city (Jacobs, 1969). In other words, localization
economies stress the importance of intra-industrial externalities (and thus, of specialization) whereas urbanization
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agglomeration economies die out quickly with distance. For example, Baldwin et al. (2010)
estimate that the productivity level of a ﬁrm signiﬁcantly increases with the number of ﬁrms
in the same industry located within 5 km of the ﬁrm. On the contrary, ﬁrms located beyond 5
km of the ﬁrm do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect its productivity level. Rosenthal and Strange (2003)
reach a similar conclusion regarding the geographic scope of agglomeration economies.
However, it is well-known that the extent of spatial externalities strongly depends on the
type of externalities considered (Rosenthal and Strange, 2001). Typically, while localization
economies, and especially knowledge spillovers, occur in very limited areas (such as within a zip
code), urbanization economies occur at a wider level (such as within the city), whereas transport
costs (or NEG eﬀects) occur at an even broader level, such as within the region (Nakamura,
2012). As a result, and as pointed out by Mion (2004), studies which focus on localization
economies (Rosenthal and Strange, 2003; Baldwin et al., 2010) conclude that agglomeration
economies have a very limited geographic scope.
In the regional science literature, a number of studies emphasize that agglomeration economies
have an extended geographic scope. These studies highlight that even if agglomeration economies
decrease with distance, they extend beyond the city boundaries. As a result, ﬁrms in rural areas
close to cities beneﬁt from some agglomeration economies, contrary to ﬁrms in areas farther
away from urban centers, where all agglomeration eﬀects have disappeared. Deckle and Eaton
(1999) estimate that in Japan, agglomeration eﬀects in the manufacturing sector spread nation-
wide. Even in the case of ﬁnancial services, where agglomeration economies are more localized,
the authors ﬁnd that agglomeration economies spread beyond the prefecture boundaries. More
recently, Broersma and Oosterhaven (2009) also ﬁnd that the regional labor productivity is
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by job density in surrounding regions in The Netherlands. In addition,
Lopez-Bazo et al. (2004) estimate that even knowledge externalities can have an extended
geographic scope. Using a sample of European regions, the authors estimate that knowledge
spillovers do not entirely disappear until about 600 km, even if most spillovers occur within
the regions belonging to the same country. Finally, several papers speciﬁcally investigate the
geographic scope of NEG type externalities (or cost and demand linkages) and ﬁnd that such
economies highlight the importance of inter-industrial externalities (and thus, of diversiﬁcation). See Duranton
and Puga (2004) for a presentation of the theoretical micro-foundations of agglomeration economies and Rosenthal
and Strange (2004) for a review of the empirical literature. Puga (2010) oﬀers a more recent overview of this
issue. Finally, while localization and urbanization economies highlight production externalities, the New Economic
Geography literature stresses the importance of pecuniary externalities: a ﬁrm beneﬁts from the proximity to
suppliers and consumers because proximity leads to a reduction in transport costs.
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externalities extend over hundreds of kilometers (Mion, 2004; Hanson, 2005).
By setting up in rural areas close to cities, ﬁrms are thus likely to beneﬁt from pecuniary
and production externalities, which enables them to raise their productivity level. Looking at
the spatial patterns in wages and land rents provides evidence of these productive diﬀerences6
(Puga, 2010). For the U.S., Partridge et al. (2009) estimate that productive disadvantages are
the primary explanation for the lower wage levels and housing costs in remote rural counties.
In addition, remoteness would not only lead to productive disadvantages, but also to increasing
productive disadvantages over time (Partridge et al., 2010).
3.2.1.4 Relocation of urban ﬁrms
As cities grow, congestion costs appear; typically land prices and wages increase (Glaeser,
1998). Such congestion costs lead cost-sensitive industries to relocate to nearby rural areas,
where they beneﬁt from cheaper production costs while still retaining advantage of the urban
market access and of some external economies granted by urban proximity. Thus, as cities
grow, rural areas close to cities beneﬁt from progressive industrialization, which enhances rural
employment growth. It is worth noting that such spread eﬀects are expected to be at work only
in the surrounding areas of large urban centers. Indeed, in small urban areas, land and labor
costs are quite similar to production costs in nearby rural areas so that urban ﬁrms have no
interest in relocating there (Schmitt and Henry, 2000).
While rural areas close to cities are likely to beneﬁt from a higher demand for labor, they
are also likely to beneﬁt from a larger and more rapidly growing population.
3.2.2 Positive impact on rural population
Rural areas close to cities usually beneﬁt from a higher population growth rate than remote
areas for at least two reasons: (i) people are attracted to regions close to cities because they
oﬀer more job opportunities; (ii) there is a decentralization of urban population to nearby rural
areas.
6Indeed, ﬁrms in remote areas, which have to pay higher transport costs and which do not beneﬁt from
agglomeration economies, are expected to pay lower wages and land rents in order to compensate for the costs
of distance.
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As described in Section 3.2.1, rural areas close to cities beneﬁt from a higher and more
rapidly growing demand for rural labor. As a result, a number of migrants, especially from
remote areas, may be encouraged to set up in areas close to cities, leading to an increase in
population close to cities7. For example, Renkow (2003) estimates that employment growth in
metropolitan counties signiﬁcantly increases labor force (i.e. both in-migration and participation
rate) in nearby rural counties. Thus, rural counties close to urban centers might in fact “be net
recipients of migrants” (Jordan et al. 2011).
Rural areas close to cities also have a higher population growth rate because of the decen-
tralization of urban populations. For example, Barkley et al. (1996) highlight that in certain
U.S. states, urban families leave the urban core to relocate to suburban and nearby rural areas,
where they beneﬁt from lower housing costs and natural amenities, while still retaining access
to urban amenities and jobs. As indicated by Henry et al. (1997), the decentralization of urban
populations not only depends on urban growth but also on the characteristics of rural areas.
For example, as urban families decide to move to nearby rural areas to beneﬁt from a better
quality of life, rural areas oﬀering stronger amenities (e.g. green spaces) should beneﬁt from
larger spread eﬀects (Deller et al., 2001).
3.2.3 Negative eﬀects of cities on nearby rural areas
While cities can enhance rural growth and development in nearby rural areas, ﬁrms in nearby
rural areas can also suﬀer from the competition with urban ﬁrms. On the urban market, a
high number of ﬁrms are concentrated; as a result, urban ﬁrms, which face a high level of
competition, are usually particularly competitive. In this context, rural populations close to
cities may prefer buying goods and services from urban ﬁrms, which usually produce more
competitive and diversiﬁed products than rural ﬁrms. This would both threaten the viability of
rural ﬁrms and lead to a leakage of spending from rural to urban areas (Barkley et al., 1996).
While rural ﬁrms may suﬀer from competition close to cities, on the contrary, ﬁrms in remote
areas may beneﬁt from a “distance-protection” eﬀect (Pole`se and Shearmur, 2004). In this case,
distance to urban areas is likely to have a positive impact on rural development as it “protects”
rural ﬁrms from destructive urban competition.
7There is a debate in the literature on whether “jobs follow people” or “people follow jobs”. On the whole,
the results diﬀer from one study to another and there is support for both hypotheses. However, Hoogstra et al.
(2005), who perform a meta-analysis of Carlino-Mills’ studies, point out that there is a little more support in
favor of the “jobs follow people” hypothesis.
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As a consequence, rural areas close to cities may both beneﬁt and suﬀer from urban proxim-
ity. However, as we will see in more detail in Section 3.3, most empirical studies have estimated
that the positive eﬀects of urban proximity exceed its negative eﬀects (Barkley et al., 1996;
2006; Henry et al., 1997; Henry et al., 1999; Schmitt and Henry, 2000; Partridge et al., 2007a;
2007b; Ganning et al., forthcoming). In other words, the closer the urban areas, the higher
rural development and/or rural growth.
Two broad reasons can explain why rural areas remote from urban centers are less developed.
First, the greater the distance to urban areas, the lower the beneﬁts in terms of employment and
population, as highlighted in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. For example, a higher distance to urban
areas signiﬁcantly reduces commuting opportunities, agglomeration beneﬁts and inter-industry
linkages between urban and rural areas. Second, as we will explain in the following section, it
seems that urban backwash eﬀects are much more prevalent in remote areas, especially beyond
the distance that makes commuting impossible and/or exchange with the urban market too
costly (Partridge et al., 2007a).
3.2.4 Negative eﬀects of cities on remote rural areas
3.2.4.1 Luring capital
As previously noted, agglomeration economies induce ﬁrms to locate close to each other. Thus,
the appeal of productivity gains can induce rural capital holders to move to cities in order to
invest their capital where they will beneﬁt from productive advantages and from the growing
urban market (Barkley et al., 1996). This backwash eﬀect is expected to be stronger in remote
areas than in rural areas close to cities. Indeed, capital holders close to cities can beneﬁt from
some productive advantages and can easily exchange inputs and/or ﬁnal goods with the urban
market. In remote areas, where transport costs are very high so that exchange with the urban
market is non-existent, the incentive to relocate is much higher.
This issue is all the more problematic when local governments have to ﬁnance local public
goods, such as infrastructure. As ﬁrms often constitute a very large share of the local tax base,
the departure of capital holders leads to the departure of major tax payers (Renkow, 2003).
This is likely to result in both an increased burden for remaining residents and a lower provision
of local public goods.
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3.2.4.2 Luring workers
Not only may cities lure capital from remote areas but they may also lure workers for two
main reasons: cities oﬀer (i) consumption amenities and (ii) job opportunities. Contrary to
residents in areas close to cities, remote residents cannot access consumption amenities and job
opportunities without migrating, which may result in a desertiﬁcation problem in remote areas.
Cities not only oﬀer productive advantages but also consumption amenities (such as restau-
rants and theaters) that are only available in urban areas (Glaeser et al., 2001). Thus, while
urban productive advantages may lure rural capital, urban consumption amenities may lure
rural residents and workers. Once again, the backwash eﬀect is expected to be less severe close
to cities where residents can remain living in their rural community while accessing urban con-
sumption amenities. In areas close to cities, the appeal for urban amenities can lead in some
cases to “reverse commuting”8. In this case, the central city may lure residents from nearby
rural areas but not workers. On the contrary, in remote areas the only way for rural residents to
beneﬁt from urban consumption amenities is to migrate to a city, which induces both a decrease
in rural population and employment.
In addition, urban employment growth is likely to lure workers from remote areas by gen-
erating new employment opportunities (backwash eﬀect). As explained in Section 3.2.1, urban
employment growth generates new employment opportunities for nearby rural areas, since com-
muting is possible. On the contrary, when a rural commune is located too far away from the
city, commuting is not possible. In this case, rural workers will have to migrate to the city if
they want to beneﬁt from its economic expansion, thus leading to a decrease in rural popula-
tion. According to Khan et al. (2001), while a county’s growth increases population for counties
located within the daily maximum commuting distance (estimated to be a three county-radius),
it reduces population in counties located too far away (outside the three county-radius). In
other words, while urban growth produces spread eﬀects on nearby rural areas, it generates
backwash eﬀects once the maximum daily commuting distance has been reached. Similarly,
Pole`se and Shearmur (2006) highlight that in Canada, out-migration from peripheral regions
increases during periods of national economic expansion.
8Reverse commuters refer to people who reside in the central city but who work in the suburbs or in nearby
rural areas. As shown by Glaeser et al. (2001), the number of reverse commuters increased by 4.7% per year
from 1980 to 1990 in the U.S., providing evidence of the increasing role played by urban amenities on the location
choices of households.
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According to Pole`se and Shearmur (2006), in Canada, and more generally in countries
characterized by a core-periphery structure and having completed their demographic transition9,
“peripheral regions are destined to decline” (i.e. to lose jobs and population). Indeed, while
employment in the traditional resource sector is decreasing10, other industries do not locate
to peripheral areas because of the continued impact of distance on ﬁrms’ location choices and
because the “intrusive rentier syndrome” may discourage the emergence of new sectors11. In
other words, peripheral regions are suﬀering from a decline in the traditional resource sector
but are not managing to diversify in other industries, leading to a decline in employment, which,
in turn, leads workers to move to central regions with higher employment opportunities.
As a consequence, the propensity for workers to migrate is usually much higher in remote
areas. For example, in the United States, individuals in remote non-metropolitan areas are
two to three times more likely to migrate than those in non-metropolitan areas close to urban
centers (Jordan et al., 2011). Over the last 50 years, remote communities have thus been slowly
declining and many of them have even disappeared. As Kilkenny (2010) points out, nowadays
in the U.S., remote areas have become both smaller and more dispersed geographically.
The higher emigration rate in remote areas is likely to be particularly harmful for their
economic development (Kilkenny, 2010). Indeed, out-migration leads to a reduction in the
local tax base, which increases the ﬁscal burden of the remaining individuals and can reduce the
provisions for local public goods. Moreover, as is well-known, migration is selective (Greenwood,
1997). The departure of the most educated and skilled workers is likely to reduce productivity
and innovation and thus, long-term economic growth in remote areas. Finally, out-migration
further reduces the size of the local market and thus, makes it even more diﬃcult to attract
new industries to remote rural areas.
9In countries that have completed their demographic transition, natural growth rates are close to zero. As a
result, the growth (decline) of the local population is almost entirely determined by net out-migration.
10Technological change and new production methods have led the primary sector to increasingly concentrate
in urban areas. In addition, and more importantly, the availability of natural resources has decreased and thus,
the exploitation of a number of natural resources is no longer proﬁtable.
11This syndrome, which was ﬁrst described in Pole`se and Shearmur (2002), refers to a Dutch disease phe-
nomenon at the regional level. Speciﬁcally, when resource-based industries are highly capital intensive, the local
economy is usually dominated by a handful of companies. As these industries are highly capitalized, labor costs
are only a very small component of total costs so that industries are able to pay high wages to their laborers.
However, high wages paid by large companies make it diﬃcult for smaller businesses to start up and discourage
them from investing in workers. This discourages the emergence of sectors other than natural resource-based
industry sectors.
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3.2.5 Heterogeneity of urban eﬀects
Urban eﬀects on nearby rural areas are likely to be heterogeneous. For example, in the U.S.
during the 1980s, while 25% of non-metropolitan counties adjacent to a metropolitan area grew
faster than the national average, as much as 40% lost population (Barkley et al., 1996).
The literature has shown that urban eﬀects varied according to the characteristics of both
cities and rural communities. First, urban eﬀects are likely to vary according to a number
of characteristics of the rural communities, such as tax rates, amenities, size and industrial
composition of the rural community (Khan et al., 2001; Partridge et al., 2007a). For example,
rural areas providing a number of basic public services are much more attractive for households
and thus, are more likely to beneﬁt from the decentralization of urban population (Henry et
al., 1997). Second, urban eﬀects are likely to vary according to a number of characteristics
of a given city, such as city’ size, growth rate or industrial structure (Barkley et al., 1996).
For example, cities with a more developed and faster growing service sector are more likely
to generate positive eﬀects on nearby rural areas through the relocation of industry from the
downtown area to the close periphery.
Perhaps the most important issue when dealing with heterogeneity consists in investigating
whether or not diﬀerent cities (usually in terms of size) have diﬀerent impacts. Indeed, in
terms of urban-planning, it is of primary importance to understand whether the optimal policy
consists in promoting the development of a few huge cities or in focusing on the development
of a network of medium-sized cities scattered across the territory. While the New Economic
Geography only considers the role of the aggregate market potential eﬀects, Mark Partridge
has been pointing out for several years that NEG representation is “too blunt” for providing
relevant policy recommendations regarding the role of cities in rural development. According
to Partridge, the city type signiﬁcantly determines the magnitude (or even the sign) of urban
eﬀects on rural areas and thus, empirical observations would be more consistent with the Central
Place Theory (Christaller, 1933) than with NEG models. According to the Central Place
Theory (CPT), higher-order services are only available in higher-tier cities so that there would
be additional beneﬁts to being close to a large city. Thus, contrary to NEG models, which
consider the aggregate market potential, the CPT emphasizes that diﬀerent tiers within the
urban hierarchy generate various eﬀects. Considering elements from the CPT would thus enable
researchers to provide more nuanced policy recommendations by highlighting the role played
82 Chapter 3. Literature Review
by diﬀerent cities in rural development. We will further discuss this issue when presenting
empirical ﬁndings (Section 3.3) and when discussing the measure of urban proximity to use in
this dissertation (Section 3.4.3).
Summary
In this section, we have reviewed the mechanisms by which cities may enhance, or impede,
the economic development of the hinterland. There is no doubt that rural economic development
signiﬁcantly depends on urban proximity. Rural areas close to cities beneﬁt from a locational
advantage, which may lead them to beneﬁt from higher employment opportunities and popu-
lation arrivals. Even if they may suﬀer from some backwash eﬀects, overall spread eﬀects are
likely to prevail as we will see in the next section. On the contrary, the distant periphery has
very few assets and thus, struggles to develop economic activities. In addition, the diﬃculties
of remote areas are compounded by the fact that capital and their most eﬃcient workers are
induced to move to cities so that such areas are threatened by diversiﬁcation. As a consequence,
one major reason for the heterogeneous development of rural areas would be diﬀerences in urban
proximity.
3.3 Empirical evidence for developed countries
The previous section has presented the diﬀerent mechanisms by which urban proximity (in-
cluding proximity to cities, city’ size and city’ growth rate) can enhance, or on the contrary
reduce, employment and population in nearby rural areas. As cities may produce at the same
time positive and negative eﬀects on nearby rural areas, a number of empirical analyses have
estimated the net eﬀect of cities on rural areas.
On the whole, empirical studies have estimated that growing cities may produce signiﬁcant
net spread eﬀects on their closest rural neighbors12. For example, Barkley et al. (1996) ob-
serve that in the U.S., urban growth leads to a decentralization of the population in the central
city, leading in turn to an increase in population for rural areas located within 30-40 miles
12Hugues and Holland (1994) is a notable exception. Using input-output models, the authors ﬁnd that growth
in the core produces very few spread eﬀects on the periphery in the State of Washington. According to the
authors, as industries in the core have weak backward linkages to industries in the periphery, shocks in the major
industries in the core have very little impact on industries in the periphery.
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from the center13. Henry et al. (1997) provide additional evidence on urban spillover eﬀects in
the U.S. Interestingly, the authors highlight that rural areas where governments provide basic
public services are much more attractive for households and ﬁrms. More recently, Barkley et
al. (2006) have conﬁrmed that in the U.S., urban growth signiﬁcantly enhances both popula-
tion and employment growth (and to some extent growth of earnings per worker) in adjacent
non-metropolitan counties. While all the previously quoted studies were carried out for the
U.S., Henry et al. (1999) and Schmitt and Henry (2000) provide evidence for other developed
countries. Henry et al. (1999) estimate that urban growth generally enhances rural employment
and population growth in Denmark, France and in the U.S. Moreover, using data on six French
regions, Schmitt and Henry (2000) ﬁnd that urban employment growth strongly stimulates ru-
ral population growth. On the other hand, however, urban population growth appears to have
little eﬀect on rural employment growth.
One potential drawback of the previously mentioned studies is that they only consider the
impact of cities on their “closest” rural areas, assuming that cities have no eﬀect on rural
areas beyond a given distance. For example, Barkley et al. (1996), Henry et al. (1997),
Henry et al. (1999) and Schmitt and Henry (2000) have focused on the eﬀect of urban areas
on rural communes located within the commuting distance. Moreover, Barkley et al. (2006)
have investigated the impact of metropolitan counties on non-metropolitan counties sharing
a common border. Interestingly, some recent studies have estimated the geographic scope
of urban spillover eﬀects without a priori limiting urban eﬀects to the commuting distance.
Thus, using nationwide data on Canada, Partridge et al. (2007a) estimate that cities produce
signiﬁcant eﬀects on rural areas over several hundreds of kilometers, i.e., well beyond what is
generally assumed. Speciﬁcally, while urban spread eﬀects dominate over about 175 km, urban
growth would generate backwash eﬀects on rural communities located beyond 175 km from the
urban center. Similarly, using nationwide data on the U.S., Ganning et al. (forthcoming) have
estimated that large urban centers may produce spread eﬀects over about 140 miles.
In addition, several studies have emphasized that urban eﬀects are heterogeneous according
13However, the authors show that urban spread eﬀects disappear quickly over space as urban growth has no
eﬀect, or even negative eﬀects, on population in rural areas located beyond 30-40 miles from the urban center.
However, as noted by the authors, this probably arises from the fact that they use a sample of counties that
contains relatively small cities. As a result, few diseconomies of scale (in terms of housing costs, input costs,
criminality) are likely to occur in their sample and thus, the relocation of the urban population to nearby rural
areas is likely to be limited.
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to city size. Partridge et al. (2007a) have provided a very comprehensive study on urban eﬀects
by disentangling the eﬀects of (i) distance from urban areas, (ii) city size and, (iii) urban growth.
According to them, both distance to city, city size and city growth rate matter for rural areas.
Indeed, they estimate that greater distance to the nearest urban center and to mega-urban
centers (over 500,000 inhabitants) signiﬁcantly reduces rural population growth14. Moreover,
urban population growth would produce signiﬁcant spread eﬀects on rural population growth.
Similar results can be found in Partridge et al. (2007b). Finally, Ganning et al. (forthcoming)
show that larger cities not only produce higher spread eﬀects, but also that the spread eﬀects
they generate extend over a broader distance.
Finally, we may wonder whether the appearance of new communication technologies and the
decline in transport costs have reduced the disadvantages of remoteness over time. However,
recent empirical works have estimated that distance still signiﬁcantly determines ﬁrm location.
Thus, in spite of the appearance of new communication technologies and the decline in transport
costs, very few industries are locating to peripheral regions. For example, Pole`se and Shearmur
(2004) have shown that location patterns of diﬀerent industrial sectors in Canada remained
heavily sensitive to both distance to metropolitan areas and city size between 1971 and 1996.
Moreover, the location pattern of some industrial sectors, especially the service sector, became
even more sensitive to distance and urban hierarchy eﬀects over the period. According to
the authors, while recent technological change has reduced transport costs, the production
process of most activities still heavily depends on the characteristics of locations. For example,
producing knowledge-based service activities requires locating in areas with a large pool of
educated workers. Similarly, Partridge et al. (2008) show that while proximity to higher-tiered
urban centers and market potential signiﬁcantly stimulated rural growth over the period 1950-
2000, the eﬀect has become larger since the 1970s. According to the authors, the increasing
cost of remoteness may arise from the fact that higher-end services, which are only available
in large urban centers, are increasingly important for production, leading ﬁrms to more heavily
agglomerate close to cities. Moreover, innovative technologies are almost exclusively available
in large urban centers, which makes remote counties increasingly disadvantaged. A similar
observation is made by Barkley et al. (1996), who point out that new productions (such as
14The authors also ﬁnd that the negative eﬀect of distance on rural population growth diminishes when one
moves further away from the urban area.
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business services) and new production methods (such as vertical disintegration or just-in-time
inventory replacement) have led ﬁrms to increasingly set up in areas with a good supplier and
market access. According to Kilkenny (2010), remote areas also remain disadvantaged because,
in spite of the decline in transport costs, the use of transport has increased and commodities
are increasingly carried by high-cost transport (such as truck transport) instead of low-cost
transport (such as railway). In addition, while transport costs of goods have declined, the cost
of moving people remains high.
3.4 Urban proximity and rural development in China
The present section begins by discussing whether the transmission channels previously presented
may be relevant to understand urban eﬀects on the hinterland in China. After that, we will
present the few empirical studies investigating whether cities aﬀect rural development in China.
This will help us to discuss how to measure urban proximity in the Chinese context.
3.4.1 Relevancy of the analytical framework in the Chinese context
Section 3.2 has presented the transmission channels by which cities may aﬀect the hinterland.
As most studies have been carried out in the context of developed countries, and especially
of North America, it is necessary to discuss whether or not these transmission channels seem
relevant in the Chinese context. To our knowledge, there is no study which explicitly discusses
whether or not Western theories on urban eﬀects are relevant in the Chinese context.
3.4.1.1 Urban proximity and rural employment
Studies on urban eﬀects in developed countries have emphasized that rural areas close to cities
are likely to beneﬁt from a higher demand for rural labor. As explained in Section 3.2.1, this
can be due to several mechanisms: (i) commuting, (ii) inter-industry linkages, (iii) pecuniary
and production externalities and, (iv) relocation of urban ﬁrms to rural areas close to cities.
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In our view, all four of these mechanisms may also be at work in China. First of all, one may
wonder whether rural workers in China, where transportation is much less developed, manage
to commute to nearby urban areas. Indeed, because of poor transportation, even rural workers
close to cities could be unable to access urban jobs without migrating (Partridge et al., 2007a).
However, as Xu (2001) highlights, commuting of rural workers to nearby urban areas is far from
being a marginal phenomenon in China. According to a nationwide survey, 42% of town workers
are composed of commuters. Moreover, commuting is even more signiﬁcant in Eastern China:
as much as 64% of town workers were commuters in the Yangtze River delta. According to
Xu, the very speciﬁc land tenure system15, the restricted access of migrants to urban beneﬁts16
and the improvements in transportation explain the high number of commuters from rural to
nearby urban areas in China. Thus, it appears that rural workers close to cities manage to get
access to urban jobs, contrary to remote workers who have no choice but to migrate to work in
urban areas.
In addition, in China rural workers usually also beneﬁt from a higher number of job oppor-
tunities directly in their own rural community, compared with remote workers. As in developed
countries, in China rural areas close to cities have a more developed industrial sector thanks to
inter-industry linkages, the presence of pecuniary and production externalities and the reloca-
tion of urban ﬁrms. First, the rural non-agricultural sector (Township and Village Enterprises)
has mainly developed close to cities because: (i) a large proportion of rural industries has been
engaged in subcontracting with urban ﬁrms and (ii) areas close to cities beneﬁt from location
advantages (Naughton, 2007). Second, an increasing number of urban ﬁrms have been relocat-
ing to nearby rural areas. Indeed, congestion costs have appeared in some large cities over the
last few years, leading cost-sensitive industries to relocate to the nearby periphery. Moreover,
as the service sector develops in urban China, industry is relocating to nearby smaller cities and
counties (Chan et al., 2008).
As a consequence, rural workers close to cities are very likely to beneﬁt from a much higher
15In China, households receive a quantity of land which is proportional to the number of members in the
household. Moreover, land remains collectively owned and is periodically reallocated among households in the
village, especially because of demographic changes. In this context, households with migrant workers run the
risk of being deprived of part of their land (de la Rupelle et al., 2010) and thus, rural workers usually prefer
commuting to migrating.
16Rural migrants in cities suﬀer from bad living conditions, are often separated from their family and are poorly
look upon by urban dwellers. For these reasons migration is “2nd best” work: workers only decide to migrate
when they have no possibilities to work locally or to commute (Zhao, 1999; Guang and Zheng, 2005).
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number of job opportunities, particularly in the non-agricultural sector, than remote workers.
In our opinion, cities are likely to play a crucial role on rural development by enhancing the
number of job opportunities given that labor surplus remains considerable in Chinese rural
areas17 (Golley and Meng, 2011).
3.4.1.2 Urban proximity and rural population
Studies on developed countries have emphasized that rural areas close to cities usually beneﬁt
from a positive population growth rate whereas remote areas are declining (Kilkenny, 2010).
One major explanation of such a phenomenon is that urban households increasingly relocate to
nearby rural areas, where housing costs are lower and where they can enjoy natural amenities,
while retaining access to urban consumption amenities.
Obviously, this transmission channel is not relevant in China, where population ﬂows are
still from rural to urban areas, as was the case for developed countries until the end of the
1960s and early 1970s (Saraceno, 1994). In China, the rural population is currently looking for
(better paid) jobs and for a higher standard of living in urban areas and there is no migration
ﬂow from urban to rural areas.
In spite of that, however, in China rural areas close to large cities may have a higher
population growth rate than remote rural areas. Indeed, as many migrants cannot aﬀord to
rent accommodation in cities, an increasing number of them is forced to settle in what is known
as “urban villages” (Henderson, 2010). Urban villages, which are located in rural areas close
to cities, are very similar to slums in other developing countries. Thus, while urban proximity
may increase population in areas close to cities in China, this cannot be considered as a spread
eﬀect but much more as a backwash eﬀect as it leads to the development of slums.
3.4.1.3 Negative eﬀects of cities on nearby rural areas
Studies on developed countries have emphasized that urban proximity may generate negative
eﬀects on nearby rural areas. Speciﬁcally, we explained that urban proximity could threaten
17The rising trend in real wages in urban areas could lead one to conclude that China has reached the Lewisian
turning point and is no longer a surplus labor economy (Zhang et al., 2011). However, because of the very speciﬁc
institutional context in China (hukou), the country is actually in a situation where a huge rural labor surplus
coexists with rising wages in rural areas (Knight et al., 2011).
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the viability of rural ﬁrms by increasing competition. However, empirical studies on developed
countries have estimated that on average, spread eﬀects prevail over backwash eﬀects.
In our opinion, cities may be more likely to generate negative impacts on nearby rural areas
in China because the country is at a lower stage of economic development. Indeed, as some
Chinese cities (especially county-level cities) have a very similar economic structure to rural
areas, they are very likely to compete with and thus, to lure resources from rural areas. As we
will see, Ke and Feser (2010) have estimated that in China, the least developed cities produce
net backwash eﬀects on nearby rural areas in the non-agricultural sector.
In addition, cities may generate additional negative eﬀects on rural development in China
because of the speciﬁc “city administering county” system. As described in Chapter 2 of this
dissertation, prefecture and provincial-level cities administer rural counties. While this admin-
istrative arrangement was implemented in order to facilitate urban-rural interactions, it has in
fact created opportunities for cities to exploit their administered rural counties. For example,
cities are used to paying depressed prices to obtain resources from their administered counties
(Ma, 2005). Moreover, while city leaders receive funds for the whole administrative area, they
often retain most of the funds for the city. This administrative arrangement has also enabled
cities to more easily requisition farmland, which has disastrous consequences for rural workers,
as already highlighted in the general introduction.
3.4.1.4 Negative eﬀects of cities on remote rural areas
Studies on developed countries have pointed out that urban backwash eﬀects are much more
prevalent in remote areas, especially beyond the distance that makes commuting impossible
and/or exchange with the urban market too costly (Partridge et al. 2007a). As previously
explained, remote rural areas may suﬀer in particular from the departure of their most eﬃcient
workers.
This channel is also very likely to be at work in China. Indeed, as stated in Section 3.4.1.1,
rural areas close to cities beneﬁt from a much more developed non-agricultural sector. Thus,
rural workers close to cities beneﬁt from a higher number of job opportunities and can access
more stable and income-generating activities18. By contrast, in remote areas, workers suﬀer
18Indeed, non-agricultural activities are on average signiﬁcantly more remunerated and generate more stable
income than agriculture.
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from underemployment and very few opportunities exist to generate income. As a result, remote
workers have no other solution but to migrate to cities (Knight and Song, 2003). Out-migration
from rural areas is a widespread phenomenon in China: over the last 10 years, out-migration
has led to the disappearance of about 900,000 villages across China19.
To summarize, studies on developed countries have highlighted a number of mechanisms by
which cities may aﬀect rural development. The majority of these mechanisms could also be at
work in the Chinese context. However, cities may generate additional negative eﬀects on nearby
rural areas in China, in particular because of the similarity between the economic structure of
some cities and counties and because of the “city administering county” system.
3.4.2 Empirical evidence on urban eﬀects on rural areas in China
A few recent studies have investigated whether cities enhance growth in nearby rural counties
in China (Ke, 2010; Ke and Fesert 2010; Chen and Partridge, 2011). One major ﬁnding of
these works is that urban eﬀects vary a great deal according to the city type. For example,
Ke and Fesert (2010) estimate that in Central China, non-agricultural growth in large cities
(prefecture and higher-level cities) enhance non-agricultural growth in nearby rural counties
whereas county-level cities produce backwash eﬀects on nearby counties. According to the
authors, because of their similar economic structure, county-level cities and rural counties are
competing. Thus, counties close to county-level cities suﬀer from backwash eﬀects because rural
non-agricultural activities relocate to the nearby growing urban center in order to beneﬁt from
agglomeration economies. On the contrary, counties close to large cities may beneﬁt from the
relocation of industries due to tertiarization and to the increase in factor prices. Similarly,
while Chen and Partridge (2011) ﬁnd that on the whole, cities signiﬁcantly increase GDP per
capita growth in nearby rural counties, the authors estimate that diﬀerent cities produce very
diﬀerent impacts. Speciﬁcally, while prefecture-level cities produce signiﬁcant spread eﬀects on
rural GDP growth, mega-cities produce backwash eﬀects. Combining the results from these two
studies, it appears that both cities at the bottom (county-level cities) and at the top (provincial
cities) of the hierarchy generate backwash eﬀects on nearby rural counties whereas prefecture-
level cities produce spread eﬀects on nearby rural areas.
19Information available on the website of the Embassy of France at: http://www.ambafrance-cn.org/900-000-
villages-disparus-en-dix-ans.html [as seen on 04.05.2013].
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In our opinion, if empirical studies on both developed countries and China have demonstrated
that urban eﬀects vary according to the city type, there is a stark contrast between these studies.
On the one hand, most studies on developed countries have demonstrated that the magnitude
of spread eﬀects varies according to city type. In other words, on the whole it seems that urban
proximity is almost always good for rural development in developed countries. By contrast,
studies on China have shown that the type of spillovers (spread vs backwash) varies with city
type. In other words, in developed countries some cities generate larger spread eﬀects than
others while on the contrary, in China, some cities produce spread eﬀects while other cities
generate backwash eﬀects on nearby rural places. As a result, it seems that urban spread
eﬀects are much less predominant in China than in developed countries. This is consistent with
Hirschman (1958), who assumes that at the ﬁrst stages of development, core areas may lure
resources, generating backwash eﬀects on peripheral areas. However, in the long-run, once cities
develop, they may generate spread eﬀects on peripheral areas.
Regarding the spatial reach of spillover eﬀects, both Ke (2010) and Ke and Feser (2010)
estimate that most urban spillover eﬀects occur within 100 km from the urban center. Thus,
the geographical reach of urban eﬀects is much more limited in China than that estimated
for the U.S., which is not surprising given diﬀerences in the development of communication
and transportation networks. Administrative and institutional constraints on the circulation of
goods, materials and people, as well as greater cultural diﬀerences, are also likely to reduce the
geographic scope of urban eﬀects in China.
3.4.3 Measuring urban proximity in China
3.4.3.1 Distance to city, city size and/or city growth rate
Previous studies have emphasized that distance to city, city type and/or city growth may sig-
niﬁcantly determine rural development. On the whole, there are two broad types of studies,
and thus two diﬀerent ways to measure urban inﬂuence on the hinterland, depending on the
framework the studies are based on.
A ﬁrst category of works is based on the growth pole theory. Following this theory, urban
inﬂuence is measured by the growth rate of nearby cities (see Ke (2010) and Ke and Feser (2010)
for China). Speciﬁcally, a spatial lag variable, measuring growth in nearby cities, is constructed
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to estimate whether this growth signiﬁcantly aﬀects the growth rate of rural counties. Urban
inﬂuence is then measured as:
UrbanProxi =
J∑
j=1
Growthj
DISTij
(3.1)
where i refers to the rural county and j to the city. DISTij is the number of kilometers
20 from
county i to city j and Growthj is the population or employment growth rate of city j. By
introducing this spatial lag variable in a growth function for rural counties, these studies intend
to estimate whether urban employment and population growth stimulate or slow employment
and population growth in rural areas.
A second category of works is based on the NEG and agglomeration economies theory. In
this case, urban inﬂuence is measured by the size of nearby cities, also referred to as “market
potential” (see Chen and Partridge (2011) for China). The most common way to test for
market potential eﬀects is to use the measure proposed by Harris (1954). Urban inﬂuence is
then measured as:
UrbanProxi =
J∑
j=1
Sizej
DISTij
(3.2)
where i refers to the rural county and j to the city. DISTij is the number of kilometers
from county i to city j and Sizej is the size of city j. With this approach, the market potential
variable does not intend to capture spread or backwash eﬀects but rather inter-industry linkages
and production and pecuniary externalities.
In the present dissertation, we will follow Chen and Partridge (2011) by constructing market
potential variables to measure how urban proximity aﬀects the level of agricultural eﬃciency
(Chapter 4), the level of non-agricultural wages (Chapter 5) and the location choices of pollut-
ing ﬁrms (Chapter 6)21. Indeed, as we will highlight in the next three chapters, agricultural
20Remoteness is a function of both physical distance, i.e. the number of kilometers, and frictional distance,
i.e. distance due to lack of infrastructure (Bird and Sheperd, 2003). As a result, the more relevant consists
in taking into account both the number of kilometers from urban centers and transport facilities. Luo (2004)
has proposed an indicator of “peripheral degree” to measure the eﬀective remoteness of Western provinces from
Coastal provinces, by adjusting physical distance by the level of infrastructure. Interestingly, Luo et al. (2014)
have used this indicator to assess the role of remoteness on regional economic growth in Western China and to
estimate the eﬀect of transportation infrastructure investments on regional and national growth. Unfortunately,
data on infrastructure is not available for rural counties.
21While in Chapter 4 we will exclusively use market potential variables, we will use additional indicators to
measure urban inﬂuence in Chapters 5 and 6 due to greater data availability (Chapter 5) or to test for transmission
channels (Chapters 5 and 6).
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eﬃciency, non-agricultural wages and the location choices of polluting ﬁrms are more likely to
be aﬀected by inter-industry linkages and production and pecuniary externalities than by urban
growth, which justiﬁes our choice for measuring urban proximity.
3.4.3.2 How to measure city size?
As shown in Equation 3.2, to measure urban inﬂuence we must use information on city size.
City size may alternatively be measured by the population or by the GDP of the city. In this
subsection, we explain why the increase in the “ﬂoating population” has raised concerns about
the accuracy of city population data provided in the City Statistical Yearbooks. Speciﬁcally,
the population of a number of cities may be seriously underestimated in the City Statistical
Yearbooks and thus, it seems much more relevant to use the city’s GDP to measure city size.
Since the 1980s, the household registration system has been liberalized (Naughton, 2007).
First, while it remains diﬃcult to obtain hukou in large cities, it has became quite easy to obtain
an urban hukou in towns and small cities. Second, for recently graduated students from good
colleges and for wealthy individuals, it is now quite easy to obtain an urban hukou. In spite of
this, however, for most rural migrants the liberalization of the hukou system has not made the
obtention of an urban hukou easier in practice. In fact, the main change which has occurred
since the 1990s is that it has become much easier for rural migrants to work in cities without
the local urban hukou.
Due to the household registration system, there are two diﬀerent kinds of migration in
China: “hukou migration” and “non-hukou migration”. Hukou migration refers to migrants who
have obtained the hukou of their destination community and thus, are oﬃcially registered as
residents in their destination community. As the liberalization of the hukou has not made the
obtention of the urban hukou much easier, hukou migration has remained relatively stable in the
last decades (Brandt et al., 2008). Non-hukou migration (or temporary or ﬂoating migration)
refers to migrants who are living in a given destination community without having acquired
the local hukou. In practice, most non-hukou migration is made up of rural migrants who work
and live in urban areas without an urban hukou. While the ﬂoating population was very low
before the 1990s due to the very stringent implementation of the household registration system,
it has signiﬁcantly increased since the late 1990s. According to Census data, it increased from
3.4. Urban proximity and rural development in China 93
11.44 million in 1982 to 29.73 million in 1990 and to 54 million in 1995. According to the 2000
Census, the ﬂoating population accounted for 153.19 million people, including 117.5 million in
cities, which accounts for 25.6% of the urban population (Xu, 2008)22. According to the most
recent estimates, as much as 31% of the urban population is composed of temporary migrants23.
The increase in non-hukou migration has led to a serious underestimation of city population.
The problem is particularly severe for cities in coastal provinces (especially in Guangdong, Fu-
jian, Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces), which receive a very high number of temporary migrants,
as well as in municipalities. For example, the ﬂoating population in Beijing and in Shenzhen is
estimated to account for about 36% and 75% of the city population respectively (Duan, 2011).
To tackle this problem, since 1982, censuses have provided a de facto measure of urban
population by including temporary migrants who have been living in a given city for at least
one year (1982; 1990 Censuses) or six months (2000 Census). However, the annual city-level
population data provided in the City Statistical Yearbooks still suﬀer from inconsistency. In-
deed, the City Statistical Yearbooks provide a de jure measure of urban population by only
accounting for permanent residents, i.e. those with local urban hukou. Thus, data from the
City Statistical Yearbooks may seriously underestimate the actual urban population as it only
includes some registered migrants (Chan et al., 2008). As a consequence, and following Chen
and Partridge (2011), we will use city GDP to construct our indicators of urban proximity in
this dissertation. Thus, urban inﬂuence will be measured as:
UrbanProxi =
J∑
j=1
GDPj
DISTij
(3.3)
where i refers to the rural county and j to the city. DISTij is the number of kilometers from
county i to city j and GDPj is the Gross Domestic Product of city j.
22The deﬁnition of non-hukou migrants used in the 2000 Census is less restrictive than the deﬁnition used in
the previous censuses which considered as temporary migrant every individual who had been living in a given
community more than one year without local hukou. The 2000 Census has reduced the minimum stay to six
months, which automatically increases the number of non-hukou migrants. In spite of this change in deﬁnition,
the 2000 Census data highlights that there has been a huge increase in temporary migration.
23Kam Wing Chan, “Path to Riches is Paved Through Cities”, China Daily, May 25, 2012.
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3.4.3.3 Taking into account city type
As already pointed out, the literature has emphasized that diﬀerent cities may produced diﬀerent
impacts on nearby rural areas. For Canada and the U.S., it has been shown that more populated
cities produce larger beneﬁts on nearby rural areas (Partridge et al., 2007a; Partridge et al.,
2009). Indeed, larger cities provide higher-order services and higher production and pecuniary
externalities. While studies on China have also highlighted that urban eﬀects vary according to
the type of city, the distinction is not based on city size but on city administrative rank (Ke,
2010; Ke and Fesert 2010; Chen and Partridge, 2011). As already explained in Chapter 2, there
are three de jure types of cities in China, which are from top to bottom: provincial, prefecture
and county-level cities.
We believe that it is indeed much more relevant to classify cities according to their admin-
istrative rank to study urban eﬀects on the hinterland in China. First, the administrative rank
of cities is well correlated to city size, political and economic powers, and economic develop-
ment level. Thus, distinguishing urban eﬀects according to city administrative rank makes it
possible to capture the fact that larger cities may generate higher production and pecuniary
externalities (Ma, 2005; Chan et al., 2008). Second, in terms of policy recommendation, it is
much more meaningful to compare the role of higher-ranked versus lower-ranked cities than
to compare the role of larger versus smaller cities. Indeed, the Chinese government has been
favoring higher-ranked cities for a long time24. Thus, in terms of urban-planning, it is crucial
to investigate whether favoring the development of a few high-ranked cities is better to enhance
rural development than focusing on the development of a network of low-ranked cities.
To empirically assess whether diﬀerent tiers in the urban hierarchy produce diﬀerent eﬀects,
one must create three diﬀerent market potential variables to separately estimate the eﬀect of
provincial, prefecture and county-level cities:
24Since 1978, Chinese urban policy has tried to control the size of large cities and to encourage the growth
of small cities. However, in spite of this, the Chinese government has continuously favored higher-ranked cities.
For example, higher-ranked cities beneﬁt from more ﬁscal resources and from more investment, which results
in much higher investment in roads than in lower-level cities. Higher-ranked cities also beneﬁt from favorable
policies in terms of FDI and land development (Chan et al., 2008). As a consequence, there is a contradiction
between the urban policy’s stated aim of encouraging the growth of smaller-ranked cities and the actual situation
as smaller-ranked cities suﬀer from policy disadvantages, which slow down their development (Chan and Zhao,
2002).
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UrbanProxProvinciali =
J∑
j=1
GDPj
DISTij
(3.4)
where i refers to the rural county and j to the provincial-level city.
UrbanProxPrefecturei =
J∑
j=1
GDPj
DISTij
(3.5)
where i refers to the rural county and j to the prefecture-level city.
UrbanProxCounty − leveli =
J∑
j=1
GDPj
DISTij
(3.6)
where i refers to the rural county and j to the county-level city.
3.4.3.4 The speciﬁc case of county-level cities
While county-level cities are oﬃcially designated as cities, a number of studies do not consider
them as de facto cities. For example, in their study on inequality in Zhejiang Province, Ye
and Wei (2005) have considered both county-level cities and rural counties as rural entities.
Similarly, to investigate the determinants of city growth, Zhu et al. (2012) have focused on
cities at prefecture level and above.
Studies on urban eﬀects on the hinterland also diﬀer in the way they consider county-level
cities. On the one hand, Chen and Partridge (2011) have estimated the eﬀects of prefecture
and higher-level cities on both rural counties and county-level cities. On the other hand, Ke
and Feser (2010) have estimated the eﬀects of both county-level and higher-level cities on rural
counties.
There are reasons to consider county-level cities both as cities and as rural entities. On
the one hand, as county-level cities are oﬃcially designated as cities, they beneﬁt from more
favorable policies, such as receiving more government revenue (Fan et al., 2009). For this reason,
it may be more relevant to consider county-level cities as cities. On the other hand, as explained
in Chapter 2, the “turning counties into cities” policy has led a number of jurisdictions to be
designated as county-level cities even if they remain fundamentally rural. Thus, it seems that on
the whole, county-level cities are very similar to counties in terms of economic growth, provision
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of public services, industrial employment and ratio of immigrants to total population (Fan et
al., 2009), which may lead one to consider them as de facto rural entities.
In our opinion, given that there are reasons to consider county-level cities as both cities and
as rural entities, the best option is the following: (i) to take into account the potential role of
county-level cities on rural counties, but (ii) to distinguish the eﬀects of county-level cities from
those of higher-level cities. Creating three diﬀerent market potential variables to separately
estimate the eﬀects of provincial, prefecture and county-level cities will enable us to do that.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the literature on the role of cities in rural development. In developed
countries, cities signiﬁcantly increase employment and population in nearby rural areas. Close to
cities, rural areas beneﬁt from signiﬁcant externalities and from urban spread eﬀects. However,
these beneﬁts attenuate with distance to the urban center. Moreover, spread eﬀects may turn
into backwash eﬀects beyond the distance that make commuting impossible and/or exchange
with the urban market too costly. As a result, in developed countries most empirical evidence
supports the view that urban proximity is good for rural development.
As most studies have been carried out in the context of developed countries, we have dis-
cussed the relevance of this framework in the Chinese context. In our opinion, most of the
mechanisms at work in developed countries may also be relevant in China. However, it appears
that cities may produce additional negative eﬀects on rural areas in China. Indeed, the country
is at a lower stage of development and thus, the least developed cities and rural areas may be
competing. Moreover, the “city administering counties” system has enabled cities to exploit
their administered rural counties.
A few recent studies have analyzed whether cities may enhance rural development in China
and have found more nuanced results than in the case of developed countries. Thus, while some
cities seem to produce spread eﬀects on nearby rural areas in China, other cities may produce
backwash eﬀects. In addition, we have wondered about the relevant measure of urban proximity
to empirically assess the eﬀect of cities on the hinterland in China.
This chapter was a necessary stage to go through before carrying out the empirical analyses
in this dissertation. Indeed, it has enabled us to learn about the existing works on urban eﬀects
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on the hinterland and thus will make it easier to understand the contributions of the following
three empirical analyses. In addition, it was necessary to think about the relevant measure of
urban inﬂuence in the Chinese context. As highlighted, it seems crucial both to assess whether
the diﬀerent tiers in the urban hierarchy produce diﬀerent eﬀects and to use information on city
GDP to measure city size.
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Chapter 4
Urban Proximity and
Agricultural Eﬃciency
This chapter is an adapted version of an article untitled“Does Urban Proximity Enhance Technical Eﬃciency?
Evidence from Chinese Agriculture”, accepted for publication in the Journal of Regional Science.
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4.1 Introduction
Agricultural productivity growth is a real challenge for China today. First, given the increase
in food demand and the growing shortage in arable land1, agricultural productivity growth is
the only solution to avoid importing large quantities of food. Second, although non-agricultural
activities represent a growing share of rural households’ income, agriculture remains a signiﬁ-
cant source of income for most of them. Then, to reduce rural poverty and inequalities between
rural and urban areas, there is a need to raise agricultural productivity (Liu and Zhuang, 2000).
Finally, because of intersectoral linkages, agricultural growth has a positive eﬀect on the devel-
opment of non-agricultural activities (Haggblade et al., 2002). Thus, agricultural productivity is
both important in terms of alimentary self-suﬃciency, poverty reduction and economic develop-
ment. That is why, many papers try to disentangle the determinants of agricultural productivity
in China. For instance, the eﬀect of agricultural reforms (Fan, 1991; Lin, 1992; Bru¨mmer et al.,
2006), infrastructures (Fan and Zhang, 2004), migration (Taylor et al., 2003) and environmental
degradations (Rozelle et al., 1997) have been investigated.
An interesting fact in China is that all the components of agricultural productivity have not
experienced the same evolution (Kalirajan et al., 1996; Mao and Koo, 1997; Yao and Liu, 1998;
Wu et al., 2001; Chen et al., 2008). Changes in total factor productivity can be broken down
into technical change and technical eﬃciency change2 (Coelli et al., 2005). In China, technical
change is the strength of agriculture as it contributes the most to total factor productivity (TFP)
growth. On the contrary, technical eﬃciency would be the weakness of Chinese agriculture as
it is both low and decreasing and, therefore, negatively contributing to TFP growth3. That is
why, we argue that agricultural eﬃciency is a fundamental outcome in analyzing urban spillover
eﬀects on the hinterland. Consistently, many papers study its determinants (Liu and Zhuang,
2000; Chen and Song, 2008; Chen et al., 2009; Monchuck et al., 2010).
1Between 2001 and 2008, although population increased by 4%, cultivated area fell by nearly 6.5%. Moreover,
before that, the arable land area in China was already far below the world average as it was only 0.11 hectare
per capita in 2000 (Tan et al., 2005)
2Technical eﬃciency measures the ability to produce the maximum output which can be produced given the
inputs and the technology. A producer is considered as technically ineﬃcient if its eﬀective production level is
lower than the maximum output it could produce. A more detailed deﬁnition will be given in Section 4.2.1.
3According to Tian and Wan (2000) agricultural eﬃciency is high in China and so there is little potential to
increase output by eﬃciency improvements. However, other studies consider that eﬃciency is not so high and
above all declining (Yao and Liu, 1998; Chen et al., 2008) so that there is room to further improve eﬃciency.
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Literature review
The literature provides very little evidence on whether or not cities enhance the agricultural
eﬃciency level of nearby rural areas. First, even if the agricultural economics literature has
extensively investigated the determinants of agricultural eﬃciency, very little attention has been
dedicated to the speciﬁc role of urban proximity. Second, even if the regional science literature
has extensively studied whether cities produce spillover eﬀects on rural counties, it has focused
on the non-agricultural sector or on the whole economy of counties. In addition, this literature
has overwhelmingly focused on the eﬀect of cities either on rural growth or on factor prices
(wages, land prices) and provides no evidence on the eﬀect of cities on rural eﬃciency. Finally,
the urban economics literature has provided some evidence on the eﬀect of agglomeration on
technical eﬃciency. However, existing studies do not explicitly test how cities aﬀect nearby
rural areas because they focus on the eﬀects of agglomeration within the city or the regional
boundaries.
Agricultural economics literature on technical eﬃciency
A few agricultural economics papers have provided some evidence on the role of cities on
agricultural eﬃciency. For the speciﬁc case of China, Yao and Liu (1998), Monchuk et al.,
(2010) and Zhou et al., (2011) ﬁnd that the higher the share of the rural population, the
lower the agricultural eﬃciency. Moreover, Wang et al., (1996) estimate that farmers living in
mountainous areas are less eﬃcient. However, these studies on agricultural eﬃciency in China
investigate all the determinants of ineﬃciency and thus, urban proximity only constitutes one
determinant among many others. In our opinion, the present chapter provides one of the most
comprehensive studies of urban eﬀects on rural eﬃciency, particularly by using a much more
precise measure of urban inﬂuence and by investigating whether urban eﬀects vary across cities
and regions.
Regional economics literature on urban spread and backwash eﬀects
A few recent studies have empirically assessed the role of Chinese cities on the non-agricultural
sector (Ke, 2010; Ke and Feser, 2010) or on the whole economy of rural counties (Chen and
Partridge, 2011). However, cities are likely to exert very diﬀerent eﬀects on counties, depending
on whether we consider a county’s agricultural or non-agricultural sector. According to Peng et
al. (1997), if urban growth often produces spread eﬀects on a county’s non-agricultural sector,
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it may produce backwash eﬀects on agriculture. For example, urban growth often fosters indus-
trialization in neighboring counties, i.e. stimulates non-agricultural growth (Naughton, 2007)
which, in turn, produces backwash eﬀects on a county’s agriculture. Indeed, industrialization
leads to the conversion of agricultural lands and thus, results both in a decrease in farm lands,
which reduces agricultural production capacities, and in a fragmentation of farm lands, which
increases the costs of production (Gardner, 1994). The regional science literature provides thus
very few information on the role of cities on the agricultural sector of counties.
In addition, regional science studies have overwhelmingly focused on the eﬀect of cities
either on rural growth or on factor prices (Barkley et al., 1996; 2006; Henry et al., 1997;
Schmitt and Henry, 2000; Partridge et al., 2007a; 2007b; 2009; Ganning et al., forthcoming). If
we acknowledge that these indicators are crucial, these studies do not provide evidence on the
impact of cities on the technical eﬃciency level of nearby rural areas, which is a key determinant
of long-term rural economic growth.
Regional and urban economics economics literature on the role of agglomeration on eﬃciency
A few papers have highlighted that market potential and/or agglomeration economies stim-
ulate technical eﬃciency4 (Beeson and Husted, 1989; Tveteras and Battese, 2006; Larue and
Latruﬀe, 2009; Otsuka et al., 2010; Lakner et al., 2011). However, in some cases the relationship
is very weak (Mitra and Sato, 2007) and diseconomies are likely to prevail after a certain level of
urbanization (Mitra, 1999). On the whole, the evidence on how agglomeration aﬀects technical
eﬃciency remains scarce, especially for China. In addition, existing studies do not explicitly test
how cities aﬀect nearby rural areas because these studies focus on the eﬀects of agglomeration
within the urban (Mitra, 1999), the regional (Tveteras and Battese, 2006; Larue and Latruﬀe,
2009; Lakner et al., 2011) or the State (Beeson and Husted, 1989; Mitra and Sato, 2007; Otsuka
et al., 2010) boundary5. Yet, understanding how urban areas aﬀect rural development requires
investigating the role of agglomeration economies on eﬃciency beyond the city’s boundary.
4Among these studies, Tveteras and Battese (2006), Larue and Latruﬀe (2009) and Lakner et al. (2011)
investigate agglomeration eﬀects on technical eﬃciency in agriculture.
5One partial exception is Larue and Latruﬀe (2009) who take into account the eﬀect of nearby sub-counties.
However, no attempt is made to assess the eﬀect of cities on nearby rural areas.
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Contributions of the chapter
We make two contributions to the literature. First, to our knowledge, the present chapter
provides the most comprehensive study on the eﬀect of cities on the agricultural eﬃciency of
counties in China. Speciﬁcally, we begin by a theoretical framework in which we disentangle
the diﬀerent channels by which urban proximity can aﬀect the agricultural eﬃciency of nearby
rural counties. After that, we empirically assess the net eﬀect of cities on rural eﬃciency by
using county-level data for the period of 2005-2009. We truly believe that our analysis sheds
some light on the role of cities on both the agriculture and technical eﬃciency of counties.
Second, to our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to highlight that urban eﬀects are considerably
heterogeneous across Chinese regions. Ke (2010) has already estimated that urban eﬀects on
rural counties were heterogeneous between Eastern and Western China. This chapter extents
the study of Ke (2010) by separating China into seven macro-regions, that diﬀer both in terms
of natural conditions and of economic development, and by allowing urban eﬀects to vary
across these regions. We estimate that while cities produce signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on nearby
counties in Northeastern, Northern and Eastern regions, their eﬀects are much less signiﬁcant
in the Central provinces and not signiﬁcant at all for the Southwestern and the Northwestern
regions.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 identiﬁes the main channels
by which urban proximity can aﬀect the agricultural eﬃciency of counties and highlights that
urban spillovers are likely to be heterogeneous both across regions and urban tiers. Section
4.3 describes the methodology and the data. Econometric results are analyzed in Section 4.4.
Section 4.5 concludes and discusses the implications of these ﬁndings in terms of urban and
regional planning.
4.2 Theoretical analysis: urban proximity and technical eﬃ-
ciency
This section is divided into four subsections. First, we brieﬂy deﬁne technical eﬃciency. Second,
we disentangle the channels by which cities can aﬀect eﬃciency in the hinterland. Finally, in
the third and fourth subsections, we explain why urban eﬀects are likely to vary across regions
and urban tiers.
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4.2.1 Technical eﬃciency
Producers often do not adopt the best practice methods of the application of technology, and as
a result, they do not realize the full potential of the technology (Coelli et al., 2005). Technical
ineﬃciency, then, refers to the gap between the eﬀective production level of a producer and
the maximum production level he could reach, given the existing technology and the inputs
used. There are three main causes of ineﬃciency: (1) producers lack incentives to eﬃciently use
the technology; (2) producers do not manage to eﬃciently use the existing technology (lack of
knowledge); (3) there is input excess. In Figure 4.1, the production frontier represents the max-
imum output that can be produced given the technology and the inputs. Graphically, producer
A is ineﬃcient as his production level lies below the existing production frontier. Technically,
producer A could increase his output without raising the quantity of inputs employed, simply
by adopting better practice methods, i.e. by reducing the level of technical ineﬃciency. Graph-
ically, this is represented by the shift from A (the producer is ineﬃcient) to B (the producer is
fully eﬃcient).
Figure 4.1: Output-oriented measure of technical eﬃciency
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4.2.2 How can urban proximity stimulate agricultural eﬃciency in nearby
rural areas?
Urban proximity is likely to work on the three causes of ineﬃciency: (1) producer incentives;
(2) producer knowledge; (3) inputs excess.
First of all, producers close to cities face a stimulating economic environment that raises
their incentives to eﬃciently use the entire technology. Major agricultural reforms have been
implemented in China since 1978. As they reward individual eﬀorts, they have led to important
productivity gains in agriculture (Fan, 1991; Lin, 1992). Yet, market access heavily determines
whether or not farmers can enjoy these opportunities. Thus, while remote farmers are forced
into self-consumption, farmers close to cities beneﬁt from signiﬁcant market outlets, which
encourages them to intensify labor eﬀorts (Benziger, 1996). Moreover, proximity to suppliers
and consumers reduces transport costs and thus, increases producers’ proﬁt opportunities, which
could encourage them to eﬃciently use the technology. In addition, farmers close to cities also
face a more competitive environment, due to the high number of eﬃcient ﬁrms on the urban
market, which may conduce to a reduction in X-ineﬃciency (Leibenstein, 1966). However, the
seizure of farmland, more likely to happen in rural areas close to urban centers, could also
discourage farmers in providing labor eﬀorts6. Since the beginning of the transition, peri-urban
areas have increasingly suﬀered from losses in arable land which are converted for urban uses.
For example, in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei provinces, urban areas rose by 71% between 1990
and 2000, and among the new areas converted for urban uses, 74% were farmlands. The lack of
respect for leases of farmland could lead farmers to progressively give up agriculture for more
secure activities and could discourage them to provide labor eﬀorts in the agricultural sector.
Secondly, urban proximity may aﬀect producers’ knowledge regarding existing technologies.
Indeed, producers close to cities can beneﬁt from the diﬀusion of urban knowledge which enables
them to better control existing technologies (Jacobs, 1969; Barkley et al., 1996).
Last, urban proximity is likely to enhance eﬃciency in surrounding rural areas by reducing
excess in diﬀerent inputs. First, rural areas close to cities usually beneﬁt from a much more
6As explained in the general introduction of the thesis, farmers have leases which give them the right to use
their land but the land ownership remains collective. Although the duration of the lease has been increased these
last years, reaching 50 years today, some farmers still suﬀer from relocation. Since land ownership is collective,
the local authorities decide what to do with the land although farmland are under lease. Thus, local authorities
are used to requisition farmland to dedicate them to non-agricultural uses which are more lucrative (Naughton,
2007). As non-agricultural uses are more numerous in areas next to cities, farmers have more probabilities to be
expropriated in rural areas close to cities.
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developed infrastructure and input suppliers network, as well as from an easier access to a wide
range of services, which facilitates the sharing of indivisible inputs and facilities (Tveteras and
Battese, 2006). As such, urban proximity enables producers to save on investments in indivisible
inputs that are necessary for production but usually not fully utilized (for example, by enabling
farmers to rent farm equipment). Second, urban proximity might enhance eﬃciency by reducing
labor surplus in agriculture. Despite a loosening of institutional constraints on labor mobility,
population movement remains very restricted in China (Chan and Buckingham, 2008). As a
result, labor surplus remains considerable (Golley and Meng, 2011) and its level heavily depends
on the extent of opportunities to work out of agriculture locally (Ke and Feser, 2010). As rural
areas close to cities beneﬁt from a more developed local non-agricultural sector (Knight and
Song, 2003), they might bear a lower labor surplus, resulting in a higher eﬃciency level in the
agricultural sector. All the transmission channels are summarized in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Urban proximity and agricultural eﬃciency: transmission channels
Transmission channels Eﬀect on eﬃciency
1. Aﬀects producers’ incentives
1.1. Increased proﬁt opportunities +
1.2. Toughen competition +
1.3. Uncertainty of land ownership -
2. Aﬀects producers’ knowledge of existing tech-
nologies
+
3. Reduces inputs excess
3.1. Sharing indivisible inputs and facilities +
3.2. Reduces surplus labor +
In addition to the aforementioned mechanisms, according to which urban proximity aﬀect
eﬃciency in the agricultural sector, urban proximity may also lead to huge eﬃciency gains
in the whole economy of rural counties. In China, there are still major distortions in rural
markets and there are two main sectors in rural areas: the agricultural sector, with a low level
of eﬃciency, and the non-agricultural sector, with a high level of eﬃciency (Zhang and Tan,
2007). In this context, cities may have generated considerable eﬃciency gains in nearby rural
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areas by fostering structural change of the rural economy. Indeed, thanks to their locational
advantage, rural areas surrounding cities have beneﬁted from a substantial shift of labor from
the lower eﬃcient agricultural sector to the more eﬃcient non-agricultural sector, leading to
huge eﬃciency gains (Zhang and Tan, 2007). On the contrary, in remote areas most workers
remain in the traditional agricultural sector, limiting eﬃciency gains. It is worth noting that
our empirical analysis will not capture this last transmission channel as we focus on the eﬀect
of urban proximity on agricultural eﬃciency.
4.2.3 Heterogeneous urban eﬀects across regions
Chinese provinces are traditionally grouped into three regions (Eastern, Central and Western)
according to their level of economic development. Eastern China is by far the most developed
and urbanized part of the country. In our view, cities might be more likely to enhance the
eﬃciency of nearby rural areas in Eastern than in Interior provinces.
First, the infrastructure network is much more developed in Eastern China, leading rural
counties to interact more with cities. A better connection between counties and cities should
result in stronger urban externalities (proﬁt opportunities, competition, uncertainty of land
ownership, knowledge diﬀusion, diversiﬁcation, and reduction in inputs excess) in Eastern China.
Second, urban proximity mainly leads to a higher demand for rural labor (and thus to a
lower labor surplus) in Eastern provinces. Indeed, as Eastern counties beneﬁt from location
advantages, rural industry concentrates much more in the vicinity of Eastern cities than in the
vicinity of other cities (Naughton, 2007). In addition, congestion costs have mostly appeared
in large Eastern cities over the last few years. Thus, the relocation of cost-sensitive industries
to nearby rural counties is primarily a phenomenon that occurs in Eastern China. Finally, as
the service sector develops, industry is relocating to nearby smaller cities and counties (Chan et
al., 2008). However, services are both more signiﬁcant and growing faster in the largest Coastal
cities, leading to more ﬁrm relocations to counties close to cities in Eastern China.
4.2.4 Heterogeneous urban eﬀects across urban tiers
Previous studies have emphasized that diﬀerent cities in the urban hierarchy produce various
spillover eﬀects on counties in China (Benziger, 1996; Ke, 2010; Ke and Feser, 2010; Chen and
Partridge, 2011). The eﬀect of cities on rural eﬃciency is also likely to vary according to their
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administrative rank.
On the one hand, rural producers close to higher-level (prefecture and provincial) cities
beneﬁt from higher proﬁt opportunities and face more competition. Services are also more
developed in large cities, enhancing the relocation of industrial ﬁrms to nearby counties. Overall,
counties close to larger cities may thus beneﬁt from higher agglomeration externalities, strongly
enhancing the overall eﬃciency level.
On the other hand, however, the largest Chinese cities, mainly provincial cities, could pro-
duce less beneﬁcial (or even detrimental) eﬀects on rural eﬃciency. First, provincial cities beneﬁt
from a higher population growth rate (see Appendix 4.A and Chan et al. (2008)). As a result,
urban sprawl, and thus farmland requisitioning, are more likely to happen in the vicinity of
provincial cities. Second, there are very high congestion costs in China’s largest cities (Fu and
Hong, 2011). If urban congestion can lead to the relocation of industries to nearby rural areas,
cities bearing very high congestion costs can entail congestion eﬀects in nearby rural areas,
thus lowering urban externalities. Speciﬁcally, urban congestion can reduce accessibility to the
urban market for nearby rural producers and thus, reduce their proﬁt perspectives. Congestion
in provincial cities can also increase commuting costs for nearby rural residents7, resulting in
lower job opportunities for rural workers than in the surroundings of smaller cities.
Finally, county-level cities are also likely to produce diﬀerent spillover eﬀects because, con-
trary to other cities, they have a very similar economic structure to counties given that they
still heavily depend upon agriculture (see Appendix 4.A). This could lead county-level cities to
compete with rural counties, setting back the development of the rural non-agricultural sector
(Ke and Feser, 2010) and thus deteriorating rural eﬃciency.
4.3 Methodology and data
While the previous section highlights the diﬀerent transmission channels by which cities can
enhance rural eﬃciency, the empirical investigation consists in estimating the net eﬀects of
cities on eﬃciency in nearby counties. While testing the transmission channels by which cities
can aﬀect the eﬃciency of counties is an important area that requires further research, it is well
beyond the scope of this chapter and would require additional data which is not available to us.
7Henderson (2002) points out that around the world, on average, commuting times increase by 80% when the
city size goes from 250,000 to 2.5 million inhabitants.
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Two broad types of methodologies exist to study technical eﬃciency: Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontiers. If both methods have their own merits, the stochastic
frontier method is usually considered as the best one to study agriculture8.
4.3.1 Stochastic production frontier
Unlike the standard production function, the stochastic production frontier relaxes the assump-
tion that all producers are fully eﬃcient. The stochastic production frontier model (Aigner et
al., 1977; Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977) takes the following form:
ln yit = β0 +
K∑
k=1
βk · lnxkit + εit (4.1)
The error term εit is composed of two parts:
εit = vit − uit (4.2)
where i refers to the county and t to the year. The dependant variable, yit, is the output which is
a function of a vector of K inputs (xkit) and of a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated
(βk). The error term εit is composed of two parts: a traditional symmetric error component (vit)
and an ineﬃciency term (uit). On the one hand, vit is assumed to be independent and identically
distributed and to follow a normal distribution centered at zero [N(0, σ2v)]. It is also assumed
to be independent of the ineﬃciency term. On the other hand, uit is a non-negative random
variable. This component reﬂects the lack of ability of the producer to reach the maximum
output it could produce (technical ineﬃciency). Indeed, the production frontier represents the
maximum output that can be produced given the inputs and the technology. Thus, if uit = 0,
county i is fully eﬃcient and its eﬀective level of production equals the maximum potential
output. However, if uit is positive, then, county i is technically ineﬃcient as its eﬀective level of
production is inferior to the maximum output it could produce. The technical eﬃciency score
of county i at year t is obtained as:
TEit = e(−uˆit) (4.3)
8The DEA method does not account for noise and shocks (such as climatic shocks) and considers them as
ineﬃciency (Coelli et al., 2005). The inherent stochastic nature of agriculture leads us to use the stochastic
production frontier model.
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Technical eﬃciency corresponds to the ratio of the eﬀective output of county i relative to the
output that would be produced by a fully eﬃcient county. Therefore, technical eﬃciency scores
take a value between zero and one.
4.3.2 Ineﬃciency eﬀects in a stochastic production frontier
In this study, we do not only seek to estimate the ineﬃciency component but are also interested
in explaining it. More speciﬁcally, we want to assess whether urban proximity aﬀects technical
eﬃciency. To do that, we estimate the model for ineﬃciency eﬀects in a stochastic frontier
production function (Battese and Coelli, 1995). This model is composed of the following two
equations:
ln yit = β0 +
K∑
k=1
βk · lnxkit + vit − uit (4.4)
uit = δ0 +
M∑
m=1
δm · ln zmit + wit (4.5)
Equation 4.4 is the production frontier and Equation 4.5 is the ineﬃciency eﬀects equation.
The ineﬃciency eﬀects (uit) are independently distributed and are obtained by truncation at
zero of the normal distribution with mean zitδ and variance σ
2
u. It is assumed to have a
deterministic and a random component. On the one hand, the ineﬃciency eﬀects are assumed
to be a function of a set of explanatory variables (zmit) and of a vector of unknown parameters
(δm) to be estimated (deterministic component). Thus, the Equation 4.5 enables us to identify
the factors which can explain diﬀerences in technical eﬃciency across rural areas (of primary
interest here, urban proximity). On the other hand, wit is a random variable which includes the
eﬀect of the unobserved factors. It is deﬁned by the truncation of the normal distribution with
zero mean and variance σ2u such that the point of truncation is −zitδ. This is consistent with
the assumption that uit is a non-negative truncation of the normal distribution with mean zitδ
and variance σ2u.
Under the assumption that vit is independent of uit, xkit and zmit, the parameters of Equa-
tions 4.4 and 4.5 are consistently estimated in one-step by the maximum likelihood. The like-
lihood function is expressed in terms of the variance parameters σ2 = σ2u + σ
2
v and γ = σ
2
u/σ
2.
Note that σ2 is positive and γ, which represents the share of ineﬃciency term in the variance
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of the composed error term, lies between 0 and 1. Finally, Equations 4.4 and 4.5 are simulta-
neously estimated; this approach is much more preferable than the two-step one which leads to
severe estimation bias9.
4.3.3 Data and empirical model
To explicitly test whether cities produce spillover eﬀects on counties, we estimate the model
for ineﬃciency eﬀects in a stochastic frontier production function using county-level data. The
limited availability of indicators at the county level has led us to carry out the analysis for 910
counties belonging to 19 provinces for the period of 2005 to 200910. Speciﬁcally, we have data
for the following 19 provinces, listed in alphabetical order: Anhui, Beijing, Chongqing, Gansu,
Hainan, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Inner Mongolia, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Ningxia, Qinghai,
Shaanxi, Shanghai, Sichuan, Tianjin and Xinjiang. As there were a total of 1,636 counties11 in
China over the period of 2005-2009, we carry out the analysis for more than half of the counties
in China. Thus, our dataset covers a very large part of China, spanning from the North to
the South (with Heilongjiang and Hainan) and from the West to the East (with Xinjiang and
Jiangsu provinces) of the country.
Previous analyses on agricultural productivity have stressed that there are seven macro-
regions in China, diﬀering both in terms of economic development, institutions and agro-climatic
conditions (Fan, 1991; Bhattacharyya and Parker, 1999; Cho et al., 2007; 2010). Speciﬁcally,
the country is broken down into the following seven zones: Central, East, North, Northeast,
9Indeed, the two-stage approach ﬁrst estimates a standard stochastic production frontier in order to predict
the ineﬃciency eﬀects, assuming that these eﬀects are not inﬂuenced by other variables. In a second stage, the
predicted ineﬃciency eﬀects are regressed on a set of explanatory variables, which contradicts the assumption
made in the ﬁrst stage. Thus, in the two-step approach, the model estimated in the ﬁrst step is misspeciﬁed
leading to estimations bias. Caudill and Ford (1993) provide evidence on the bias in the estimated technology
parameters. Wang and Schmidt (2002) provide evidence on the bias at all stages of the procedures (both in
the estimation of technology parameters, of the estimated eﬃciency scores and of the estimated determinants of
eﬃciency) due to the two-step approach.
10While a number of indicators at the county level are available in the China Statistical Yearbooks for Regional
Economy as well as in the Provincial Yearbooks, information is relatively scarce. For example, gross agricultural
output has only been published in the China Statistical Yearbooks for Regional Economy since 2005 and only
some provinces published such information in their Yearbook before 2005. Moreover, information on fertilizers is
not published in the China Statistical Yearbooks for Regional Economy but rather in the Provincial Yearbooks
so that its availability greatly varies over time and across provinces. For this reason, few studies that analyze
Chinese agriculture consider all counties. The only studies with data on all counties use the cross-sectional data
of 1999 from the county-level socio-economic survey (Cho et al. 2007; 2010; Chen and Song, 2008; Monchuk et
al., 2010). After reviewing every Provincial Yearbook from 2002 to 2009, we have restricted the analysis for the
period from 2005 to 2009 in order to keep the highest possible number of provinces in our sample. Nevertheless, 12
provinces are not included because they did not publish data on all of the necessary indicators (mainly fertilizers).
11Includes autonomous counties as well as banners and autonomous banners.
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Northwest, Southwest and South as shown in Figure 4.212. Such diﬀerences in economic and
geographic conditions lead agricultural production technology to diﬀer across Chinese regions
(Cho et al., 2007; 2010; Chen et al., 2009; Zhou et al., 2011). Thus, as each region has its
own frontier production, it is necessary to estimate a separate frontier production for each of
the seven macro-regions in order to obtain unbiased estimates of eﬃciency scores13 (Chen and
Song, 2008). Given that eﬃciency scores are the outcome of interest in the present study, this
point is of primary importance.
Table 4.2 gives the name of the provinces and the number of counties in our sample for each
of the seven zones along with some descriptive statistics. Given our dataset, we are able to
estimate a production frontier for each region except for the South. Indeed, Hainan is the only
Southern province for which we have data and it contains merely 10 counties.
Estimating the model for ineﬃciency eﬀects in a stochastic frontier production function
separately for each of the six zones enables us (1) to obtain unbiased eﬃciency scores and (2)
to account for heterogeneity of urban eﬀects across the six regions. Alternative groupings of
provinces exist and could have been used to analyze heterogeneity of urban eﬀects across regions.
The most common grouping divides Chinese provinces into Eastern, Central and Western China.
However, this grouping is likely to be inappropriate for taking into account all the regional
heterogeneity of urban eﬀects.
For example, as highlighted in Table 4.2, such a grouping would not enable us to account for
the considerable variation in the level of economic development and urbanization within Eastern,
Central and Western provinces. Southern provinces lag behind other Eastern provinces in
terms of GDP per capita, density of infrastructures and wages. Moreover, Southwest provinces
are much more endowed with infrastructures than Northwestern ones and services are also
both more signiﬁcant and growing faster in Southwest than in Northwest China. As a result,
grouping provinces into Coastal, Central and Western would not adequately capture the regional
heterogeneity of urban eﬀects.
12Provinces are grouped into the seven zones as follows: Central (Henan, Hubei, Hunan); East (Shanghai,
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi and Shandong); North (Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi and Inner Mongolia);
Northeast (Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang); Northwest (Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Nongxia and Xinjiang); South-
west (Guangxi, Guizhou, Sichuan, Chongqing, Tibet, Yunnan) and South (Fujian, Guangdong and Hainan). See
Cho et al. (2007) for a description of the climatic characteristics of each area.
13Remember that eﬃciency scores are obtained by comparing the eﬀective level of production with the maximum
output that can be produced (represented by the frontier production). Thus, if the frontier production is not
consistently estimated, this will lead to biased eﬃciency scores.
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To summarize, breaking China down into seven areas was primarily due to the necessity
of matching diﬀerences in production technology in order to obtain unbiased eﬃciency scores.
However, this classiﬁcation seems fully appropriate for accounting for regional heterogeneity of
urban eﬀects, as these seven areas also diﬀer in terms of economic and urban development.
We estimate simultaneously the following two equations for China as a whole and separately
for each of the Chinese macro-regions14:
ln yit = β0 +
4∑
k=1
βk · lnxkit + β5 · trend+
P∑
p=1
αp · provp + vit − uit (4.6)
uit = δ0 + δ1 · ln proxit +
4∑
m=2
δm · ln zmit + δ5 · trend+
P∑
p=1
λp · provp + wit (4.7)
where i refers to the county, p to the province and t to the year.
In the estimated model, we identify two diﬀerent categories of variables: the production
frontier variables (Equation 4.6) and the ineﬃciency variables (Equation 4.7). First, with re-
gard to the production frontier variables, the dependent variable, yit, and the inputs, xit, are
the variables currently introduced in the literature on agricultural productivity. We use the
logarithm of the gross output value of agriculture in constant prices as dependent variable15.
We consider two traditional inputs (labor and land) and two modern inputs (chemical fertilizers
and machinery). We also introduce provincial ﬁxed-eﬀects (provp) to control for agro-climatic
conditions in each region and a time trend to take into account technical change. The stochastic
approach forces us to choose a speciﬁcation for the production frontier. Although it imposes
restrictions on the technology, we estimate a Cobb-Douglas function which does not suﬀer from
multicolinearity problems, contrary to ﬂexible functional forms, such as the translog function
(Hassine and Kandil, 2009; Mayen et al., 2010).
Second, regarding the ineﬃciency eﬀects equation, to test whether urban proximity aﬀects
technical eﬃciency, we introduce a measure of urban proximity (proxit) among the determinants
of technical ineﬃciency (zmit). As explained, the goal of the empirical analysis consists in
estimating whether cities produce net spread or net backwash eﬀects on the agriculture of
14Estimations are made with the maximum likelihood using Frontier 4.1.
15Fan and Zhang (2002) underline that using constant prices for aggregate output cannot account for changes
in relative prices, which can lead to a bias in the estimation of productivity. The authors propose a method to
minimize this potential bias. However, such a method cannot be implemented with county-level data due to data
unavailability.
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counties in China. To test for this, we follow Chen and Partridge (2011) by constructing a
set of measures of market potential (Harris, 1954) to account for urban proximity. First, we
construct an aggregated measure of market potential as follows:
Proxi =
J∑
j=1
GDPj
DISTij
(4.8)
where i refers to the county and j to the city. DISTij is the number of kilometers from the
centroid of county i to the centroid of city j16 and GDPj is the gross domestic product of city j in
2005. We use GDP of city j at the initial period to minimize the potential endogeneity problem
which could arise from common shocks aﬀecting both counties and cities17 (we will further
discuss the problem of endogeneity in Section 4.4.3). This market potential variable captures
all the potential eﬀects of urban proximity outlined in Section 4.2. To construct this aggregated
market potential variable, we consider all kinds of cities: provincial, prefecture and county-level
cities. Second, to take into account potential heterogeneity across the urban hierarchy, we create
diﬀerent market potential variables according to the administrative rank of the city (provincial,
prefecture and county-level). By using similar indicators of market potential to those of Chen
and Partridge (2011) who study urban eﬀects on counties’s GDP and employment growth, we
are able to clearly compare whether cities produce varying impacts on the agriculture and the
other sectors of counties.
Finally, following Liu and Zhuang (2000) and Chen and Song (2008), we assume that ineﬃ-
ciency depends on the level of education, health and loan (zmit) of the county. We also introduce
provincial dummies (provp) and allow ineﬃciency to vary over time by introducing a time trend.
Data is taken from the 2006-2010 China Statistical Yearbooks for Regional Economy and from
the 2006-2010 Provincial Yearbooks. The precise deﬁnitions and descriptive statistics of all the
variables are provided in Appendices 4.B and 4.C.
16Data on cities’ GDP is from the 2006 China City Statistical Yearbook. Distance is calculated using the
latitude and longitude of each county and city using data available on the U.S. Geological Survey website.
17We are aware that this does not completely rule out endogneneity problems. However, given that no in-
strumental variables approach has been developed for the model for ineﬃciency eﬀects in a stochastic frontier
production function, this is the best strategy to minimize endogeneity. Indeed, even if some empirical studies
have introduced instrumental variables in the model for ineﬃciency eﬀects in a stochastic frontier production
function, they do not discuss the econometric procedure in detail (neither regarding the implementation of the
procedure or the test of the instruments or the property of the estimator). Thus, we prefer not to implement
an instrumental variables approach given that such a method remains very uncommon and uncertain in the
framework of the model for ineﬃciency eﬀects in a stochastic frontier production function.
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Does urban proximity enhance technical eﬃciency in each Chinese re-
gion?
We begin by estimating the model for China as a whole and for each of the six macro-regions,
using the aggregated market potential variable. Table 4.3 presents estimates of the ineﬃciency
eﬀects in the production frontier model. The production frontier estimates are reported in the
ﬁrst part of the table. First of all, estimated elasticities for inputs signiﬁcantly vary across
regions, conﬁrming that estimating a diﬀerent production frontier is necessary in order to ob-
tain unbiased eﬃciency scores. Thus, results for China as a whole (Column 1) are likely to
be biased. Second, overall estimated elasticities are consistent. For example, the coeﬃcient
associated with machinery is insigniﬁcant in all regions, with the exception of Northern and
Northwestern China, which is not surprising, as labor is abundant in China and so, we expect
mechanical technologies (or labor-saving technologies) to be insigniﬁcant. On the contrary, for
the Northern and Northwestern regions, where population density is low and farmland large,
machinery consistently has a positive and signiﬁcant impact18. We also ﬁnd decreasing returns
to scale in each region. Finally, the coeﬃcient associated to the time trend is positive, high and
very signiﬁcant for all regions except Central China. This conﬁrms that technical progress is a
strong component of total factor productivity growth in China (Chen et al., 2008).
The second part of Table 4.3 is of particular interest, as it gives the results of the estimation of
the ineﬃciency model. First, ineﬃciency does exist in Chinese agriculture. Indeed, the estimated
variance parameters are signiﬁcant and the parameter γ is close to one. More importantly, the
likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis that there are no technical ineﬃciency eﬀects is
strongly rejected at the 1% level in every case19. Average technical eﬃciency ranges from about
55% in the Southwest to 79% in the North. Eﬃciency estimates are close to those found by
Wang et al. (1996) and Yao and Liu (1998) but lower than those found by Tian and Wan
(2000). Second, several studies warn that agricultural eﬃciency has been deteriorating in China
since the 1980s (Mao and Koo, 1997; Chen et al., 2008). Our result conﬁrms that most regions
suﬀer from a decrease in their technical eﬃciency level given that the coeﬃcient associated
18For the Northern region, this result is probably driven by Inner Mongolia
19The likelihood ratio statistic has a mixed Chi-square distribution (Coelli, 1995). The critical values, which
are reported in the table, can be found in Kodde and Palm (1986).
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to the time trend is positive20 and signiﬁcant for most regions. Regarding the determinants
of technical eﬃciency, counties with better health infrastructures are consistently signiﬁcantly
more eﬃcient. One surprising result is that education increases ineﬃciency in most regions
whereas we expected better educated farmers to be more able to utilize existing technologies.
Although this result is unexpected, it is not new in the literature (Chen et al., 2008; Chen and
Song, 2008). This is most likely due to the fact that education variables at the county level
are no longer appropriate indicators of the level of education of farmers because most educated
rural workers are involved in non-agricultural activities. “Loan” is also found to be a signiﬁcant
determinant of eﬃciency but its impact varies across regions. This probably arises because
loan exerts two opposite impacts on technical eﬃciency. On the one hand, access to credit
alleviates capital constraints and thus, it allows farmers to buy every input whenever necessary.
As a result, farmers who beneﬁt from better access to credit can undertake optimal agricultural
operations by using the necessary inputs at the optimal timing, increasing technical eﬃciency
(Binam et al., 2004). On the other hand, credit also raises investment in new technologies. Yet
a high rate of technical change can lead to deterioration in eﬃciency when farmers do not have
the time to assimilate new technologies (Mao and Koo, 1997).
When it comes to the eﬀect of urban proximity, we ﬁnd considerable heterogeneity across
regions. Indeed, urban proximity signiﬁcantly enhances eﬃciency in the Northeastern, Northern
and Eastern regions, while its eﬀect is lower and less signiﬁcant for the Central region and
not signiﬁcant at all for the Southwest and the Northwest. As predicted in Section 4.2.3,
urban proximity has a much more positive impact in Eastern China due to the well-developed
infrastructure network. In addition, large coastal cities bear high congestion costs and a rapidly
growing tertiary sector, leading industrial ﬁrms to relocate to nearby rural counties. Finally,
we ﬁnd that cities have no impact on rural eﬃciency in the West. However, at this stage we do
not know whether this is the result of compensation between spread and backwash eﬀects or of
the absence of ties between cities and counties in the West. The next subsection sheds light on
this issue.
20A positive sign in the ineﬃciency model means that the associated variable increases technical ineﬃciency
(and so, reduces eﬃciency).
Table 4.3: Urban eﬀects across Chinese regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
China Northeast North East Central Northwest Southwest
Production Frontier Model
Constant 8.060*** 10.736*** 5.876*** 6.553*** 7.805*** 4.892*** 8.441***
(0.081) (0.503) (0.315) (0.215) (0.805) (0.219) (0.204)
Land 0.047*** 0.009 0.006 0.350*** 0.344*** 0.115*** 0.019**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.021) (0.027) (0.057) (0.017) (0.007)
Labor 0.397*** 0.337*** 0.232*** 0.223*** 0.240*** 0.193*** 0.729***
(0.016) (0.059) (0.025) (0.029) (0.052) (0.020) (0.030)
Machinery 0.009** -0.056 0.447*** -0.006 0.047 0.278*** -0.001
(0.004) (0.055) (0.023) (0.012) (0.032) (0.021) (0.003)
Fertilizer 0.230*** 0.115*** 0.056*** 0.162*** 0.021 0.187*** 0.121***
(0.009) (0.044) (0.018) (0.020) (0.031) (0.012) (0.015)
Trend 0.127*** 0.130*** 0.039*** 0.125*** -0.043 0.039*** 0.154***
(0.006) (0.020) (0.012) (0.005) (0.138) (0.008) (0.037)
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No† Yes Yes
Ineﬃciency eﬀects model
Constant -26.248*** -1.973 26.146*** 4.482*** 4.809** -5.472* 3.229
1.364 (4.483) (2.516) (0.830) (1.872) (2.803) (2.195)
Urban Proximity -0.137 -3.695*** -6.801*** -0.729*** -0.682** 0.582 -0.386
0.249 (0.730) (0.510) (0.153) (0.319) (0.533) (0.409)
Education 0.501*** 3.977*** 1.754*** 0.111** 0.161** -0.231*** 0.581***
0.153 (0.578) (0.195) (0.044) (0.082) (0.073) (0.058)
Health -0.182** -4.985*** -2.013*** -0.137*** -0.208*** -0.116*** -0.136***
0.089 (0.304) (0.181) (0.036) (0.069) (0.042) (0.024)
Loan 0.044 1.102*** 1.608*** -0.107*** -0.184*** 0.091*** -0.031*
0.062 (0.212) (0.103) (0.028) (0.043) (0.030) (0.018)
Trend 2.856*** 0.857*** 0.239** 0.086*** -0.087 -0.142*** 0.116***
0.033 (0.173) (0.119) (0.011) (0.139) (0.018) (0.040)
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No† Yes Yes
Average eﬃciency level 0.674 0.664 0.785 0.614 0.624 0.703 0.545
σ2 9.216*** 4.973*** 2.575*** 0.043*** 0.062*** 0.204*** 0.101***
(0.124) (0.613) (0.187) (0.003) (0.006) (0.013) (0.007)
γ 0.991*** 0.985*** 0.965*** 0.999*** 0.527 0.659*** 0.590***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.549) (0.039) (0.137)
Likelihood ratio test statistic 7339.66 359.99 755.58 64.47 51.52 207.67 198.54
Critical value of LR test 43.696 19.384 22.525 20.972 17.755 24.049 19.384
N 881‡ 65 186 151 88 242 139
N ∗ T 4317 325 930 755 352 1210 695
Note : *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Standard-errors in parenthesis.
A negative sign in the ineﬃciency model means that the associated variable reduces technical ineﬃciency (and so,
enhances eﬃciency).
† No provincial dummies are introduced given that Henan is the only province included in the Central region.
‡ The total number of counties for China is higher than the sum of the counties belonging to each region. This
diﬀerence is due to Hainan province (10 counties) which is included in the regression for China and which belongs to
the South region. Remember that we do do not run estimation for the South region because of the lack of suﬃcient
observations.
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4.4.2 Do all cities exert the same impact?
We further investigate the eﬀect of urban proximity by substituting the aggregated market
potential variable for the disaggregated variables. Table 4.4 presents the results when allowing
urban eﬀects to vary both across regions and across the urban hierarchy.
First of all, our results indicate that provincial cities have a detrimental impact on counties.
As population growth is the fastest in provincial cities, urban sprawl is likely to be higher,
leading to a higher number of seizure of farmland and thus, discouraging farmers to eﬃciently
use the technology. These results are complementary with the estimations of Chen and Partridge
(2011) and, as the authors highlight, this ﬁnding tends to invalidate the expectations of the
government according to which the provincial cities produce spread eﬀects on the rest of the
country. Consistently, provincial-level cities have a signiﬁcant impact in the North because of
the proximity to Beijing and Tianjin, in the East because of Shanghai, and in the West because
of Chongqing. Conversely, counties located in the Northeast and Central regions are not aﬀected
by provincial cities which are located too far away.
Second, contrary to provincial cities, we ﬁnd that prefecture-level cities enhance agricultural
eﬃciency in most regions. Our results are complementary to previous studies (Ke, 2010; Ke and
Feser, 2010; Chen and Partridge, 2011) which ﬁnd that high-level cities produce spread eﬀects on
counties’ (non-agricultural) GDP growth. In addition, Northeastern China is the only region in
which prefecture cities deteriorate rural eﬃciency. One likely explanation is that Northeastern
prefecture-level cities generate a high level of pollution due to their specialization in heavily
polluting industries. Indeed, Northeastern China has been the traditional industrial base of the
country, specializing in heavy industry, and it has already been estimated that pollution has a
detrimental eﬀect on agricultural eﬃciency in China21 (Monchuk et al., 2010).
Turning to county-level cities, we ﬁnd that their impact varies a great deal across regions.
While they produce positive eﬀects in the Southwest, Northwest and Northeast, they have
no net impact in the East and Center and they produce signiﬁcant negative eﬀects in the
North. Such a geographic pattern probably arises for two reasons. First, in the West, where
the urbanization rate and the number of large cities is low, county-level cities may constitute
attractive destinations for rural migrants. In other words, proximity to county-level cities in the
West should signiﬁcantly help in reducing rural labor surplus. Conversely, in the more developed
21We will further discuss the issue of input quality in Section 4.4.3.
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and urbanized parts of China, almost every county-level city is close to a higher-level city. Yet,
as rural workers generally prefer to migrate to large cities rather than to county-level cities
(Chan et al., 2008), proximity to a county-level city does not entail a reduction of rural labor
surplus in more urbanized provinces. Second, as underlined in Section 4.2.4, given their similar
economic structure, growth in county-level cities can produce backwash eﬀects on counties (Ke
and Feser, 2010). Such a phenomenon may be particularly at work in Eastern and Northern
China where county-level cities have beneﬁted from higher growth rate than in the rest of the
country. Indeed, small cities have beneﬁted from high growth rates in Coastal provinces, where
export processing jobs have developed, and close to large cities, which stimulate the economic
development of smaller cities (Chan et al., 2008).
Finally, using disaggregated market potential variables, we are able to conclude that the
absence of impact of cities on counties in the West, as estimated in Table 4.3, arises from the
compensation of spread and backwash eﬀects. Thus, the use of an aggregated indicator for
urban proximity can be misleading, as one could conclude that counties and cities in Western
China are two separate worlds. On the contrary, Table 4.4 highlights that cities and counties
in Western China are interconnected. Indeed, the coeﬃcient associated to the disaggregated
market potential variables are statistically signiﬁcant both in the Northwestern and Southwest-
ern regions. However, cities produce both spread and backwash eﬀects on counties, resulting in
a non-signiﬁcant aggregated impact. This issue has important policy implications. Indeed, if
Western counties and cities did not interact, an optimal policy would be a local one, targeting
only rural areas. However, as counties and cities are interconnected, the optimal policy should
be a regional one, including both rural and urban areas (Roberts, 2000).
Table 4.4: Urban eﬀects across regions and urban tiers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
China Northeast North East Central Northwest Southwest
Production Frontier Model
Constant 8.085*** 10.840*** 5.236*** 6.628*** 7.569*** 4.730*** 8.100***
(0.082) (0.530) (0.282) (0.195) (0.760) (0.210) (0.178)
Land 0.044*** 0.008 0.032 0.367*** 0.316*** 0.132*** 0.016**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.023) (0.026) (0.060) (0.018) (0.007)
Labor 0.388*** 0.349*** 0.208*** 0.193*** 0.226*** 0.189*** 0.703***
(0.013) (0.055) (0.027) (0.027) (0.054) (0.021) (0.035)
Machinery 0.010*** -0.065 0.415*** -0.014 0.102** 0.287*** 0.001
(0.003) (0.059) (0.026) (0.013) (0.040) (0.023) (0.003)
Fertilizer 0.231*** 0.115*** 0.072*** 0.152*** 0.016 0.176*** 0.120***
(0.008) (0.043) (0.020) (0.019) (0.030) (0.012) (0.015)
Trend 0.127*** 0.129*** 0.036*** 0.126*** -0.069 0.035*** 0.138***
(0.006) (0.024) (0.009) (0.009) (0.133) (0.009) (0.032)
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No† Yes Yes
Ineﬃciency eﬀects model
Constant -30.508*** -0.296 16.731*** -0.744 7.591* -13.245*** 4.421
(2.050) (1.012) (2.107) (1.305) (4.298) (1.551) (3.170)
Provincial cities 1.343** -0.999 3.584*** 0.768** -0.049 4.164*** 0.425*
(0.589) (2.353) (0.775) (0.310) (0.678) (0.326) (0.236)
Prefecture cities -0.016 9.536*** -19.717*** -0.663*** -1.364*** -2.118*** -0.107
(0.798) (1.366) (0.782) (0.112) (0.352) (0.471) (0.236)
County-level cities -0.945 -15.977*** 12.133*** -0.300 0.368 -2.634*** -1.311**
(0.953) (4.210) (0.905) (0.411) (0.489) (0.427) (0.665)
Education 1.395*** 1.902*** 2.720*** 0.109* 0.150* -0.344*** 0.597***
(0.263) (0.326) (0.121) (0.062) (0.078) (0.083) (0.064)
Health -0.569*** -5.147*** -0.833*** -0.122*** -0.228*** -0.060 -0.151***
(0.184) (0.907) (0.191) (0.039) (0.065) (0.048) (0.026)
Loan 0.103 1.349** 0.845*** -0.159*** -0.192*** 0.031 -0.033*
(0.092) (0.530) (0.100) (0.036) (0.038) (0.029) (0.018)
Trend 2.635*** 0.656*** 0.105*** 0.095*** -0.106 -0.144*** 0.218**
(0.061) (0.156) (0.049) (0.016) (0.133) (0.020) (0.093)
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No† Yes Yes
Average eﬃciency level 0.668 0.666 0.774 0.617 0.597 0.709 0.559
σ2 8.604*** 4.035*** 2.945*** 0.041*** 0.059*** 0.156*** 0.104***
(0.191) (0.671) (0.164) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
γ 0.991*** 0.981*** 0.971*** 0.999*** 0.519 0.558*** 0.642***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.016) (0.462) (0.033) (0.094)
Likelihood ratio test statistic 7512.563 366.232 776.889 240.444 64.466 345.745 271.783
Critical value of LR test 46.349 22.525 25.549 24.049 20.972 27.026 22.525
N 881‡ 65 186 151 88 242 139
N ∗ T 4317 325 930 755 352 1210 695
Note : *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Standard-errors in parenthesis.
A negative sign in the ineﬃciency model means that the associated variable reduces technical ineﬃciency (and so,
enhances eﬃciency).
† No provincial dummies are introduced given that Henan is the only province included in the Central region.
‡ The total number of counties for China is higher than the sum of the counties belonging to each region. This
diﬀerence is due to Hainan province (10 counties) which is included in the regression for China and which belongs to
the South region. Remember that we do do not run estimation for the South region because of the lack of suﬃcient
observations.
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4.4.3 Discussion
To our knowledge, this study is the ﬁrst to estimate the eﬀect of urban proximity on agricultural
technical eﬃciency in China. We ﬁnd that on average, i.e. when using the aggregated market
potential variable, being close to a city increases technical eﬃciency in the Northeastern, North-
ern, Eastern and Central regions. For other regions, we ﬁnd that cities, at the aggregated level,
have no impact on the agricultural eﬃciency level of counties. This is interesting to note that
our conclusion diﬀers from that of Nehring et al. (2006) according to which urban proximity
negatively aﬀects farmers’ technical eﬃciency level in the US. However, their study is carried
out on a sample of farmers in the Corn Belt, the production context of which is very diﬀerent
from the Chinese context. Therefore, we do not expect urban proximity to impact technical eﬃ-
ciency by the same transmission channels. For example, if urban proximity most likely enhances
eﬃciency in China giving farmers more opportunities to access market to sell their produce, in
the Corn Belt, this transmission channel should not be at work, as even farmers in remote areas
have easy access to markets.
One possible shortcoming of this study however, is that we assume that remote counties
and counties close to cities produce the same agricultural products, which could be misleading.
Eﬃciency could be higher close to cities if the output produced there is less complicated to yield
than that of remote counties. To relax the assumption that all counties produce the same type
of agricultural output, we could estimate a production frontier, either with several outputs or
with only one type of output (for example grain or vegetables). Yet the lack of disaggregated
output data at the county level prevents us from estimating these models.
Another objection could be made regarding the lack of control for input quality. Strictly
speaking technical eﬃciency is considered as an indicator of management. If there is no control
for input quality, diﬀerences in input quality can wrongly be attributed to diﬀerences in eﬃciency
levels and lead to bias estimates22. Most of the time, it is thus highly desirable to control for
input quality (Alvarez and Gonzalez, 1999).
Nevertheless, the present study constitutes a very speciﬁc case because urban proximity
itself could impact input quality. First, counties close to cities are likely to suﬀer from more
22For example, if land quality is poor, then more quantity of land is required to produce the same agricultural
output. However, if land quality is not controlled for in the econometric speciﬁcation, this is attributed to
technical ineﬃciency.
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land degradation than remote counties, due to a higher level of pollution23. Second, as rural
areas close to cities beneﬁt from a more developed local non-agricultural sector, there is a risk
that the most eﬃcient workers (typically young men) leave agriculture to work in the more
remunerative and socially rewarding non-agricultural activities (Song et al., 2009; Chang et al.,
2011). Thus, urban proximity itself could deteriorate both land and labor quality. As a result,
we can wonder whether or not it is appropriate to control for such“urban proximity-induced”(or
“endogenous”) variations in input quality. In other words, do the degradation of input quality
induced by urban proximity should be considered as an omitted variable or as a transmission
channel inﬂuencing eﬃciency?
In this study, we have not introduced any controls for “endogenous” input quality and thus,
our econometric results capture the eﬀect of urban proximity on both management and input
quality. In our opinion, it seems appropriate to also capture the potential negative impact
of urban proximity on input quality, such as the estimated eﬀect of prefecture-level cities in
Northeastern China. Of course, the best would have been to separably estimate the eﬀect of
urban proximity on technical managerial eﬃciency and on input quality. However, the lack of
available data prevents us from doing this. Thus, assuming that the lack of control for land and
labor quality aﬀect the results, this would underestimate the “pure” eﬀect of urban proximity
on technical managerial eﬃciency.
Finally, a last objection could be made regarding the direction of causality. It could indeed be
argued that farmers sort across rural areas according to their individual characteristics, which
could be one major source of endogeneity. For example, the most talented and enterprising
farmers may move close to cities in order to beneﬁt from the urban market. In this case, the
higher level of technical eﬃciency would not stem from urban proximity but from diﬀerences
in farmers’ characteristics (omitted variable problem). However, in China, it is very likely that
the causality runs from urban proximity to rural eﬃciency. Indeed, farmlands are allocated
to farmers by the authorities, according to birth place, and nothing indicates that the most
enterprising farmers are given land close to urban centers. Moreover in China, the land market
is under-developed and migration from one rural area to another area is very low24. As a result,
spatial sorting of farmers across rural areas is not likely to lead to estimation bias and thus, the
23Chapter 6 of the thesis will shed light on this issue.
24According to the 2007 Chinese Household Income Project rural survey, more than 90% of migrant rural
laborers leave their local countryside to work in towns or cities.
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location of Chinese farmers should be exogenous to their ability to produce.
4.5 Conclusion
The present chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of the eﬀect of cities on agricultural
eﬃciency, which is one of the most crucial determinants of potential agricultural growth in
China. First, in a theoretical analysis we disentangle the transmission channels by which cities
can aﬀect agricultural eﬃciency in neighboring counties and we emphasize that urban eﬀects are
probably heterogeneous both across regions and across the urban hierarchy. Second, we carry
out an empirical investigation to estimate the net impact of cities on the technical eﬃciency
level of nearby counties.
Using an aggregated indicator of market potential, we ﬁnd no evidence that cities produce
signiﬁcant net negative eﬀects on the agriculture of counties, at least in terms of technical
eﬃciency. Thus, it appears that cities can produce signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on both the non-
agricultural (Ke and Feser, 2010) and agricultural sectors of nearby counties. Moreover, we ﬁnd
that the eﬀect of cities strongly varies across Chinese regions. In Eastern provinces, we ﬁnd that
cities strongly enhance eﬃciency in nearby counties. In the less developed Central provinces,
spread eﬀects are much less signiﬁcant and they are not signiﬁcant at all in Western provinces.
The evidence of positive and signiﬁcant urban eﬀects on the agricultural eﬃciency level of rural
counties in Eastern China, may explain why the urban-rural gap is lower in Eastern China, as
estimated by Sicular et al. (2007). This may also explain why distance to the nearest county
town is one major determinant of rural poverty in Coastal, Northeastern and Central China
but only poorly explains rural poverty in Southwestern and Northwestern China (World Bank,
2009).
Second, spillover eﬀects not only appear to vary across regions but also across the urban
hierarchy. Provincial-level cities are found to produce signiﬁcant backwash eﬀects on counties.
Thus, the current policies that favor provincial-level cities are unable to enhance rural develop-
ment. On the contrary, prefecture-level cities, and to some extent county-level ones, produce
spread eﬀects on counties in almost every region. In terms of urban-planning, favoring the
development of a network of medium-sized cities scattered across the territory would be much
more likely to enhance rural development and achieve balanced growth than the development
of a few huge cities.
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In addition, cities appear to interact with their neighboring counties in every region of China.
Indeed, close to the Coast and in Central China, counties beneﬁt from positive urban eﬀects.
Moreover, in the West, we found that the absence of signiﬁcant urban eﬀects at the aggregated
level arises as a result of compensation of equal positive and negative urban eﬀects and not as
a result of a lack of ties between counties and cities.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
4.A Provincial, prefecture and county-level cities
Table 4.5: Provincial, prefecture and county-level cities
Population
(10,000 persons)
Primary sec-
tor (% GDP)
Secondary sec-
tor (% GDP)
Tertiairy sec-
tor (% GDP)
Population growth
Provincial cities 1196.17 2.53 43.80 53.67 3.87
Prefecture-level cities 115.75 7.78 50.82 41.41 1.57
County-level cities 66.82 17.01 47.89 34.99 0.70
4.B Deﬁnition of the variables
Table 4.6: Deﬁnition of the variables
Variable Deﬁnition Unit
Frontier variables
Output Gross output value of agriculture 100 million
yuan (constant
prices)
Land Cultivated area 100 hectares
Labor Agricultural labor 10,000 persons
Machinery Total power of agricultural machinery 10,000 kW
Fertilizer Consumption of chemical fertilizer 100 tons
Plain Dummy equal to 1 if the county is located in a
plain area, 0 otherwise
Ineﬃciency variables
Aggregated market potential Sum of GDP in cities weighted by the inverse of
the distance between each city and county
Market potential: provincial cities Sum of GDP in provincial cities weighted by the
inverse of the distance between each city and
county
Market potential: prefecture-level cities Sum of GDP in prefecture cities weighted by the
inverse of the distance between each city and
county
Market potential: county-level cities Sum of GDP in county-level cities weighted by
the inverse of the distance between each city and
county
Education Share of students enrolled in regular secondary
schools in population
%
Health Number of beds in hospitals and sanitation agen-
cies
10,000 beds
Loan Outstanding loan of ﬁnancial institutes at year-
end
100 million yuan
4.C Descriptive statistics
Table 4.7: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Frontier Variables
Agricultural output 4417 16.71 14.53 0.16 102.08
Land 4317 482.80 484.84 0.02 4699.26
Labor 4512 11.94 10.03 0.04 59.51
Machinery 4369 33.69 34.94 0.17 290.00
Fertilizer 4452 248.14 293.91 0.02 2597.57
Plain 4550 0.40 0.49 0 1
Ineﬃciency variables
Aggregated Market Potential 4550 294.29 68.25 135.11 688.39
Market potential: provincial cities 4550 6544.97 1577.28 2021.85 11939.75
Market potential: prefecture-level cities 4550 391.04 84.26 184.84 731.81
Market potential: county-level cities 4550 136.82 32.65 53.23 303.29
Education 4518 6.07 1.85 0.29 27.00
Health 4496 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.38
Loan 4511 16.48 17.62 0.03 341.06
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5.1 Introduction
In the development economics literature, it is widely recognized that non-agricultural employ-
ment enables rural households to get out of poverty. Indeed, non-agricultural work can enable
households both to raise their income and to reduce instability (Ellis, 1998). In addition, as
income risk often leads individuals to hold unproductive assets -in the form of precautionary
savings (Giles and Yoo, 2007) or grain stocks (Park, 2006)- diversiﬁcation reduces unproductive
behaviors which fosters growth. As a result, the literature regularly found a positive relationship
between non-agricultural employment and households’ welfare (Barrett et al., 2001).
In China, rural non-agricultural employment has played a major role in reducing poverty
(de Janvry et al., 2005). Indeed, getting access to non-agricultural employment is particularly
important in rural China for several reasons. First, as farm size is extremely small, farmers
have few opportunities to generate agricultural income. Second, in rural China, where transient
poverty1 accounts for a large share of total poverty (Jalan and Ravallion, 1998; World Bank
2009), it is extremely important to diversify income. Finally, rural non-agricultural employment
has played a key role in reducing labor surplus in rural China.
Thanks to the economic reforms implemented in China over the last thirty years, nowa-
days, many rural households are involved in some kind of non-agricultural activities. According
to the nationally representative 2002 Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) rural sur-
vey, 78% of rural households were involved in non-agricultural wage-employment and 53% in
self-employment in 2002 (Liu and Sicular, 2009). However, over the last thirty years, non-
agricultural employment has developed unevenly across rural China, leading to a signiﬁcant
increase in intra-rural inequality (Scott, 1994; Kung and Lee, 2001). For example, more than
60% of rural industrial employment was concentrated in the 10% richest villages whereas only
8% of rural industrial employment occurred in the 10% poorest villages in 1995 (Mohapatra
et al., 2006). In addition, urban proximity plays a major role in determining the probability
of an individual to engage in non-agricultural employment. Indeed, rural areas close to cities
and towns beneﬁt from productive advantages given their greater access to market, transport
networks, communication and technologies. Moreover, in China a large proportion of rural in-
1Transient poverty is due to an abrupt temporary fall in consumption or income. It has been estimated that
as much as one-third of Chinese rural households has fallen into poverty at least once between 2001 and 2004,
because of income shocks (World Bank, 2009).
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dustries has been engaged in subcontracting with urban ﬁrms, leading rural industry to further
concentrate close to cities (Naughton, 2007). As a result, the closer the urban area, the higher
the probability for an individual to engage in non-agricultural employment. This has been
estimated for several developing countries2 (Corral and Reardon, 2001; Ferreira and Lanjouw,
2001; Micevska and Rahut, 2008; Winters et al. 2009; Deichmann et al., 2009; Jonasson and
Helfand, 2010) and also speciﬁcally for China (Knight and Song, 2003; de Janvry et al., 2005;
Mohapatra et al., 2006; Zhu and Luo, 2006).
Aim and contributions of the chapter
The present work aims at studying more deeply how urban proximity aﬀects non-agricultural
employment, by investigating whether rural workers closer to cities engage in better remunerated
non-agricultural employment. Therefore, unlike previous studies, our focus is not on the level
but on the kind of non-agricultural employment that rural workers manage to get according
to their location. In our opinion, this issue is of particular interest. Indeed, non-agricultural
employment is nearly always considered as a mean to get out of poverty thanks to its capacity
to raise income and to reduce its instability. However, if on average non-agricultural activities
are much more income-generating than agricultural activities3, there is a signiﬁcant variation
in the remuneration of non-agricultural employment. There are even low-paid non-agricultural
jobs where earnings are lower than agricultural earnings (Lanjouw, 1999), so that one cannot
assume a priori that non-agricultural employment enables workers to increase their income.
To our knowledge, no empirical evidence exists on the eﬀect of urban proximity on rural
non-agricultural wages in China, although there is some empirical evidence for other developing
countries. On the one hand, non-agricultural earnings tend to be higher in rural areas closer to
urban centers and roads (Corral and Reardon, 2001; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2001; Micevska
and Rahut, 2008). However, these studies estimate the determinants of annual non-agricultural
earnings which depend on both the intensity of participation in the non-agricultural sector and
on the hourly wage. As urban proximity increases the intensity of participation in the non-
agricultural sector (Knight and Song, 2003), one cannot infer from these studies that workers
2On the contrary, according to Elbers and Lanjouw (2001) and Lanjouw et al. (2001), there are fewer non-
agricultural activities in peri-urban rural areas as cities already produce all the necessary non-agricultural prod-
ucts. However very few empirical studies, and to our knowledge none studies on China, support this view.
3Wage-employment is estimated to be paid more than twice, and self-employment three to ﬁve times as much
as agricultural work in China (Kung, 2002).
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close to urban areas are paid higher wages. On the other hand, others assess whether workers
closer to cities have a higher probability of being involved in high-paid4 jobs and ﬁnd mixed
evidence. Deichmann et al. (2009) estimates that high-paid jobs are concentrated in rural areas
surrounding urban centers in Bangladesh. In contrast, Jonasson and Helfand (2010) ﬁnd that
there is no clear relation, as both high-paid and low-paid jobs are concentrated around urban
agglomerations in Brazil.
The 2002 and 2007 Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) rural surveys, gives some
insights on the diﬀerences in wages both across rural areas and between suburban and other
villages in China. First, in 2002 the average daily wage was 2.5 times higher in the ninth decile
than in the ﬁrst decile. Even if the gap narrowed slightly5 from 2002 to 2007, the average
daily wage was still two times higher in the ninth decile than in the ﬁrst decile in 2007. This
data shows that intra-rural and intra-urban wage inequality are of comparable magnitude (see
Combes et al. (2012) for data on intra-urban wage inequality). Second, suburban villages
beneﬁt from higher wages, as the average daily wage in these villages was about 1.25 higher
than in other villages.
In our opinion, in China workers close to cities may be likely to engage in more remunera-
tive non-agricultural jobs for three reasons: (i) agglomeration externalities, (ii) market potential,
both leading to diﬀerences in productivity, and thus in wages, across villages, and (iii) com-
muting to nearby urban centers, that enables workers to beneﬁt from the higher urban wages.
Firstly, nowadays Chinese suburban areas are highly urbanized and with densely concentrated
industries (Naughton, 2007). In these villages, a large number of TVE work together to pro-
duce a single product, each being highly specialized in a given stage of the production process.
Suburban villages are therefore likely to beneﬁt from some kinds of agglomeration economies,
leading to higher productivity and so, to higher wages6 (Puga, 2010). Second, villages close to
cities beneﬁt from a large market potential. Thus, ﬁrms in these villages, which enjoy lower
transport costs to reach their consumers, can aﬀord to pay higher wages. Previous studies have
highlighted that market potential plays a major role in determining wages in Chinese cities
(Hering and Poncet, 2010). Market potential should also play a crucial role in determining
4Non-agricultural jobs are high-paid if the hourly wage falls above the earnings of wage laborers in agriculture.
5Note that the 2002 and 2007 CHIP surveys were not carried out in the same villages so that the narrowing
in wage diﬀerentials could be lead by diﬀerences in villages surveyed between 2002 and 2007.
6For example, TVE close to cities can specialize their production, leading to eﬃciency gains, through learning-
by-doing and a reduction in costs as workers do not have to switch tasks.
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rural wages given that rural non-agricultural production is closely tied to urban production,
through subcontracting and technical assistance to urban ﬁrms. Third, workers close to cities
are likely to beneﬁt from higher wages because of commuting. Indeed, workers close to urban
areas are much more likely to commute to nearby urban centers and thus, to beneﬁt from the
higher level of wages that is paid in urban areas.
Using data from the 2002 CHIP survey, we investigate whether workers close to cities are paid
higher wages. We make two main contributions to the existing literature. First, we highlight
that rural workers close to cities beneﬁt from higher wages than workers in outlying rural areas.
This issue has been largely ignored in the literature on spatial disparities in China, which mainly
focuses on disparities either between urban and rural areas or within urban areas. Second, to our
knowledge, we oﬀer the most comprehensive study on the impact of urban proximity on rural
earnings in China. We ﬁnd very robust evidence that workers close to cities are paid signiﬁcantly
higher wages. In addition, the closer to the urban center, the more detrimental is the impact
of distance on wages. Workers closer to the biggest cities are also found to beneﬁt from the
highest wage premium. Finally, workers close to cities manage to engage in better remunerated
jobs because they beneﬁt of both higher wages in their villages and higher opportunities to
commute.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 brieﬂy describes the rural non-
agricultural sector in China. Section 5.3 presents the data and Section 5.4 the methodology
used. We describe the results in Section 5.5 and ﬁnally, we conclude in Section 5.6.
5.2 The rural non-agricultural sector in China
Before the Mao era, Chinese rural households were quite extensively engaged in non-agricultural
activities (Naughton, 2007). Traditionally, the rural non-agricultural sector consisted of a dense
network of household processing businesses: households converted the agricultural products
they grew and sold the transformed products on markets. However, these traditional household
processing businesses disappeared during the Mao era because of the establishment of the state’s
monopoly control over agricultural goods. Indeed, during the 1950s the state began collecting
the agricultural products of households just after the harvest. As a result, households were left
with no agricultural products to process and thus, household processing businesses progressively
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disappeared. This deindustrialization process of rural areas led to a signiﬁcant drop in rural
household incomes.
Later in the Mao era, several attempts were undertaken to develop rural industry. In the
1970s, the government tried to foster rural industrialization through the creation of “communes
and brigade enterprises”7. As a result, in the 1970s the countryside started to industrialize
again, although this new type of industrialization was very diﬀerent from that characterized
by the traditional household processing businesses. On the whole, the communes and brigade
enterprises were much larger, were capital-intensive and did not employ many rural workers
(Naughton, 2007). Consequently, despite the industrialization process which occurred at the
end of the Mao era, in 1978 nearly all of the rural labor force remained engaged in agriculture.
The rural non-agricultural sector has heavily developed since the beginning of the economic
transition. First, the agricultural reforms undertaken at the beginning of the transition has
led to a signiﬁcant increase in agricultural productivity. This has released a large number
of rural workers from agriculture and has generated capital that could be re-invested in the
rural non-agricultural sector. Second, the government has allowed rural workers to engage in
non-agricultural activities, either as wage-earners in rural industries or by setting up their own
non-agricultural business. Labor surplus, as well as low and irregular incomes in agriculture,
have led farmers to engage in non-agricultural activities. As the government continued to heavily
control rural migration, especially until the 1990s, farmers were especially encouraged to develop
non-agricultural activities locally and thus, to “leave the land but not the village”.
The rural non-agricultural sector is often equated with Township and Village Enterprises
(Heston and Sicular, 2008). Township and Village Enterprises (TVE) refer to enterprises lo-
cated in townships and villages. The “TVE” designation encompasses both collectively owned
enterprises, privately-owned enterprises and foreign invested enterprises. While TVE were pre-
dominantly collective businesses at the beginning of the reforms, they are now overwhelmingly
private as collective ﬁrms represent less than 10% of total TVE employment today (Naughton,
2007).
Nowadays, TVE are typically labor-intensive, produce low-proﬁt products and are indepen-
dent from agriculture (de Janvry et al., 2005). They are primarily involved in industry, but
7In 1982, the “communes and brigade enterprises” became the “Township and Village Enterprises” when the
communes and brigades were respectively renamed townships and villages.
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are also signiﬁcantly engaged in construction, transport and commerce. In 2002, 77% of the
value-added was produced in the secondary sector, 22% in the tertiary sector and 1% in the
primary sector (Heston and Sicular, 2008). From 1978 to the mid-1990s, TVE were a very dy-
namic component of the Chinese economy, with an annual growth rate of 9%. TVE employment
increased from 28 million workers in 1978 to 135 million workers in 1996, absorbing a signiﬁcant
share of rural labor.
After the mid-1990s, however, TVE began facing a much more competitive environment and
more diﬃculty obtaining credit. As a result, the growth rate of the sector declined, TVE under-
took a substantial restructuring and a huge wave of privatization of TVE occurred. Beginning
in the 2000s, TVE began growing again; in 2004, TVE employment reached 139 million workers,
surpassing the 1996 peak level for the ﬁrst time (Naughton, 2007). In addition to the wide wave
of privatization, since the 2000s TVE have been turned into highly competitive “industrial clus-
ters” (Naughton, 2007). Nowadays, TVE are usually grouped together in villages surrounding
urban areas, linked to cities by eﬃcient transport networks and are usually highly specialized
in production. A large number of TVE work together to produce a single product, each TVE
unit being highly specialized in a given stage of the production process. Finally, one striking
characteristic of the rural non-agricultural sector is that the number of self-employed ﬁrms in
the non-agricultural sector (traders, merchants, household run businesses) has recently surged
(Mohapatra et al., 2007). These ﬁrms are either part of the formal rural non-agricultural sector
(TVE) or form part of the informal segment of the rural non-agricultural sector. As Mohapatra
et al. (2007) have highlighted, such businesses are run by especially productive and innovative
entrepreneurs.
The rest of the chapter is an empirical analysis which aims at investigating whether rural
workers close to cities are paid higher non-agricultural wages.
5.3 Data
To carry out the empirical analysis, we use the 2002 rural survey of the CHIP8. This survey was
conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and investigates households’ conditions
in 2002. The database is composed both of an individual, a household and a village level
8We do not use the 2007 CHIP survey as there is no detailed information on rural non-agricultural work to
calculate hourly wages. A detailed description of the 2002 rural survey can be found in Gustafson et al. (2008).
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survey. Thus, we beneﬁt from detailed information on individual labor allocation and from
household and village characteristics. In addition, this is a nationally representative survey
which investigates 37,969 individuals of 9,200 households from 961 villages belonging to 122
counties of 22 provinces9. As a result, compared to most microeconomic studies on rural areas
in developing countries, we beneﬁt from a great range of variability in terms of remoteness-
proximity to urban areas.
5.3.1 Labor allocation of workers in the sample
We restrict the CHIP sample to workers. Every individual above 15 years old, who reports
having earned some income or having spent some time working, is considered as a worker.
We have classiﬁed rural workers according to their primary activity10 in one of the following
four categories: (1) Local agricultural workers, (2) Local non-agricultural wage earners, (3)
Local non-agricultural self-employed and (4) Migrant workers. Local agricultural workers are
individuals whose primary activity consists of working on the family farm or as a farm-employee.
Local non-agricultural wage earners include workers who spend most of their time working
out of agriculture as wage earners. Local non-agricultural self-employed are workers who are
self-employed in the non-agricultural sector. The three previous categories only include local
workers, i.e. individuals working in their home county. On the contrary, we considered as
migrant every individual whose primary activity takes place out of his home county (Zhao,
1999). Indeed, given the size of counties, it is impossible for a worker to commute from a
county to another county. This ensures that individuals working out of their home county, i.e.
migrants, are both working and living in towns and cities. On the contrary, this criteria ensures
that commuters, who work out of their village but who come back to their home village every
day, are classiﬁed as local workers (de la Rupelle et al., 2010)11. As stated in the introduction,
workers close to cities are expected to be paid higher wages partly because they can commute
9The sample includes the following 22 provinces, listed in alphabetical order: Anhui, Beijing, Chongqing,
Gansu, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Hebei, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Liaoning, Shaanxi,
Shandong, Shanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, Yunnan and Zhejiang.
10The primary activity is the activity to which the worker devotes most, if not all, of his working time. Many
workers also declare having a secondary activity, which is an activity to which they devote a smaller part of their
time. As some workers have both agricultural and local non-agricultural or migratory work, we have classiﬁed
individuals according to their primary activity so that each worker belongs to only one category. The worker’s
primary activity has been demonstrated to be the most relevant criteria to classify rural workers with multiple
activities (Deichmann et al., 2009).
11Consistently, in our sample 75% of the local workers spent less than 14 days out of their households during
the year, whereas 75% of migrants spent more than 180 days out of their households.
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to cities and thus, beneﬁt from the higher wages that are paid in urban areas. Thus, to capture
the entire eﬀect of urban proximity, commuters must be classiﬁed in the local workers category.
Table 5.1 presents the classiﬁcation of workers in our sample. Our sample is composed of 22,551
workers12. Regarding local non-agricultural employment, 4530 workers are wage earners and
863 are self-employed workers. 2652 workers are migrants (nearly all of them are in the non-
agricultural sector). Thus, about 35% of the labor-force is involved in the non-agricultural sector
as a primary activity, which is very consistent with previous ﬁndings (Knight and Song, 2003;
Shi et al., 2007). Finally, given land rights reallocation and the scarcity of non-agricultural jobs
in rural China, a large share of the labor force continues to work primarily in agriculture13.
Table 5.1: Classiﬁcation of workers (1ary activity)
Eﬀective %
Local agricultural workers 14,506 64.32
Local non-agricultural wage-earners 4530 20.09
Local non-agricultural self-employed 863 3.83
Migrant workers 2652 11.76
Total workers 22,551 100
5.3.2 Non-agricultural hourly wage
To study whether workers close to cities are engaged in better paid non-agricultural jobs, we
focus on local non-agricultural workers. As described above, local non-agricultural work is
composed by wage earners and self-employed workers. However, most information on labor
time and earnings is not available at the individual level for self-employed workers. Thus, the
present study focuses on local non-agricultural wage earners.
The explained variable is the individual non-agricultural hourly wage (hereafter NAHW).
12On the 37,969 individuals surveyed, 7869 are children and 30,100 are adults. 26,065 adults are workers and
4035 are inactive. However, we have missing information on place of work, labor time and/or wage for 949
workers. Finally, there are 2565 individuals for whom explanatory variables are missing. As a result, our sample
is composed of 22,551 workers.
13It is worth noting that even in each of the ﬁrst three categories, most workers spend a small portion of their
labor time in the agricultural sector. Precisely, only 784 workers in the sample declared not having worked at all
in the agricultural sector during the year.
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Another option could be to use annual non-agricultural earnings. However, annual earnings
depend on both the intensity of participation in the non-agricultural sector and on the hourly
wage. Given that urban proximity increases the intensity of participation in the non-agricultural
sector (Knight and Song, 2003), using annual earnings would lead to over-estimating the eﬀect
of urban proximity. As a result, the NAHW is the most appropriate variable. This variable is
calculated as:
NAHWi =
Wi
Di ∗Hi (5.1)
with Wi the annual wage
14 earned by individual i, Di the number of days worked during the
year and Hi the number of hours worked per day. Both Wi, Di and Hi refer to the worker’s
primary activity.
5.3.3 Variables of interest
The relationship between urban proximity and wages is likely to be characterized by two phe-
nomena: nonlinearity and heterogeneity. First, distance is likely to have a nonlinear impact
on wages. Indeed, there is extensive evidence that most urban agglomeration eﬀects disap-
pear quite rapidly across space (Rosenthal and Strange, 2001; Aminiti and Cameron, 2007).
Thus, the closer to the urban areas, the more detrimental the impact of the distance should
be. In remote areas, where almost all agglomeration eﬀects have disappeared, distance should
have a much lower eﬀect, or no eﬀect at all, on wages. Secondly, Partridge et al. (2009) have
demonstrated that urban hierarchy eﬀects were at work in the determination process of wages;
speciﬁcally, if wages are higher close to cities, the eﬀect is the strongest close to the biggest
cities because they generate the largest agglomeration eﬀects.
We use two indicators to measure the degree of urban proximity of workers’ villages. These
two indicators are designed to take into account nonlinearity and urban hierarchy eﬀects. First,
in the survey we have data on the number of kilometers between each worker’s village and the
nearest county seat (Distance). To account for the nonlinearity of the eﬀect of distance, we
have created four dummy variables (Quartile) to indicate which quartile of distance the village
is located in (q1 = 10km; q2 = 20km; q3 = 30km; q4 = 160km). Thus, the dummy “Quartile1”
14Following Hering and Poncet (2010) and De´murger et al. (2012), this includes the basic wage, bonuses and
in-kind earnings.
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is equal to 1 if the village is located within 10 km from the county seat, the dummy“Quartile2”
is equal to 1 if the village is located between 10 and 20 km from the county seat and so on. To
test whether distance has a non-linear impact on wages, we have introduced in the estimates
the Distance variable, together with interactive terms between the Distance variable and the
Quartile dummies. These interactive terms enable us to test whether an increase of 1 km in
the distance between the county seat and the worker’s village has a more detrimental impact
on wages close to the county seat.
Second, to test whether wages are highest close to the biggest cities, we use the oﬃcial codes
of the counties available in the dataset to construct the following two variables. Provincial City
is a dummy equal to 1 if the worker’s village is located in the suburb of a provincial city, and
0 otherwise. Low level City is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker’s village is a suburb
of a prefecture city, or if it is located in the administrative area of a county-level city, and 0
otherwise15. As provincial cities are much bigger and more economically developed than other
cities, we expect workers located close to these cities to beneﬁt from the highest wages.
Table 5.2 gives descriptive statistics on the hourly wages in yuan according to the distance
to urban areas. It appears that wages decrease with the distance to the county seat. In addition,
they are signiﬁcantly higher in suburban villages than in non-suburban villages.
15As explained in Chapter 2, villages located in the suburb of a provincial/prefecture city or in the adminis-
trative area of a county-level city are considered as urban areas in county and city-level data but are considered
as rural according to the more accurate deﬁnition used in the censuses and in the CHIP survey. Thus, this is
particularly interesting to asses the eﬀect of urban proximity on these villages.
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Table 5.2: Distance to urban centers and non-agricultural hourly wages
Mean SD Median Diﬀerence†
All sample 3.07 3.92 2.31
Distance to county seat
[0-10] km 3.13 3.97 2.38
]10-20] km 3.06 4.28 2.24
]20-30] km 3.05 4.01 2.31
]30-160] km 3.03 3.47 2.33
Suburban village
Yes 3.47 4.72 2.50 0.46**
No 3.01 3.80 2.28 (-2.52)
Notes: †A test of diﬀerence between means has been conducted;
t-statistic reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate signiﬁ-
cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
5.4 Methodology
5.4.1 Selection bias correction based on a multinomial logit model
To test whether workers close to urban centers are paid higher wages, we estimate an income
function on the sub-sample of local non-agricultural wage earners. To get unbiased estimates
of the coeﬃcients in the income function, we need to correct for the potential selective decision
of workers to engage in local non-agricultural wage-employment rather than in other activities.
The standard solution to tackle selection bias consists in estimating the two-step Heckman
selection model (Heckman, 1979). In our case, selection is over more than two choices, given
that workers choose to engage in one of the following four activities: local agriculture, local
non-agricultural wage-employment (hereafter NAWE), local non-agricultural self-employment
(hereafter NASE) and migration. Several methods have been proposed to correct for selection
bias when selection is over more than two exclusive choices (Lee, 1983; Dubin and MacFadden,
1984; Dahl, 2002); these models take into account the potential eﬀects of endogenous selection
in the diﬀerent activities on earnings. Essentially, these models consist in estimating a Heckman
selection model but, in the ﬁrst step, a multinomial logit model is estimated instead of a simple
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binomial logit model. Thus, these models consist in the following two steps. First, a multinomial
logit model is estimated, accounting for all the diﬀerent possible choices. Second, the results of
the ﬁrst-step equation are used to compute the appropriate correction terms, which are included
as control variables in the second-step earning equation. Bourguignon et al. (2007) show that
the Dahl (2002) semi-parametric model (with full speciﬁcation) should be preferred to the other
models. Following their recommendation, we use the Dahl’s method in the empirical analysis.
5.4.2 Baseline speciﬁcation
In the ﬁrst-step multinomial logit model, the explained variable takes the following four values,
according to the worker’s primary activity: 0 if local agriculture, 1 if NAWE, 2 if NASE and 3
if migration. In the second step, we estimate a hourly earnings function by the OLS, by adding
the correction terms calculated from the ﬁrst-step model to the set of explanatory variables16.
Regarding the income function, to test whether workers close to cities are paid higher wages,
we introduce as determinants of the hourly wage the variables of interest described in Section
5.3. We also introduce a wide range of controls, both at the worker and village levels, which
are expected to aﬀect the level of hourly wages. Thus, we control for worker’s age and its
square, education, experience and its square, gender, ethnic minority and Communist Party
membership. We introduce two more variables, at the village level, to control for frictional
distance (Bird and Sheperd, 2003): a dummy variable to control for the topography and a
dummy variable indicating whether or not a road reaches the village. In addition, as wages are
expected to be lower in poorer areas, we introduce a variable indicating whether the village is in
a province level poverty township. Regional (East, Center, West) and provincial dummies are
introduced to control for diﬀerences in development, endowments and policies. These dummies
also partially control for living costs. However, living costs are also likely to vary within a given
province, and especially between remote rural areas and other ones. As wages are expected to
be an increasing function of living costs, and as living costs are expected to be higher close to
urban areas, the coeﬃcients associated with the variables of interest could be over-estimated17
(Hering and Poncet, 2010). To precisely control for living costs, we calculate an index of living
16In the Dahl’s model, the correction terms are a polynomial of choice probabilities. Following Bourguignon et
al. (2007), we use all the probabilities, which are included as a fourth-order polynomial and with all interactions
between them.
17If living costs are often assumed to be higher close to cities, other argues that living costs are lower close to
cities due to lower transport costs.
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costs at the village level, using information on the market price, in yuan per kg, of six non-staple
foods (meat, eggs, edible oil, sugar, vegetables, fruit and melons)18.
As identifying restrictions, we use the quantity of land per capita in the worker’s household
and a dummy indicating whether the worker is unmarried. These variables, which are assumed
to aﬀect the participation choice of the worker but not his wage, have been demonstrated to be
good indentifying restrictions (Micevska and Rahut, 2008; De´murger et al., 2009). Finally, as
we introduce village-level variables in our worker level-analysis, the standard errors are clustered
at the village level in order to obtain unbiased standard errors (Moulton, 1990). Deﬁnition of
the variables and descriptive statistics are given in Appendices 5.A and 5.B.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Baseline results
Table 5.3 presents the baseline estimates of the Dahl’s model. The ﬁrst three columns give the
results of the multinomial logit model. The reference category is made up of local agricultural
workers. The results of the income equations are reported in columns (4), (5) and (6). In
Column (4), we only control for living costs by introducing provincial level dummies, whereas
in Column (5) we add the index of living costs at the village level to the set of control variables.
Finally, in Column (6) we use the index of living costs to calculate the real hourly wage, which
is used as explained variable instead of the nominal wage.
First of all, the multinomial logit model assumes the Independence of Irrelevant Alternative
(IIA) hypothesis. According to this assumption, the probability of choosing one category over
another does not depend on other alternatives. To check the validity of this assumption, we have
carried out the Small and Hsiao (1985) test19. According to Appendix 5.C, the Small and Hsiao
(1985) test indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of validity of the IIA assumption.
Moreover, Bourguignon et al. (2007) have shown that “the selection bias correction based on
18We do not use information on the market prices of ﬁsh and shellﬁsh due to too many missing values. Moreover,
market prices of non-staple foods are reported at the household level. As market prices are likely to vary across
villages, and to avoid measurement errors, we construct an index at the village level. First, for each of the six
non-staple foods, we calculate the average of its market price at the village level. Second, we create the living
cost index by averaging the market price of the six non-staple foods.
19According to this test, the IIA assumption holds if omitting one working category from the entire choice
set does not change the estimates for the remaining alternatives. Thus, the Small and Hsiao test compares the
estimated results of a restricted model (in which one of the working categories is omitted) with the estimated
results of the unrestricted model (containing the entire choice set). The null hypothesis of validity of the IIA
assumption is not rejected if the restricted and unrestricted models give similar results.
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the multinomial logit model can provide fairly good correction for the outcome equation, even
when the IIA hypothesis is violated”.
The selection correction terms enter the income equation signiﬁcantly, suggesting that the
selection model is appropriate20. In addition, the identifying restrictions are jointly signiﬁcant
in the participation model for each category of workers.
5.5.1.1 Participation model
The estimation results of the participation model are very consistent with previous ﬁndings (de
Brauw et al., 2002; Xia and Simmons, 2004; Liu and Sicular, 2009; De´murger et al., 2010),
indicating that older workers as well as more educated and experienced workers have a higher
probability of engaging in the local non-agricultural sector. On the contrary, ethnic minority
workers and those living in poor townships have much lower probability of working locally out
of agriculture. Regarding our variables of interest, as estimated by Knight and Song (2003),
distance to urban areas signiﬁcantly decreases the participation in local non-agricultural employ-
ment. However, we provide additional evidence on the role of urban proximity by breaking down
local non-agricultural employment into wage-employment and self-employment. According to
our estimates, if urban proximity increases the probability of engaging in local non-agricultural
employment, the eﬀect seems stronger for wage-employment than for self-employment, which
should not be a surprise. Indeed, large-scale rural industries are heavily concentrated in peri-
urban areas, where they beneﬁt from lower transport costs and easy access to information and
technology (Mohapatra et al., 2006). Moreover, industrial linkages with urban ﬁrms (through
subcontracting) lead rural industry to further concentrate close to cities (Peng, 1998). Thus,
local wage-employment might be the dominant type of non-agricultural employment close to
cities. However, the relation between urban proximity and self-employment is slightly weaker,
probably because two opposite forces are at work. On the one hand, households close to cities
beneﬁt from signiﬁcant market outlets, which encourages them to build up family businesses.
As a result, the closer the urban area, the higher the probability of engaging in local self-
20We do not report the whole set of coeﬃcients associated with the polynomials of the selection probabilities
in the table because they have no direct interpretation and because of their high number. Instead, we report
the F-test indicating whether or not the selection correction terms are jointly signiﬁcant in the income equation,
which is much more informative.
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Table 5.3: Baseline estimation
Multinomial logit model Income equation
NAWE NASE Migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individual characteristics
Age 0.007*** 0.002*** -0.0001 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.046***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.576) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age2 -0.011*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.056***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.011*** 0.001*** -0.002*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.043***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Experience 0.082*** 0.015*** 0.034*** 0.122*** 0.127*** 0.116***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Experience2 -0.220*** -0.051*** -0.122*** -0.310*** -0.326*** -0.297***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
Party member 0.053*** -0.010*** -0.022*** 0.196*** 0.200*** 0.183***
(0.000) (0.006) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.154*** 0.014*** 0.032*** 0.426*** 0.440*** 0.423***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Minority -0.034*** -0.003 -0.018*** -0.097 -0.101* -0.104*
(0.009) (0.319) (0.000) (0.108) (0.088) (0.063)
Village characteristics
Distance q1 -0.004** -0.001** 0.002** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022***
(0.018) (0.023) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance q2 -0.001* -0.0004** 0.001*** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006**
(0.066) (0.034) (0.008) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011)
Distance q3 -0.002*** -0.0003** 0.001*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.026) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Distance q4 -0.002*** -0.0004*** 0.0005*** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.024) (0.018) (0.018)
Low level city 0.058*** 0.008*** -0.019*** 0.119** 0.103** 0.077*
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.010) (0.015) (0.072)
Provincial city 0.108*** -0.002*** 0.521*** 0.543** 0.623*** 0.567**
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.012) (0.009) (0.015)
Road 0.050*** 0.005 -0.0001 0.192*** 0.190** 0.170**
(0.003) (0.198) (0.593) (0.008) (0.011) (0.024)
Topography -0.011 0.002 0.009*** -0.045* -0.047** -0.045**
(0.149) (0.361) (0.001) (0.059) (0.034) (0.037)
Township -0.025** -0.016*** 0.009 -0.119** -0.107** -0.104*
(0.018) (0.000) (0.164) (0.028) (0.044) (0.079)
Living costs 0.479***
(0.005)
Land per capita -0.007*** -0.002** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.020) (0.000)
Unmarried -0.002 -0.012*** 0.061***
(0.480) (0.005) (0.000)
Constant -4.977*** -7.246*** -6.491*** -39.84 -33.79 -47.29
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.422) (0.461) (0.311)
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,551 4530 4530 4530
Adj. R2 0.21 0.21 0.18
Selection correction terms 2.02*** 1.99*** 1.98***
Wald test for identifying restrictions 15.62*** 13.99*** 114.75***
Distance q1 = Distance q2 13.01*** 12.88*** 13.51***
Distance q2 = Distance q3 0.05 0.03 0.18
Distance q3 = Distance q4 4.81** 4.55** 3.47*
Provincial city = Low level city 4.31** 5.68** 4.81**
Notes: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. p-values in parenthesis. The
reference category in the multinomial logit model is made up of local agricultural workers. The dependent variable
in the earning equation is the logarithm of hourly earnings. The models have been estimated using a bootstrap
procedure with 500 replications.
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employment. On the other hand, however, the positive impact of urban proximity on the
participation in local self-employment is probably counter-balanced by the greater availability
of non-agricultural goods close to cities. Indeed, the ease in ﬁnding manufactured goods from
urban and local rural industries may reduce the probability that local non-agricultural family
businesses set up (Corral and Reardon, 2001). In remote areas, on the contrary, as households
bear high transport costs, they are usually involved in some self-employment production in order
to satisfy their own consumption of non-agricultural produce (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2003).
5.5.1.2 Income equation
Turning to the income equation, it appears that, as for urban areas (Hering and Poncet, 2010;
De´murger et al., 2012), hourly wages in rural China are an increasing function of a worker’s age,
education and experience. Men and party members also beneﬁt from higher wages. Regarding
our indicators of interest, the distance21 to the county seat has a negative impact on wages,
whereas living in a suburban village signiﬁcantly increases wages. Interestingly, distance exhibits
a strongly nonlinear impact. A 1 km increase in the distance between a worker’s village and
the county seat has a signiﬁcantly stronger impact on wages within 10 km from the county
seat (ﬁrst quartile). The eﬀect is the lowest for villagers located at more than 30km from the
county seat (last quartile), indicating that most urban spillover eﬀects occur in the vicinity of
the county seat. In addition, we ﬁnd strong evidence of urban hierarchy eﬀects. While workers
in the suburb of the county and prefecture-level cities earn about 7%− 12% more than workers
not located in the suburb of a city, workers in the suburbs of provincial-level cities earn about
54% − 62% more. To our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to demonstrate that rural workers are
paid diﬀerent wages according to their location in rural China. As for physical distance, wages
also decrease with frictional distance: wages are higher in villages linked by a road and lower in
mountainous areas. Finally, the results are robust whatever the controls introduced for living
costs. Interestingly, the coeﬃcients of the Distance variables remain almost the same when
controlling for living costs, which probably arises from the fact that distance to the county seat
does not lead to diﬀerences in living costs. On the contrary, the magnitude of the coeﬃcients
of the Provincial city and Low level city dummies are more aﬀected by this additional control,
21In order to make the interpretation of the results easier, we directly present in the estimation tables the
coeﬃcients of the distance variable by quartiles. To do this, we have recalculated the coeﬃcients of distance
for each quartile, together with their standard errors, using information on both the additive terms and the
interactive terms between distance and the quartiles.
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which highlights that living costs are probably signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in the suburb of cities than
in other villages. In the rest of the chapter, we use the real wage as dependant variable so that
results have to be compared with Column (6) of Table 5.3. The next step of the chapter aims
at understanding why workers in villages close to urban areas are paid higher wages, even after
controlling for diﬀerences in prices. This could arise from two main channels: (i) rural workers
are more productive close to urban areas, leading to higher wages in villages close to urban
areas; (ii) rural workers manage to commute to nearby urban areas and to beneﬁt from the
better-paid urban jobs.
5.5.2 Transmission Channels
One additional contribution of this study is to disentangle the role of the potential transmission
channels. As stated in the introduction, workers close to urban areas can be paid higher wages
because of both agglomeration externalities, a higher market potential and commuting.
To assess the eﬀect of agglomeration externalities, we test the speciﬁc eﬀect of specializa-
tion (or localization economies)22, and diversiﬁcation (or urbanization economies). We use two
indicators of specialization at the village level: the share of employees in township and vil-
lage enterprises and the number of non-agricultural family businesses. Following Combes et al.
(2008), to capture the eﬀect of the diversity of the economy, we use the log of the inverse of the
Herﬁndahl index. Speciﬁcally, in the village questionnaire, the data on the labor force is dis-
aggregated into the following ﬁve sectors: agriculture; manufacturing; construction; wholesale,
retail and food services; and other industries.
To test for the eﬀect of market potential, as is widely done, we have constructed a Harris
market potential indicator as follows:
Harris MPi =
J∑
j=i
wij ·GDPj (5.2)
where GDPj is the Gross Domestic Product of county j
23 and wij a spatial weighting matrix
22In our opinion, the notion of specialization in the context of rural areas in developing countries is diﬀerent
than the usual notion used in the literature on agglomeration economies in urban areas. In agrarian economies,
what matters for an economy is to specialize out of agriculture so that new non-agricultural knowledge can emerge,
in addition to traditional agricultural knowledge. In this context, looking at the eﬀect of specialization out of
agriculture is more relevant than testing the eﬀect of specialization in one particular non-agricultural sector.
23Data at the county-level comes from the 2003 China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy.
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deﬁned as follows:
wij = 1 if i = j (5.3)
wij =
1
distij
if distij ≤ 200km (5.4)
wij = 0 if distij > 200km (5.5)
where distij is the number of kilometers between county i and county j. The distance 200km is
chosen as the cut-oﬀ parameter, i.e. beyond 200 km, interactions are considered as negligible24.
Following Aminiti and Cameron (2007), we include in the measure of the market potential the
GDP of the county in which the village is located (Equation 5.3). As the authors highlight,
working with micro-level data alleviates the potential problem of the endogeneity of the own
county GDP that aﬀect studies at the aggregated regional level. Moreover, excluding the market
of the own county would lead to an irrelevant measure of the market potential for villages
located in the periphery of a city. In addition, we follow Partridge et al. (2009) by using
the aggregate income in surrounding concentric rings, measured from the population-weighted
center of the county, as an additional indicator of market potential. We use the aggregate
income in surrounding concentric rings of 0-50km, 50-100km, 100-150km and 150-200km25. It
is worth noting that the market potential is calculated at the county level. The market potential
of a given village is not calculated by using disaggregated data on neighboring villages for three
reasons. First, the rural non-agricultural production is much more directed to the urban market
than to the rural market. As highlighted in the introduction, rural non-agricultural production
is closely tied to urban production, trough subcontracting and technical assistance to urban
ﬁrms. Thus, market potential measures constructed from village data would not provide a
relevant measure of the market potential. Calculating spatial lagged variables using the GDP of
the whole county (which includes both urban and rural areas) provides a much better measure
of market potential. Second, we use survey data on 961 villages. Population data disaggregated
at the village level is not available, neither in our survey, nor in any oﬃcial statistical yearbook.
Third, even if we know the precise name of every village of the sample, accurate geographical
24The cut-oﬀ value chosen is similar to the values used in previous studies (Ke and Feser, 2010; Chen and
Partridge, 2011). Moreover, to check the sensibility of our results, we have used other cut-oﬀ values. Results are
robust to this change.
25The intervals chosen are consistent with previous studies (Ke and Feser, 2010).
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coordinates of the villages are not available so that distance is calculated using the geographical
coordinates at the county level.
Finally, it is worth noting that using micro-level data rules out the risk of endogeneity of
the indicators of agglomeration externalities. In our study, wages are measured at the indi-
vidual level whereas our indicators of agglomeration externalities are measured at the village
(specialization and diversiﬁcation) or at the county-level (market potential). Thus, a shock to a
worker’s wage is very unlikely to aﬀect the indicators of agglomeration externalities, measured
at a more aggregated level.
To investigate the eﬀect of commuting, we decompose local workers into two categories:
individuals working in their village and individuals working out of their village (but within
their home county), i.e. commuters. To asses the eﬀect of commuting, we estimate the income
equation on the sub-sample of individuals working within their village. To do this, we consider
commuting as a distinct choice in the multinomial logit model26. If commuting plays a signiﬁcant
role, once commuters excluded the coeﬃcients of interest should become less signiﬁcant.
Table 5.4 presents the estimation results. We begin by testing the eﬀect of agglomeration
externalities and market potential. As shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5.4, workers
living in villages where the economy is diversiﬁed are not paid higher wages27. Regarding
specialization, the share of employees in TVE has a positive eﬀect on wages; however, the
eﬀect is not robust when excluding commuters. Turning to market potential, workers are paid
higher wages, the higher the market potential of the county. The impact is robust, whatever
the measure used. Our result is consistent with Hering and Poncet (2010) who estimate that
standard agglomeration eﬀects does not aﬀect wages in Chinese cities, whereas market potential
has a very signiﬁcant impact. Compared with the baseline estimation (Column (6) in Table
5.3), the coeﬃcients of Provincial City and Low Level City are less (or no longer) signiﬁcant and
of lower magnitude when we control for agglomeration externalities. Thus, market potential
26In this case, the explained variable of the ﬁrst-step selection equation takes the following values: 0 if local
agriculture, 1 if NAWE working within their home village, 2 if NAWE commuters, 3 if NASE and 4 if migration.
The estimation results of the multinomial logit model, and of the income function for commuters, are available
in Appendix 5.D
27We can wonder whether this result arises from a lack of eﬀect of diversiﬁcation or from the construction of
the variable. Indeed, Combes et al. (2012) also estimate that diversiﬁcation has no eﬀect on wages in urban
China. However, the authors point out that they only have data on a few industrial sectors, which does not allow
them to appropriately capture the eﬀective diversiﬁcation of the economy. As we have data on only ﬁve sectors,
we are very likely to meet the same measurement problem.
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Table 5.4: Transmission channels
Agglo. ext. No commuters All channels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Individual characteristics
Age 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.063*** 0.052*** 0.052***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age2 -0.056*** -0.053*** -0.068*** -0.060*** -0.059***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.048*** 0.039*** 0.042***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Experience 0.109*** 0.105*** 0.152*** 0.096*** 0.113***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.008) (0.001)
Experience2 -0.278*** -0.267*** -0.406*** -0.261*** -0.298***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.010) (0.002)
Party member 0.174*** 0.170*** 0.372* 0.200 0.279
(0.000) (0.000) (0.088) (0.252) (0.100)
Male 0.423*** 0.408*** 0.432*** 0.384*** 0.403***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Minority -0.058 -0.103* -0.182** -0.102 -0.191**
(0.276) (0.053) (0.031) (0.219) (0.022)
Village characteristics
Distance q1 -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.027** -0.026** -0.025**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.019) (0.028)
Distance q2 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.004 -0.007 -0.007
(0.003) (0.006) (0.456) (0.207) (0.252)
Distance q3 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006 -0.008 -0.007
(0.001) (0.004) (0.230) (0.112) (0.182)
Distance q4 -0.002*** -0.002** -0.003 -0.003* -0.003
(0.006) (0.016) (0.160) (0.098) (0.167)
Low level city 0.038 0.078** 0.101 0.035 0.083
(0.242) (0.020) (0.111) (0.560) (0.139)
Provincial city 0.227 0.108 1.734*** 0.106 0.752*
(0.194) (0.597) (0.000) (0.496) (0.077)
Road 0.162*** 0.143** 0.417** 0.294** 0.333**
(0.008) (0.018) (0.016) (0.046) (0.023)
Topography -0.016 -0.032* 0.030 0.015 0.017
(0.387) (0.080) (0.616) (0.790) (0.750)
Township -0.101** -0.090* -0.346*** -0.301*** -0.272***
(0.033) (0.056) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Transmission channels
Share of workers in TVE 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.065 0.109*
(0.009) (0.006) (0.289) (0.091)
NA family businesses 4.52E-05 4.35E-06 1.57E-05 4.02E-05
(0.777) (0.978) (0.953) (0.879)
Diversiﬁcation 0.032 0.035 -0.015 0.016
(0.335) (0.294) (0.767) (0.771)
Harris market potential 0.096*** 0.075**
(0.000) (0.015)
Agg inc 0 - 50 km 1.03E-04*** 1.43E-04***
(0.001) (0.005)
Agg inc 50 - 100 km 8.79E-05** 1.17E-04**
(0.011) (0.020)
Agg inc 100 - 150 km 1.14E-04*** 1.26E-04***
(0.000) (0.006)
Agg inc 150- 200 km 1.09E-04*** 1.19E-04**
(0.000) (0.020)
Constant -16.73 -21.01 24.95 8.404 5.589
(0.673) (0.581) (0.214) (0.645) (0.745)
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4530 4530 1997 1997 1997
Adj. R2 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.20
*, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. p-values in parenthesis.
The dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly earnings. The models have been estimated using
a bootstrap procedure with 500 replications.
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appears to be one signiﬁcant transmission channel leading workers close to cities to be paid
higher wages28.
Secondly, we investigate whether workers close to cities are paid higher wages thanks to
commuting. As shown in Column (3), when excluding commuters, the coeﬃcients associated
with the variables distance are no longer signiﬁcant. This indicates that workers in villages
close to the county seat are more likely to commute to the county seat, where they engage in
better paid jobs. Thus, diﬀerences in commuting opportunities play a very signiﬁcant role in
explaining wages disparities across rural workers. On the contrary, the coeﬃcient of Provincial
City remains strongly signiﬁcant and its magnitude increases. Thus, even when commuters are
excluded, workers close to cities are paid higher wages. This clearly arises from the higher level
of wages in villages close to cities. As a consequence, workers close to cities are paid higher
wages due to both spatial diﬀerences in wages across villages and to greater opportunities to
commute. Finally, when controlling both for agglomeration externalities and for commuters,
almost all the variables of interest are no longer signiﬁcant, indicating that we have successfully
captured the transmission channels at work.
5.5.3 Robustness checks
We investigate the robustness of our results by addressing the issues of ownership structure and
endowments.
5.5.3.1 Ownership structure
Wages in the public sector are higher than the average in urban China (De´murger et al., 2012). If
wages are also higher in the public sector in rural China, and if the public sector is concentrated
close to cities, this would upwardly bias the coeﬃcients associated with urban proximity. Tables
5.5 and 5.6 present descriptive statistics in order to give some insights about whether or not
the lack of control for ownership is likely to bias our results. Table 5.5 gives the average hourly
wage in our sample for each speciﬁc sector: public, semi-public, private and other ownerships.
Consistently, workers in the public sector beneﬁt from the highest wages. Table 5.6 gives the
share of non-agricultural workers in the village involved in each diﬀerent ownership sector.
28The coeﬃcients of the distance are almost not aﬀected when we control for agglomeration externalities. This
is consistent because market potential is measured at the county level. As every village located in the same county
is given the same market potential, the market potential indicator does not capture the eﬀect of the distance to
the county seat variable.
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According to the table, the ownership structure would not signiﬁcantly diﬀer between suburban
and non-suburban villages. The semi-public sector would be slightly more present in suburban
areas. However, given that wages in the semi-public sector are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than
average wages (Table 5.5), this is unlikely to lead to estimation bias.
Even if the lack of control for ownership is not likely to lead to estimation bias, controlling
for public ownership is an interesting robustness check. Indeed, wages in the public sector could
be less inﬂuenced by market access compared with other sectors in China (Hering and Poncet,
2010).
It is quite challenging to take into account the ownership sector in the sample selection model.
A ﬁrst option would be to introduce a dummy variable to control for the sector. However, as we
only observe ownership for local non-agricultural workers, it would not be correct to introduce
this variable in the selection equation of the Heckman model. Another option would be to
simply drop public workers from the analysis but this would lead to a selection bias. The most
satisfactory solution consists in modeling the decision to work in the public sector as a speciﬁc
choice, diﬀerent from working in other sectors (see De Vreyer et al. (2010) and Wu (2010) for
empirical applications). Consequently, to control for ownership, we consider non-agricultural
wage-employment in the public sector as a distinct choice in the multinomial logit model29
and we estimate the income equation for local non-agricultural wage-earners in the non public
sector. Estimation results are reported in Table 5.7. Excluding public workers does not lead
to an increase in the coeﬃcients of interest. This may be due to the fact that public workers
only account for a small share of our sample (about 8%). In addition, these additional results
conﬁrm that the lack of control for ownership does not lead to estimation bias.
29We do not distinguish between four ownerships (public, semi-public, private and other) but rather between
two: public and not public. From an economic point of view, this is completely justiﬁed because Hering and
Poncet (2010) demonstrate that all enterprises, except public ones, react to market potential. This classiﬁcation
is also justiﬁed from an econometric point of view. Indeed, the ﬂexible Dahl model suﬀers from a signiﬁcant
loss of eﬃciency when the number of categories in the multinomial logit increases and when the sample size
decreases (Bourguignon et al., 2007). Distinguishing four ownerships would lead (i) to an increase in the number
of categories in the multinomial logit model and (ii) to estimate the income equation for each respective ownership
and thus, with few observations, both resulting in important losses of eﬃciency.
170 Chapter 5. Urban Proximity and Non-agricultural Wages
Table 5.5: Hourly wages disaggregated by ownership
Nb. of workers Average wage SD Diﬀerence†
All NAWE 4530 3.07 3.92
According to ownership:
Public 349 3.81 3.18 3.66***
Semi-public 526 3.11 2.65 0.24
Private 1694 2.76 3.79 -4.02***
Other 1961 3.19 4.39 1.79*
Notes: NAWE means local non-agricultural wage earners. † Tests of diﬀerence
between means have been conducted to compare the wage in each sector to the
average wage in the rest of the economy; t-statistics are reported in this column.
*, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Table 5.6: Share of non-agricultural wage-earners by ownership
All villages Suburban Non-suburban Diﬀerence†
(N=788) (N=62) (N=726)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
All NAWE 20.55 18.03 34.32 23.14 19.40 17.06 6.71***
According to ownership:
Public 8.77 18.95 9.78 17.94 8.68 19.05 0.44
Semi-public 9.08 20.11 13.85 22.29 8.67 19.87 1.95*
Private 34.21 33.08 32.60 27.20 34.35 33.54 -0.40
Other 47.94 35.45 43.76 30.58 48.29 35.83 -0.97
Total 100 100 100
Notes: NAWE means local non-agricultural wage earners.  Villages with no local non-
agricultural wage-earners are excluded from the table. † Tests of diﬀerence between means
have been conducted to compare the ownership structure between suburban and non-
suburban villages; t-statistics are reported in this column. *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table 5.7: Ownership: excluding public workers
No channels Agglo. externalities No commuters All channels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual characteristics
Age 0.045*** 0.047*** 0.058*** 0.043***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Age2 -0.054*** -0.056*** -0.057*** -0.047***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Education 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.030** 0.020
(0.001) (0.001) (0.049) (0.154)
Experience 0.086*** 0.081*** 0.122** 0.051
(0.009) (0.002) (0.014) (0.186)
Experience2 -0.233*** -0.224*** -0.337** -0.149
(0.010) (0.002) (0.013) (0.168)
Party member 0.202*** 0.191*** 0.483* 0.226
(0.000) (0.000) (0.051) (0.278)
Male 0.410*** 0.411*** 0.386*** 0.311***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Minority -0.093 -0.047 -0.220** -0.105
(0.104) (0.398) (0.023) (0.264)
Village characteristics
Distance q1 -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.018 -0.022*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.144) (0.097)
Distance q2 -0.006** -0.005*** -1.84E-04 -0.005
(0.013) (0.009) (0.977) (0.444)
Distance q3 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.002 -0.005
(0.009) (0.002) (0.680) (0.339)
Distance q4 -0.002** -0.002** -8.56E-04 -0.001
(0.034) (0.023) (0.750) (0.549)
Low level city 0.066* 0.034 0.068 -0.005
(0.100) (0.318) (0.322) (0.929)
Provincial city 0.304** 0.247** 1.451*** 0.961**
(0.016) (0.024) (0.001) (0.018)
Road 0.141** 0.136** 0.424** 0.282*
(0.034) (0.035) (0.029) (0.094)
Topography -0.045** -0.020 0.049 0.005
(0.025) (0.297) (0.487) (0.932)
Township -0.101* -0.092* -0.277*** -0.236**
(0.055) (0.072) (0.004) (0.012)
Share of workers in TVE 0.048*** 0.067
(0.006) (0.339)
NA family businesses -2.88E-05 -3.77E-04
(0.883) (0.274)
Diversiﬁcation 0.028 -0.011
(0.419) (0.841)
Harris market potential 0.091*** 0.061*
(0.000) (0.063)
Constant -2.721 -2.828 17.81 9.357
(0.850) (0.839) (0.287) (0.550)
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4181 4181 1862 1862
Adj. R2 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.22
*, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. p-values in parenthesis.
The dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly earnings. The models have been estimated
using a bootstrap procedure with 500 replications.
172 Chapter 5. Urban Proximity and Non-agricultural Wages
5.5.3.2 Endowments
Diﬀerences in endowments are one major source of spatial diﬀerences in wages because endow-
ments can aﬀect workers’ productivity (Hanson, 2000). Moreover, endowments are one major
source of spatial agglomeration, so that they may be correlated with our indicators of urban
proximity, leading to estimation bias. According to Hering and Poncet (2010), endowments
are likely to vary across Chinese provinces so that provincial dummies should control for such
diﬀerences.
However, to ensure robustness, we carry out two more tests. First, we substitute provincial
dummies with county-level dummies30. Second, we follow Fally et al. (2010) by excluding from
our analysis sectors which depend on natural resources. To do so, we consider non-agricultural
wage employment in these sectors as a distinct choice in the multinomial logit model (as we
did for commuters and for public workers). Estimation results are reported in Tables 5.8 and
5.9. We have re-estimated the baseline model and the “augmented” model with transmission
channels. To limit the number of results, we only provide the estimation results obtained
with the Harris market potential indicator, which is much more commonly used. Thus, results
obtained in Tables 5.8 and 5.9 have to be compared with results presented in Column (6) of
Table 5.3 and to columns (1), (3) and (4) of Table 5.4. With the exception of the coeﬃcient of
Low level city, which is no longer signiﬁcant, results are very similar to those obtained until now,
indicating that the results previously obtained are not driven by diﬀerences in endowments.
30In this case we cannot estimate the coeﬃcient of the market potential given that the market potential is
measured at the county level.
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Table 5.8: Endowments: county-level dummies
No channels Agglo. externalities No commuters All channels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual characteristics
Age 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.054*** 0.054***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age2 -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.060***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.038*** 0.040***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Experience 0.142*** 0.128*** 0.091** 0.095***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.040) (0.005)
Experience2 -0.368*** -0.332*** -0.261** -0.266***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.032) (0.005)
Party member 0.201*** 0.190*** 0.263* 0.249*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.099) (0.053)
Male 0.485*** 0.460*** 0.328*** 0.340***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Minority 0.037 0.034 0.059 0.054
(0.592) (0.617) (0.643) (0.666)
Village characteristics
Distance q1 -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.022** -0.019*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.078)
Distance q2 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.003 -0.002
(0.007) (0.009) (0.525) (0.670)
Distance q3 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006 -0.006
(0.000) (0.000) (0.130) (0.134)
Distance q4 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002 -0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.262) (0.297)
Low level city 0.128 0.120 0.085 0.099
(0.151) (0.182) (0.540) (0.482)
Provincial city 1.714*** 1.645*** 2.187*** 1.980***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.005)
Road 0.154** 0.136** 0.277* 0.272*
(0.017) (0.033) (0.082) (0.061)
Topography 0.026 0.023 0.016 0.012
(0.309) (0.357) (0.774) (0.805)
Township -0.0740 -0.0762* -0.249*** -0.240***
(0.110) (0.100) (0.001) (0.001)
Share of workers in TVE 0.050*** 0.082
(0.000) (0.102)
NA family businesses 1.64E-04 5.21E-05
(0.325) (0.834)
Diversiﬁcation 0.017 0.008
(0.637) (0.893)
Harris market potential - -
Constant 5.455 -2.321 -7.900 -9.075
(0.847) (0.934) (0.584) (0.516)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial dummies No No No No
County-level dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4530 4530 1997 1997
Adj. R2 0.22 0.23 0.29 0.29
*, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. p-values in parenthesis.
The dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly earnings.
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Table 5.9: Endowments: excluding workers engaged in natural resources sectors
No channels Agglo. externalities No commuters All channels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual characteristics
Age 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.065*** 0.057***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age2 -0.053*** -0.055*** -0.072*** -0.067***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.052*** 0.042***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Experience 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.169*** 0.106***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005)
Experience2 -0.258*** -0.257*** -0.446*** -0.283***
(0.005) (0.000) (0.002) (0.006)
Party member 0.187*** 0.180*** 0.372 0.191
(0.000) (0.000) (0.102) (0.291)
Male 0.362*** 0.374*** 0.433*** 0.388***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Minority -0.063 -0.023 -0.192** -0.112
(0.276) (0.683) (0.034) (0.216)
Village characteristics
Distance q1 -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.023** -0.024**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.030) (0.035)
Distance q2 -0.006** -0.005*** -0.004 -0.007
(0.013) (0.007) (0.483) (0.221)
Distance q3 -0.005** -0.005*** -0.006 -0.007
(0.013) (0.003) (0.255) (0.137)
Distance q4 -0.002** -0.002** -0.003 -0.003
(0.033) (0.018) (0.167) (0.103)
Low level city 0.060 0.037 0.087 0.030
(0.136) (0.269) (0.194) (0.641)
Provincial city 0.514** 0.251 1.850*** 1.437***
(0.011) (0.163) (0.000) (0.001)
Road 0.133** 0.132** 0.401** 0.298**
(0.041) (0.038) (0.020) (0.042)
Topography -0.069*** -0.046** 0.004 0.011
(0.004) (0.039) (0.933) (0.841)
Township -0.107** -0.113** -0.316*** -0.275***
(0.037) (0.023) (0.001) (0.002)
Share of workers in TVE 0.033** 0.056
(0.035) (0.365)
NA family businesses 1.01E-04 5.36E-05
(0.542) (0.855)
Diversiﬁcation 0.037 0.005
(0.269) (0.923)
Harris market potential 0.087*** 0.079**
(0.000) (0.015)
Constant -32.98 -5.468 11.84 -2.176
(0.217) (0.833) (0.552) (0.904)
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4414 4414 1932 1932
Adj. R2 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.21
*, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. p-values in parenthesis.
The dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly earnings. The models have been estimated
using a bootstrap procedure with 500 replications.
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5.5.4 Discussion
5.5.4.1 Firm size
A ﬁrst objection could be made regarding the lack of control for ﬁrm size. Bigger ﬁrms are
more able to specialize their production, leading to productivity gains, for example through
learning-by-doing and through a reduction in costs as workers do not have to switch tasks.
Thus, bigger ﬁrms may be able to pay higher wages. Moreover, bigger ﬁrms, which are more
able to survive in a more competitive environment, could be more numerous close to cities.
Thus, ﬁrm size may be correlated with our indicators of urban proximity, leading to an upward
estimation bias. In the literature, very few studies have controlled for ﬁrm size. On the one
hand, studies at the county-level are unable to control for ﬁrms’ characteristics. On the other
hand, most micro-economic studies lack data on ﬁrms’ characteristics (Aminiti and Cameron
(2007), Mion and Naticchioni (2009) and Fally et al. (2010) are notable exceptions). In our
case, the lack of data prevents us from controlling for ﬁrm size; this point should be kept in
mind.
5.5.4.2 Industry structure
Another objection could be made regarding the lack of control for industry structure. As for
ownership, if the most remunerative industries are concentrated around cities, this would lead
us to over-estimate the eﬀect of urban proximity. Tables 5.10 and 5.11 give some insights about
whether or not the lack of control for industry is likely to bias our results. First, wages are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the average in most industries. Consistently, they are signiﬁcantly
lower than the average in the construction and restaurant industries, whereas they are higher
in transport and communication, education and government (Table 5.10). However, according
to Table 5.11, there would be almost no diﬀerence in the industry structure across villages.
Indeed, “Commerce and trade” and “Services” would be the only industries for which there
would be a diﬀerence. Yet, as wages in these sectors are not statistically diﬀerent than the
average wage, this is unlikely to bias our results. Given that, and because of the three following
additional reasons, we do not control for ownership in our study. The ﬁrst additional reason is
that, in fact, some industries are already controlled for. Speciﬁcally, the industries for which
we expect the eﬀect of urban proximity to be the lowest (education and government) belong
to the public sector. As a result, controlling for the public sector is very similar to controlling
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for those two activity sectors. Moreover, to control for endowments, we have excluded from
the analysis workers that belong to the “mineral and geological survey” sector. The second
reason is that, contrary to studies on agglomeration economies in urban areas, we do not need
to estimate a model disaggregated by sector to capture the eﬀect of specialization. As already
explained in this chapter, what matters in the context of agrarian economies is to specialize
out of agriculture. In this context, looking at the eﬀect of specialization out of agriculture is
more relevant than testing the eﬀect of specialization in one particular non-agricultural sector.
Lastly, controlling for activity sectors would result in very high losses of eﬃciency due to an
increase in the number of categories in the selection equation and to a reduction of the sample
size in the income equation (Bourguignon et al., 2007).
Table 5.10: Hourly wages disaggregated by industry
Nb. of workers Average wage SD Diﬀerence†
All NAWE 4530 3.07 3.92
According to industry:
Mineral and geological survey 116 2.95 1.95 -0.32
Industry 1259 2.96 3.98 -1.13
Construction 745 2.63 3.22 -3.32***
Transport and communication 128 4.13 4.76 3.13***
Commerce and trade 146 2.80 3.60 -0.81
Restaurant 99 2.32 2.44 -1.89*
Education 224 3.49 2.56 1.66*
Government agencies 251 3.88 3.70 3.40***
Services 158 2.79 2.00 -0.87
Other 1404 3.20 4.63 1.55
Notes: NAWE means local non-agricultural wage earners. † Tests of diﬀerence be-
tween means have been conducted to compare the wage in each sector to the average
wage in the rest of the economy; t-statistics are reported in this column. *, **, ***
indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table 5.11: Share of non-agricultural wage-earners by industry
All villages Suburban Non-suburban Diﬀerence†
(N=788) (N=62) (N=726)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
All NAWE 20.55 18.03 34.32 23.14 19.40 17.06 6.71***
According to industry:
Mineral and geological survey 2.86 12.64 1.91 10.65 2.94 12.79 -0.62
Industry 19.91 28.51 21.66 25.70 19.76 28.75 0.50
Construction 18.21 26.87 15.66 23.18 18.42 27.16 -0.78
Transport and communication 3.23 10.37 4.04 8.17 3.16 10.53 0.64
Commerce and trade 2.95 9.84 5.30 12.99 2.75 9.50 1.95*
Restaurant 2.56 10.89 2.35 5.76 2.58 11.23 -0.16
Education 6.22 16.47 3.59 13.42 6.44 16.69 -1.31
Government agencies 7.45 18.72 6.26 12.98 7.55 19.13 -0.52
Services 3.52 11.61 6.62 13.07 3.26 11.45 2.20**
Other 33.09 33.12 32.61 31.98 33.14 33.23 -0.12
Total workers 100 100 100
Notes: NAWE means local non-agricultural wage earners.  Villages with no local non-
agricultural wage-earners are excluded from the table. † Tests of diﬀerence between means
have been conducted to compare the industrial structure between suburban and non-suburban
villages; t-statistics are reported in this column. *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level respectively.
5.5.4.3 Spatial sorting of workers
We could also wonder whether wages are higher close to cities because the most productive
workers agglomerate in villages close to cities. Indeed, spatial diﬀerences in wages can arise
from spatial diﬀerences in the skill composition of the workforce (Glaeser and Mare´, 2001;
Combes et al. 2008; Mion and Naticchioni, 2009). As Combes et al. (2008) highlight, the best
way to control for the spatial sorting of workers consists in using individual-level data (to control
for observable characteristics of workers) and in using panel data (to control for invariant and
unobserved workers’ characteristics).
First, by using micro-level data, we are able to control for a wide range of workers’ charac-
teristics in our estimates. Thus, we control for the fact that workers can sort across locations
according to their observable characteristics.
Nevertheless, workers could also sort across locations according to their unobservable char-
acteristics. Speciﬁcally, our results could be biased if the most motivated and talented rural
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workers moved to villages close to cities. Thus, spatial sorting of workers could still lead to
estimation bias because of the migration of workers31. In this case, the best solution to control
for spatial sorting of workers would be to use panel data. However, we only have data for the
year 2002. Indeed, although there are several waves of rural surveys in the CHIP data (1988;
1995; 2002; 2007), individuals, villages and provinces surveyed are not the same from one survey
to another. The questionnaires themselves also change from one wave to another.
In our view, even if we lack panel data, it is highly unlikely that the spatial sorting of
workers leads to estimation bias in our study for the following two reasons. First, as Combes
et al. (2012) highlight, spatial sorting of workers is almost non-existent in China because of
the institutional system, which for decades has strictly restricted internal migration (Household
registration system or hukou). The authors make this observation for urban China but it is
also relevant (indeed, even more relevant) for rural China, where migration is much lower than
in urban areas32. In other words, spatial sorting across rural areas is very unlikely in China
because there are almost no migrants who settle in rural China, due to the speciﬁc institutional
and economic context. Second, our study is carried out on the sample of local workers. Thus,
even if migration is very low in rural China, it is controlled for in our empirical analysis. Even if
the most talented workers moved to villages close to cities, they are classiﬁed in the “migrants”
category and thus, they are not taken into account in our analysis of the determinants of hourly
wages. As a consequence, working on the sample of local workers eradicates any potential spatial
sorting of workers.
Finally, it is worth noting that, if we had panel data, it would be impossible for us to
control for selection bias. Indeed, models of selection bias corrections based on the multinomial
logit model can only be applied to cross-sectional data (Combes et al., 2011). Thus, while we
acknowledge that the lack of panel data makes it impossible to control for the improbable spatial
sorting of workers, the lack of panel data is highly “preferable” because it enables us to control
for the selection bias which is, according to our estimates, at work in our study.
31According to Mion and Naticchioni (2009), the spatial sorting of workers does not necessarily require that
workers migrate across location. For example, if returns to education are higher in villages close to cities, this
would foster human capital accumulation, leading to a concentration of skilled workers in these villages. However,
this type of spatial sorting is already controlled for in our study, thanks to the micro-level data.
32The 2000 census data gives valuable information about migration across rural and urban areas. On the
whole, 6.34% of the population in China resides outside his home county. The percentage reaches 15.97% of
the population in cities whereas migrants only represent 2.28% of the population in rural counties. Thus, most
migrants in China leave the countryside to go to cities, which oﬀer the most numerous and the best employment
opportunities. On the contrary, there are very few migrants who settle in rural China, because of the very limited
employment opportunities.
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5.5.4.4 Regional heterogeneity
As presumed in the general introduction of the thesis, and as estimated in Chapter 4, urban
eﬀects on rural areas are likely to vary across Chinese regions. Until now, we have found
that urban proximity enhances agricultural eﬃciency much more in Eastern China than in
Central and Western China. In our opinion, urban areas are also more likely to impact non-
agricultural wages in nearby rural areas in Eastern China. Indeed, as Eastern rural areas
beneﬁt from location advantages, rural industry concentrates much more in the vicinity of
Eastern urban areas than in the vicinity of other urban areas (Naughton, 2007). Speciﬁcally,
the new competitive industrial clusters that have appeared over the last decade in rural China
(see Section 5.2), are mainly located in Eastern provinces. Thus, agglomeration externalities
are much more likely to occur in rural areas close to cities in Eastern China. Consistently, Table
5.12 conﬁrms that the rural non-agricultural sector is more developed in Eastern China as a
larger share of rural workers are involved in local non-agricultural wage employment in Eastern
provinces (28.21%) than in Central and Western provinces (respectively 18.21% and 14.44%).
Table 5.12: Local non-agricultural wage-earners by region
Total workers Local NAWE
Eﬀective % in total workers
Full sample 22,551 4530 20.09
East 6754 1905 28.21
Central 9134 1663 18.21
West 6663 962 14.44
To test whether urban eﬀects are heterogeneous across Chinese regions, we have re-estimated
the baseline model separately for Eastern, Central and Western provinces. Results are reported
in Table 5.13. Consistent with what we expected, it appears that urban proximity has a higher
eﬀect on rural non-agricultural workers’ wages in Eastern China, although urban eﬀects are
not limited to Eastern China. Indeed, the coeﬃcient associated to the variables of interest is
of the expected sign and statistically signiﬁcant in every case for the sub-sample of Eastern
provinces. On the other hand, urban proximity does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on wages in
Central provinces33. Finally, in Western China rural workers closer to the county seat are paid
33Consistently, as there are no provincial-level cities in Central China, the coeﬃcient associated to the Provincial
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signiﬁcantly higher wages. However, being close to a city does not have any signiﬁcant impact
on wages.
Table 5.13: Regional heterogeneity
Full sample East Center West
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual characteristics
Age 0.046*** 0.035** 0.024 0.074***
(0.000) (0.010) (0.103) (0.002)
Age2 -0.056*** -0.041*** -0.031* -0.085***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.052) (0.004)
Education 0.043*** 0.060*** 0.030*** 0.042**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016)
Experience 0.116*** 0.132** 0.040 0.080
(0.001) (0.019) (0.349) (0.399)
Experience2 -0.297*** -0.307** -0.094 -0.175
(0.001) (0.030) (0.458) (0.530)
Party member 0.183*** 0.215** 0.144** 0.087
(0.000) (0.018) (0.032) (0.295)
Male 0.423*** 0.388*** 0.274** 0.453*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.058)
Minority -0.104* 0.017 -0.192 -0.116
(0.063) (0.888) (0.140) (0.193)
Village characteristics
Distance q1 -0.022*** -0.048*** 0.011 -0.038***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.204) (0.005)
Distance q2 -0.006** -0.015*** 0.007** -0.012**
(0.011) (0.000) (0.044) (0.023)
Distance q3 -0.005*** -0.007** 0.001 -0.016***
(0.005) (0.019) (0.814) (0.009)
Distance q4 -0.003** -0.004* 0.003 -0.005**
(0.018) (0.076) (0.131) (0.029)
Low level city 0.077* 0.180** -0.037 -0.037
(0.072) (0.020) (0.533) (0.701)
Provincial city 0.567** 0.553*** - 0.579
(0.015) (0.007) (0.159)
Road 0.170** -0.084 0.287** 0.133
(0.024) (0.401) (0.047) (0.241)
Topography -0.045** -0.129*** 0.002 -0.094
(0.037) (0.003) (0.962) (0.108)
Township -0.104* -0.391*** -0.079 0.116
(0.079) (0.003) (0.340) (0.194)
Constant -47.29 51.96 -91.16 -30.26
(0.311) (0.512) (0.111) (0.663)
Regional dummies Yes No No No
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4530 1905 1663 962
Adj. R2 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.17
Notes: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respec-
tively. p-values in parenthesis. The dependent variable is the logarithm of
hourly earnings. The models have been estimated using a bootstrap proce-
dure with 500 replications.
City dummy cannot be estimated.
5.6. Conclusion 181
5.6 Conclusion
We provide a thorough analysis of the eﬀects of urban proximity on rural non-agricultural
wages, which are a crucial determinant of the level of earnings and well-being of rural house-
holds. We ﬁnd that remote workers not only suﬀer from lower opportunities to diversify out
of agriculture locally, but, in addition, when they manage to diversify, they engage in lower
paid non-agricultural jobs. By demonstrating that non-agricultural wages vary according to
the distance from urban centers, we shed additional light on intra-rural inequality and on the
geographic repartition of poverty in China. Our results are consistent with Xia and Simmons
(2004), according to which birthplace still plays a signiﬁcant role in determining an individual’s
place of work, earnings and well-being. In order to reduce poverty and inequality in rural China,
rural development policies not only must pay attention to the individual determinants of job
access and earnings but also to their spatial determinants.
In addition, workers close to cities beneﬁt from higher wages because of the combining
eﬀect of market potential, which increases wages close to cities, and of commuting. Thus, our
results suggest that a minority of villages located close to urban areas beneﬁt from signiﬁcant
productive advantages (mainly due to their greater market potential), which could lead to a
process of cumulative causation leading new industry to primarily set up in villages close to
cities. In this context, it may be diﬃcult for rural policies to attract new industries or relocate
existing ones to peripheral rural areas. This issue is extremely serious given that non-agricultural
employment strongly determines rural welfare. Finally, we have found additional evidence that
rural areas beneﬁt more from urban proximity in Eastern China.
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Appendix to Chapter 5
5.A Deﬁnitions of the variables
Table 5.14: Deﬁnitions of the variables
Variables Deﬁnition Unit
Age Age of the worker Year
Education Number of years of schooling (not including years spent on repeating
a grade)
Year
Experience Number of years since when the worker starts a non-agricultural ac-
tivity as his primary activity
Year
Party member Dummy equal to 1 if the worker is member of the Communist Party,
0 otherwise
Male Dummy equal to 1 if the worker is a man, 0 otherwise
Minority Dummy equal to 1 if the worker is an ethnic minority, 0 otherwise
Unmarried Dummy equal to 1 if the worker is not married, 0 otherwise
Land per capita Total amount of land possessed per capita in the household Mu
Distance Distance from the nearest county seat Kilometers
Quartile 1 Dummy equal to 1 if the worker’s village is located within 10 km from
the county seat (the ﬁrst quartile of the distance is equal to 10 km)
Quartile 2 Dummy equal to 1 if the worker’s village is located within 10 and 20
km from the county seat (the median of the distance is equal to 20
km)
Quartile 3 Dummy equal to 1 if the worker’s village is located within 20 and 30
km from the county seat (the third quartile of the distance is equal
to 30 km)
Quartile 4 Dummy equal to 1 if the worker’s village is located within 30 and 160
km from the county seat (the fourth quartile of the distance is equal
to 160 km)
Low level city Dummy equal to 1 if the village is in the suburb of a prefecture city
or if it is located in the administrative area of a county-level city, 0
otherwise
Provincial city Dummy equal to 1 if the village is in the suburb of a provincial-level
city, 0 otherwise
Road Dummy equal to 1 if a road reaches the village, 0 otherwise
Topography Variable equal to 1 if the village is located in a plain, 2 if in a hilly
area and 3 if in a mountainous area
Township Dummy equal to 1 if the township the village is in is a province level
poverty township
Living costs Average market price of six non-staple foods (meat, eggs, edible oil,
sugar, vegetables, fruit and melons)
Yuan
Share of workers in TVE Share of employees in township and village enterprises in the village %
NA family businesses Number of non-agricultural family businesses in the village
Diversiﬁcation Inverse of the Herﬁndahl index, calculated using labor force data at
the village level, disaggregated into ﬁve sectors: agriculture; man-
ufacturing; construction; wholesale, retail and food services; other
industries
Harris market potential Sum of the GDP of the counties, weighted by the distance in km
between the county in which the worker’s village is located and other
counties
Yuan
Agg inc within 0-50 km ring Aggregate income between 0 and 50 km radii from county centroid Yuan
Agg inc within 50-100 km ring Aggregate income between 50 and 100 km radii from county centroid Yuan
Agg inc within 100-150 km ring Aggregate income between 100 and 150 km radii from county centroid Yuan
Agg inc within 150-200 km ring Aggregate income between 150 and 200 km radii from county centroid Yuan
5.B Descriptive statistics
Table 5.15: Descriptive statistics
All workers NAWE Other workers
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age 38.89 13.43 39.61 11.92 38.70 13.78
Education 7.07 2.77 7.94 2.59 6.84 2.77
Experience 2.07 4.90 6.07 7.57 1.07 3.26
Party member 0.08 0.27 0.16 0.37 0.06 0.23
Male 0.53 0.50 0.73 0.43 0.47 0.49
Minority 0.12 0.32 0.06 0.24 0.13 0.33
Unmarried 0.21 0.40 0.15 0.36 0.22 0.41
Land per capita 1.92 2.09 1.53 1.66 2.01 2.17
Distance 24.32 20.98 19.85 16.64 25.44 21.79
Low level city 0.32 0.46 0.36 0.48 0.30 0.46
Provincial city 0.03 0.17 0.06 0.24 0.02 0.15
Road 0.96 0.19 0.97 0.17 0.96 0.19
Topography 1.73 0.78 1.61 0.73 1.76 0.78
Township 0.14 0.34 0.09 0.29 0.14 0.35
Living costs 4.65 0.60 4.69 0.58 4.63 0.60
Share of workers in TVE 0.11 0.51 0.28 1.05 0.07 0.20
Family business 26.34 52.58 33.58 69.44 24.53 47.26
Diversiﬁcation 2.34 0.75 2.36 0.70 2.32 0.76
Harris market potential 107.84 223.07 153.16 284.39 96.48 203.31
Agg inc within 0-50 km ring 19 355.09 14 206.66 20 444.64 14 249.61 19 081.20 14 183.08
Agg inc within 50-100 km ring 698.98 808.65 1037.18 1150.51 613.97 670.55
Agg inc within 100-150 km ring 992.73 1028.73 1318.94 1340.29 910.72 916.17
Agg inc within 150-200 km ring 1281.84 1109.88 1633.89 1350.54 1193.34 1021.80
Total 22551 4530 18021
Notes: NAWE means local non-agricultural wage earners.
5.C Test of the IIA assumption: Small-Hsiao test
Table 5.16: Test of the IIA assumption: Small-Hsiao test
Omitted working category LnL(full) LnL(omit) chi2 P>chi2
Local non-agricultural wage-earners -4194.584 -4151.552 86.064 0.123
Local non-agricultural self-employed -7296.032 -7257.804 76.455 0.338
Migrants -5778.988 -5739.797 78.382 0.284
Notes: LnL(full) refers to the log-likelihood for the unrestricted model (containing the
entire choice set) and LnL(omit) refers to the log-likelihood for the restricted model
(in which one of the working categories is omitted). The test statistics is calculated
as: chi2 = −2 · (LnL(full)− LnL(omit)).
5.D Commuting as a distinct choice in the multinomial model
Table 5.17: Commuting as a distinct choice in the multinomial logit model
Multinomial logit model Income equations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NAWE NAWE NASE Migration NAWE NAWE
No commuters Commuters No commuters Commuters
Individual characteristics
Age 0.073*** 0.056*** 0.085*** 0.010 0.063*** 0.029**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.571) (0.000) (0.014)
Age2 -0.089*** -0.109*** -0.129*** -0.117*** -0.068*** -0.023*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.081)
Education 0.075*** 0.078*** 0.060*** 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.032***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Experience 0.610*** 0.592*** 0.750*** 0.785*** 0.152*** -0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.957)
Experience2 -1.693*** -1.635*** -2.443*** -2.726*** -0.406*** 0.036
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.781)
Party member 0.752*** -0.360*** -0.406*** -0.468*** 0.372* 0.297*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.088) (0.082)
Male 0.834*** 1.244*** 0.828*** 0.872*** 0.432*** 0.162*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.097)
Minority -0.283** -0.271** -0.206 -0.435*** -0.182** 0.015
(0.031) (0.028) (0.320) (0.000) (0.031) (0.841)
Village characteristics
Distance q1 -0.006 -0.037*** -0.043** 0.029** -0.027** -0.006
(0.656) (0.002) (0.024) (0.027) (0.013) (0.443)
Distance q2 0.006 -0.017*** -0.017** 0.015** -0.004 0.001
(0.369) (0.001) (0.037) (0.010) (0.456) (0.806)
Distance q3 -1.75E-04 -0.026*** -0.012** 0.011*** -0.006 0.004
(0.966) (0.000) (0.027) (0.006) (0.230) (0.303)
Distance q4 -0.005** -0.013*** -0.017*** 0.006*** -0.003 0.001
(0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.160) (0.597)
Low level city 0.251*** 0.393*** 0.337*** -0.295*** 0.101 -0.017
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.111) (0.767)
Provincial city 2.990*** 2.299*** 1.840*** 4.367*** 1.734*** 0.340
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.231)
Road 0.739*** 0.114 0.286 0.059 0.417** 0.227*
(0.000) (0.404) (0.203) (0.661) (0.016) (0.052)
Topography 0.113** -0.177*** 0.065 0.151*** 0.030 -0.030
(0.020) (0.000) (0.345) (0.001) (0.616) (0.533)
Township -0.273*** -0.100 -0.830*** 0.117 -0.346*** 0.115*
(0.007) (0.273) (0.000) (0.143) (0.000) (0.073)
Land per capita -0.040** -0.066*** -0.072** -0.063***
(0.025) (0.000) (0.022) (0.000)
Unmarried -0.122 0.150 -0.474*** 0.900***
(0.299) (0.108) (0.005) (0.000)
Constant -8.237*** -4.629*** -7.271*** -6.486*** 24.95 -11.23
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.214) (0.511)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,551 1997 2533
Adj. R2 0.20 0.19
Selection correction terms 1.32** 1.73***
Wald test for identif. restrict. 6.40** 17.11*** 13.80*** 114.92***
Notes: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. p-values in parenthesis. The reference
category in the multinomial logit model is made up of local agricultural workers. The models have been estimated using
a bootstrap procedure with 500 replications.

Chapter 6
Environmental Inequality
The Role of Urban Proximity
and Regional Borders
This chapter is an adapted version of an article published under the reference: C. Duvivier and H. Xiong
“Transboundary Pollution in China: a Study of Polluting Firms’ Location Choices in Hebei Province”. Environ-
ment and Development Economics, available on CJO2013. doi:10.1017/S1355770X13000168.
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6.1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the economic reforms, dramatic environmental degradation has accom-
panied China’s spectacular economic performance. The level of pollution is now threatening
both economic development and public health. According to the World Bank (2007), the total
cost of air and water pollution in China amounts to 5.8% of GDP.
State of the environment in rural China
While it is widely recognized that cities suﬀer more from pollution than rural areas, over
recent years rural areas have experienced much more signiﬁcant environmental degradation. In
cities, where environmental problems are extremely worrying and where incomes have signiﬁ-
cantly risen, urban dwellers have begun demanding better environmental quality. As a result,
relatively stringent environmental regulation has been adopted in cities, which has progressively
led to better environmental quality in urban areas. By contrast, in rural areas, where envi-
ronmental standards are very low, environmental quality has been continuously deteriorating.
Moreover, not only is environmental regulation more stringent in cities, it is also much better
enforced in cities than in rural areas. As we will see in further detail in Section 6.2, China’s en-
vironmental policy is decentralized: while the central government sets environmental standards,
the local governments monitor and impose sanctions on polluters. Yet, local governments in
urban areas have many more incentives and resources to enforce environmental standards than
those in rural areas. As a result, rural areas may have turned into China’s new “pollution
havens”, both because of lower environmental standards set at the national level and because
the decentralized environmental policy has led to an “implementation gap” of environmental
standards between urban and rural areas.
According to several descriptive works, the tightening of environmental regulations in cities
has led an increasing number of polluting ﬁrms to locate in the recently established industrial
zones in rural areas located just outside city boundaries (Economy, 2004; Wang, 2009). Thus,
while stricter environmental regulation in urban areas has led to improvements in urban envi-
ronmental quality, it may also have led to an accelerated relocation of polluting ﬁrms in nearby
rural places, explaining why emissions remain high at the regional level. As a result, in addition
to the pollution generated by agricultural production (especially due to the use of fertilizers and
pesticides), rural areas have signiﬁcantly and increasingly suﬀered from the eﬀects of industrial
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pollution. For example, in 2000 it was estimated that Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs)
generated as much as half of total national pollutant emissions (Tianje, 2008).
Environmental degradation in rural China is all the more problematic as rural households are
extremely vulnerable to pollution (Liu, 2010). Indeed, degradation of land and water reduces
agricultural yields and thus, farmers’ income. For example, the World Bank (2007) has esti-
mated that the use of polluted water for irrigation leads to a loss, in terms of production yields
and quality, of about seven billion yuan each year. Furthermore, there has been virtually no
state investment to develop environmental protection infrastructure in rural areas. Thus, while
the rural population produces about 280 million tonnes of rubbish and nine billion tonnes of
waste water, almost no villages are equipped with waste water and rubbish treatment facilities1.
Rural inhabitants are also used to drinking water from natural sources so that water pollution
has disastrous eﬀects on their health. Finally, the rural population has limited access to health
care and is often too poor to pay for treatment so that pollution has much more detrimental
health consequences in rural areas than in urban areas.
Environmental degradation in rural areas, in conjunction with the high vulnerability of
rural populations to pollution, has led to disastrous health consequences for rural inhabitants.
According to the 2008 Third National Survey on Causes of Death of the Ministry of Health
of China, cancer is the second cause of death in rural China, accounting for as much as 21%
of deaths (Liu, 2010). The most dramatic illustration of the devastating impact of industrial
pollution on health in rural areas is given by “cancer villages” (aizheng cun). These are villages
where the number of cancer cases is extremely high, victims are younger than average, and
industrial pollution is the likely cause of the cancer. The phenomenon appeared in the 1990s
when a high number of chemical, steel and electronic factories began to locate in farming villages,
heavily polluting the air and water. A striking fact is that contrary to the U.S., where cancer
clusters are located in industrial urban sites, cancer villages are a rural phenomenon in China
(Liu, 2010). According to Liu, the clustering of cancers in rural China is primarily due to the
high vulnerability of rural households to pollution and to the government’s environmental policy,
which has continuously favored urban areas to the detriment of rural areas. Typically, cancer
villages are located close to the largest Chinese cities as Houwanggezhuang village located about
1Jane Qiu, “China vows to clean up rural environment”, Nature, April 1, 2011.
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40 miles of the centre Beijing2, or Liukuaizhuang village in Tianjin province, where nowadays
almost every family has lost at least one member to cancer.
This critical situation has led to a very rapidly growing number of environmental disputes in
rural China. In fact, although environmental disputes in urban China have attracted a great deal
of attention, rural China has actually experienced a larger, and more rapidly growing number
of “environmental mass incidents”. However, environmental disputes in cities have attracted
much more attention because they beneﬁt from quite extensive media coverage, contrary to
rural areas, where media coverage has often been censored (Tianje, 2008).
Aims and contributions of the chapter
Testing for the role of urban proximity
The present chapter aims at investigating whether, and why, localities close to cities dispro-
portionately suﬀer from industrial pollution. In our opinion, polluting ﬁrms may be more likely
to locate in the vicinity of cities for two reasons: (i) a “pure market eﬀect”, and (ii) to avoid the
more stringent environmental regulation of cities.
First, counties close to cities beneﬁt from locational advantages, leading ﬁrms to locate
there disproportionately, whatever the pollution level they generate. As already explained in
Chapter 3, counties close to cities beneﬁt from productive advantages that make them much
more attractive destinations for proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms than more remote areas3 (Wu and
Gopinath, 2008). Moreover, as cities develop, factor costs increase and the service sector grows,
leading to a progressive reallocation of industrial activities to peripheral areas. As a result,
counties close to cities are likely to suﬀer from more industrial pollution than areas further
away from cities, simply because there are more ﬁrms locating there. It is worth noting that
this phenomenon may concern both highly polluting and “non-polluting” ﬁrms and that it may
occur even in the absence of stringent environmental regulation in urban areas.
Second, polluting ﬁrms may disproportionately locate close to cities in order to escape the
more stringent environmental regulation of cities. Indeed, due to the tightening of environmental
regulation in urban China, existing polluting ﬁrms may have closed and re-opened in neighboring
counties. Moreover, this increase in environmental regulation in cities has made the creation
2Tom Phillips, “China admits pollution has caused cancer villages”, The Telegraph, February 22, 2013.
3In Chapter 5, we have also demonstrated to some extent that factories locate more often in rural areas close
to cities. Indeed, we have estimated that the closer the urban area, the higher the probability to engage in
non-agricultural wage employment.
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of polluting ﬁrms in cities more diﬃcult. As a result, it is possible that new polluting ﬁrms
wishing to set up in cities are obliged to locate in rural counties and locate as close as possible
to the cities, i.e. in adjacent counties.
A ﬁrst contribution of this chapter is to go beyond the study of the economic impact of
cities on nearby areas. By studying whether urban proximity leads to a higher level of in-
dustrial pollution, we provide complementary results to the literature on urban eﬀects, which
has overwhelmingly focused on the role of cities on the economic performance of nearby rural
areas. Although urban proximity may enhance economic performance in nearby rural places
(Chapters 4 and 5), we will highlight that it may also reduce quality of life and increase rural
vulnerability by leading to much higher pollution levels. A key step in addressing this issue is
to disentangle whether this eﬀect arises from a “pure market eﬀect” or from the implementation
of more stringent environmental regulation in cities. To our knowledge, until now no study has
empirically assessed whether counties close to cities disproportionately suﬀer from industrial
pollution in China.
By demonstrating that this phenomenon occurs, we also contribute to the very scarce liter-
ature on environmental inequality in China. Two notable exceptions are Ma (2010) and School-
man and Ma (2011), who investigate how socioeconomic characteristics of townships inﬂuence
the geographic repartition of pollution. Ma (2010) highlights that rural migrants disproportion-
ately suﬀer from pollution in Henan. Schoolman and Ma (2011) also emphasize that migrants
are disproportionately exposed to pollution in Jiangsu and put forth a general theory of envi-
ronmental inequality by highlighting that in China, as in the US, individuals at the bottom of
the social ladder bear most of the environmental burden. By adding an additional lens (ur-
ban proximity) to analyze environmental inequality, the present study provides complementary
results to these previous works.
Testing for transboundary pollution
Finally, this chapter also presents the results of an article I have co-written with Hang Xiong
on transboundary pollution4 (see Duvivier and Xiong, 2013). In my view, it is particularly
relevant to integrate this work into the present chapter for the following two reasons.
First, testing for both transboundary pollution and the eﬀect of urban proximity helps us
4Transboundary pollution refers to the excess of pollution at provincial borders of the country.
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better understand environmental inequality in China. In other words, the present chapter not
only focuses on the eﬀects of cities but also provides more general evidence on the role of two
major spatial determinants of environmental inequality in China, namely borders and urban
proximity.
Second, both the eﬀect of urban proximity and of borders are closely linked to the issue
of China’s decentralized environmental policy. As already explained, and as we will see in
more detail in Section 6.3, local governments have fewer incentives and resources to enforce
environmental regulation in rural areas. As a result, the decentralized environmental policy can
lead to an “implementation gap” in environmental standards between rural and urban areas,
leading polluting ﬁrms to disproportionately locate close to cities. Similarly, and as we will
see in more detail in Section 6.4, there is already quite strong evidence that a decentralized
environmental policy can result in an excess of pollution at regional borders.
Thus, this chapter also contributes to the literature by studying whether or not transbound-
ary pollution does indeed exist in China today. Until now, almost all studies on transboundary
pollution have been focused on the United States (Helland and Whitford, 2003; Kahn, 2004;
Sigman, 2005; Konisky and Woods, 2010). Indeed, very few have looked at this issue in emerging
countries and, to our knowledge no study has been done on China5.
Main results and structure of the chapter
To test for the eﬀect of proximity to cities and regional borders, we study the location choices
of polluting ﬁrms in Hebei, one of the most highly polluted provinces in the country. Speciﬁcally,
we test whether polluting ﬁrms are more likely to locate in counties: (i) close to large cities
(in terms of GDP), (ii) close to cities with stringent environmental regulation, and (iii) close to
provincial borders. For this purpose, we use the lists of polluting ﬁrms published annually by the
Ministry of Environmental Protection and by the Environmental Protection Bureau of Hebei
Province. We ﬁnd no evidence that being close to a county-level city signiﬁcantly increases the
number of polluting ﬁrms setting up in a given county. However, it appears that counties close
to prefecture-level cities disproportionately suﬀer from pollution. Interestingly, this appears to
arise both because of a market potential eﬀect and because polluting ﬁrms aim at escaping the
more stringent environmental regulation that is implemented in these cities. Finally, we ﬁnd
5Lipscomb and Mobarak (2011) constitute one exception with their analysis of water pollution spillovers in
Brazil.
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evidence that counties close to regional borders are more attractive destinations for polluting
ﬁrms than interior counties.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Following the introduction, in Section
6.2 we brieﬂy present China’s environmental policy. In Section 6.3 we explain why polluting
ﬁrms would tend to agglomerate in counties close to cities. In Section 6.4 we study why, in
the context of a decentralized policy, polluting ﬁrms would tend to agglomerate near regional
borders. Section 6.5 describes the study area and the data. We present the estimation strategy
in Section 6.6 and the results in Section 6.7. Finally, in Section 6.8 we conclude and oﬀer some
policy recommendations.
6.2 Environmental policy in China
6.2.1 A decentralized environmental policy
The Chinese environmental policy has gradually developed since the late 1970s, when the ﬁrst
environmental protection laws were adopted. Nevertheless, it is only after 1990 that environ-
mental protection really becomes a political objective (Sinkule and Ortolano, 1995). The 2000s
mark a new step in China’s environmental policy, which has clearly been tightened over the
past decade. For example, from 2002 to 2008, the total amount of collected pollution levies
rose from 6.74 to 18.52 billion yuan (State Environmental Protection Agency, 2003; Ministry of
Environmental Protection, 2009).
At the beginning, the power of the regional environmental agencies was extremely limited.
During the 1980s, the environmental policy followed the general movement of decentraliza-
tion occurring in the country; since then, environmental protection has depended largely on
local governments. Nowadays, it is thereby managed at the national level by the Ministry of
Environmental Protection (MEP) and at the regional and local level (provinces, prefectures
and counties) by the Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB). The central government (MEP)
establishes environmental standards, is responsible for coordinating regional interests and con-
ﬂicts, and evaluates regional environmental performances. However, environmental policy is
implemented by the regions (EPB). They monitor the emissions of polluters and impose penal-
ties if the standards are not met. Decentralization of environmental policy in a country as
heterogeneous as China oﬀers undeniable advantages. Indeed, a decentralized environmental
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policy allows for greater ﬂexibility as well as better information and adaptation to the local
context. In other words, a decentralized policy is more eﬃcient than a centralized one that
would apply uniform rules across the country. However, Chinese local governors are evaluated
more on their economic performance than on their environmental performance (Li and Zhou,
2005). Therefore, environmental protection has often been sacriﬁced to economic performance.
Facing this critical situation, we have recently observed a certain recentralization of en-
vironmental policy in China. In 2008, the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA)
became the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) in order to give more power to cen-
tral government in terms of environmental protection. Moreover, between 2006 and 2008, six
major supervision centers 6 were created. Each of these major centers is responsible for sev-
eral provinces and supervises if they respect the environmental standards established by the
central government. The centers are also in charge of coordinating interprovincial conﬂicts.
These new centers constitute in fact a new intermediate level between central government and
provinces, created in order to limit the negative eﬀects of decentralization. However, until now,
the power of these new centers has been very limited and the environmental policy is still largely
implemented by Chinese provinces.
6.2.2 Impact of environmental regulations on polluting ﬁrms
Like all ﬁrms, those that pollute do not choose their location randomly: they decide to locate
in a particular region to maximize their proﬁt. Several studies show that in China, the location
choice of both foreign (Wu, 1999) and Chinese ﬁrms (Wen, 2004) depends today on “rational
economic considerations”. Thus, ﬁrms are generally attracted to regions with good market
opportunities and where labor is cheap and skilled.
Polluting ﬁrms, in addition, usually take into account the severity of environmental reg-
ulation when deciding where to locate. This is likely to be the case in China, where it has
been shown that environmental regulations signiﬁcantly raise the costs of polluting ﬁrms. For
example, Wang (2002) estimates that pollution charges lead to a signiﬁcant increase in expendi-
tures on end-of-pipe water treatment facilities at the plant-level. Moreover, a higher number of
6Five centers were created in 2006 : the center of South China (Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi and
Hainan), of the Southwest (Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan and Tibet), of the Notheast (Liaoning Jilin
and Heilongjiang), of the Northwest (Shaanxi, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai and Xinjiang) and of the East (Shanghai,
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Anhui, Jiangxi and Shandong). In 2008 the center of North China was created (Beijing,
Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia and Henan).
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inspections leads to a higher expected penalty for ﬁrms that do not comply with environmental
standards and thus, signiﬁcantly reduces the level of water and air pollution of industries in the
city of Zhenjiang (Dasgupta et al., 2001). In addition, although state-owned enterprises have
more bargaining power with local authorities in terms of the charges they pay (Wang et al.,
2003), environmental policy also has a signiﬁcant impact on them (Wang and Wheeler, 2005).
As a consequence, given that environmental regulation in China imposes signiﬁcant costs on pol-
luting ﬁrms, we would expect these ﬁrms to locate in regions with less stringent environmental
regulation.
6.3 Why would polluting ﬁrms be more likely to locate close to
cities?
As explained in Section 6.2.2, polluting ﬁrms are expected to locate in regions with less stringent
environmental regulations. In this section, we explain why there are diﬀerences between urban
and rural areas in China both in terms of environmental regulations and the level of their
enforcement. Because of this gap between cities and rural areas, existing polluting ﬁrms in
urban areas are likely to relocate to nearby localities and new polluting ﬁrms are likely to locate
directly in counties close to cities.
In China, the environmental policy has been strongly urban-biased for a long time, resulting
in a strong divide in environmental laws between rural and urban areas. (Liu, 2010). For
example, while emission targets have been adopted in cities for quite a long time, it was only in
2011 that the Vice Minister of Environmental Protection, Li Gangjie, announced that speciﬁc
emission targets would also be imposed in rural areas. Until then, air and water pollutant
emissions in rural areas were not taken into account by the central government in its evaluation
of emission levels at the national level7. For the ﬁrst time, the central government has also
committed in its 12th Five-year Plan (2011-2015) to implement more stringent environmental
regulation in rural areas and environmental protection in rural areas has been included in
China’s Five-year budget plan.
In cities, not only is environmental regulation more stringent than in rural areas but, in
addition, the enforcement of environmental laws is much more eﬀective (Wang et al., 2008).
7“Pollution rurale: le temps du grand me´nage”, China Daily, March 29, 2011.
204 Chapter 6. Environmental Inequality
For example, Xu (1999) observes from a ﬁeld study that in 1998 in Jiangsu province, less
than 10% of TVEs eﬀectively complied with environmental laws. Moreover, while many rural
enterprises generated greater pollutant emissions than their urban counterparts, most of them
had never been inspected.
In our opinion, three broad reasons may explain why environmental regulation is less ef-
fectively enforced in rural areas than in urban areas: (i) local governments in rural areas have
fewer resources, (ii) local government have fewer incentives, and (iii) rural industries are more
diﬃcult to monitor.
Local governments in rural areas have far fewer resources to turn away businesses and to
enforce environmental regulation. Indeed, rural industries generate huge ﬁnancial beneﬁts for
poor rural localities, both in terms of tax revenues and job creation (Wang et al., 2008). For
example, the Lianhua Gourmet Powder Company (Xiangcheng county, Henan province), which
is highly suspected of poisoning the local environment, is allowed to continue operating without
government interference as it employs more than 8,000 workers and is the largest taxpayer in
the county8. In fact, local oﬃcials in rural areas are often encouraged not to comply with
environmental standards in order to induce polluting ﬁrms to locate in their jurisdiction, which
could lead to a “race to the bottom” phenomenon (Tianje, 2008). In addition, rural localities
have far fewer resources to enforce environmental regulation because the Chinese environmental
policy has been strongly urban-biased. Most resources to ﬁght pollution and monitor enterprises
are directed towards urban areas. Thus, at the county level, EPB in rural areas are much more
under-staﬀed and beneﬁt from much less qualiﬁed personal and fewer ﬁnancial resources than
EPB in urban areas (Swanson et al., 2001). Moreover, at the provincial level, most monitoring
staﬀ in EPB focus on urban administrative areas so that very few inspectors and resources are
eﬀectively allocated to monitor rural enterprises (Wang et al., 2008). As a result, TVEs are
much less frequently inspected than their urban counterparts.
Secondly, local oﬃcials in rural areas often lack incentives to eﬀectively enforce environ-
mental regulation. Indeed, as in cities, political promotion in rural areas is based on economic
performance and not on environmental quality. As Wang et al. (2008) underline, environmental
quality only matters for an oﬃcial’s promotion when an environmental scandal is made pub-
lic. Yet, environmental disasters are more likely to be made public in urban areas, where the
8Jim Yardley, “Rivers Run Black, and Chinese Die of Cancer”, The New York Times, September 12, 2004.
6.3. Why would polluting ﬁrms be more likely to locate close to cities? 205
population is much more widely covered by the media than the rural population9. In addition,
local oﬃcials in rural areas are sometimes direct stakeholders in polluting ﬁrms, which leads to
conﬂicts of interest. In such cases, local oﬃcials, who are usually in charge of pollution controls,
have no incentive to enforce environmental laws, which would penalize their enterprise and thus,
reduce their personal income (Xu, 1999). Even when local oﬃcials are not direct stakeholders,
enterprise managers often maintain close relationships with local oﬃcials and with the local
environmental staﬀ. As a result, enterprise managers are usually “informed” before an inspec-
tion occurs, which enables them to temporarily stop their production and successfully pass the
environmental inspection (Wang et al., 2008).
Finally, the speciﬁc characteristics of rural enterprises make the enforcement of environ-
mental standards particularly diﬃcult in rural areas. Indeed, polluting ﬁrms in rural areas are
much smaller, spatially dispersed and ﬁnancially instable. As a result, the cost of monitoring
polluting ﬁrms is much higher in rural than in urban areas (Xu, 1999). This, combined with
the more limited resources available for environmental protection in rural China, has led local
EPB to monitor only a very small number of polluting ﬁrms in rural areas, the vast majority
of polluting TVEs not being bothered.
The tightening of the environmental regulation in cities, in conjunction with poorly enforced
low environmental standards in rural areas, may have led to the degradation of environmental
quality in rural areas. First, urban polluting ﬁrms have been obliged to replace their out-dated
and dirty production technologies by cleaner ones. Unfortunately, this has created opportunities
for rural ﬁrms to buy from urban ﬁrms their out-dated and used equipment production (Xu,
1999). Second, it seems that the most highly polluting ﬁrms in urban areas have generally
not adopted new production technologies. Instead, they have simply closed and re-opened just
outside the city boundaries to escape from the stringent environmental regulation enforced in
cities (Economy, 2004). Moreover, it is also possible that new polluting ﬁrms wishing to locate
in cities move to nearby counties as no better option is available.
9Tianje (2008) gives a very meaningful example of this issue by mentioning the construction project of a
chemical plant in Fujian province. In June 2007, the construction project of a chemical plant in Xiamen city
generated a huge peaceful protest in the streets of Xiamen city. The protest was extensively covered by the
media so that the project to build the plant in the city was ﬁnally abandoned. However, in December it was
announced that the provincial government had decided to build the plant in a rural town in the neighboring
Zhangzhou prefecture (Fujian province). This news led to a wide protest in the rural area, which was severely
received by the police. Moreover, the dispute in the rural area went largely unreported in the media. This case
is very meaningful as it highlights how two disputes caused by the same construction project, one in Xiamen city
and one in a nearby rural area, were very unevenly covered by the media.
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Several descriptive works have provided evidence on speciﬁc cases, indicating that polluting
ﬁrms have been relocating outside the city boundaries over the recent period. For example, Xu
(1999) points out that at the end of the 1990s, about 700 industrial factories located in the
center of Shanghai city and considered as “serious polluters” closed and re-opened in the close
periphery. According to Xu (1999), this was due to two reasons: (i) to make room to allow
the tertiary sector to develop in Shanghai city, and (ii) to reduce pollution in the city center.
Economy (2004) and Tianje (2008) provide additional examples of relocations of polluting ﬁrms
from downtown to peripheral areas in China.
To our knowledge, until now there is no study which empirically assesses whether the more
stringent environmental regulation in Chinese cities has eﬀectively led to a signiﬁcant reallo-
cation of polluting ﬁrms from downtown to peripheral areas. As Xu (1999) highlights, the
increasing number of polluting ﬁrms in counties close to cities could arise both from the natural
pattern of economic development (urban market eﬀect, tertiarisation of cities and relocation of
industry to peripheral areas) and from the tightening of environmental regulation in cities. The
present study tries to provide additional evidence on this issue, especially by empirically disen-
tangling the relative role of the “pure urban market eﬀect” from the eﬀect of the environmental
regulation of cities.
6.4 Why would polluting ﬁrms be more likely to locate near
borders?
As explained in Section 6.2.2, polluting ﬁrms are expected to locate in regions with less stringent
environmental regulations. In this section, we explain how regional diﬀerences in environmental
regulations may lead polluting ﬁrms to locate more frequently in border counties. Speciﬁ-
cally, two phenomena could lead to transboundary pollution, namely “pollution havens” and
“free-riding” eﬀects. In our opinion, this may explain why over the last years more and more
environmental conﬂicts between provinces have been attracting great attention in China10.
10For example, in January 2008, residents of the Wuqing district (Tianjin province) complained that a cement
plant in the neighboring Xianghe county (Hebei province) had over-discharged dust pollution which then crossed
the province border and damaged their soil and crop production (Wuqing District Environmental Protection
Bureau, 2008). Disputes involving the Huai River, which runs through Henan, Shandong, Anhui and Jiangsu
provinces, are also very illustrative of ever-increasing transborder conﬂicts. On several occasions, downstream
provinces have accused upstream provinces of dumping pollution into the river in order to evacuate it to other
provinces. As polluters from a given province can evacuate a part of their pollution to other provinces, there is
a risk of excess of pollution at regional borders of the countries.
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6.4.1 Diﬀerences in interprovincial regulation: pollution havens hypothesis
at the provincial level
In China, environmental policy implementation varies greatly from one province to another
(Wang and Wheeler, 2005). Such disparity in policy enforcement by region would be at the
origin of a “pollution havens” phenomenon at the provincial level11: polluting ﬁrms would
be attracted to provinces where environmental regulations are less strict (Dean et al., 2009).
Indeed, at the borders, there are discontinuities in environmental regulations (Kahn, 2004).
By crossing an administrative boundary, one can suddenly move from strict environmental
regulation to a less restrictive one. In this context, it could be very proﬁtable for a ﬁrm to
locate on the border between two provinces. Crossing a border can therefore be a way to
avoid stringent environmental regulations while continuing to beneﬁt from the market access
of the neighboring province with stricter environmental regulation. Kahn (2004) shows that
in the United States, in low environmental regulation states, “dirty” industries locate more
often in counties that border high regulation states than in interior counties. Conversely, in
counties bordering low regulation states, there is a lower number of polluting ﬁrms. In terms
of environmental regulation, Hebei is less stringent than its neighbors, with the exception of
Inner Mongolia12. Thus, on the whole, we can expect the pollution havens eﬀect to be positive
in Hebei province, leading polluting ﬁrms to concentrate close to borders.
6.4.2 Diﬀerences in intra-provincial regulations: free-riding and intra-provincial
pollution havens hypotheses
When environmental policy is decentralized, provincial regulators may be less strict in imple-
menting the policy in border counties than in interior ones. In other words, free-riding may
emerge at the boundaries between diﬀerent regions of the country13. Two factors could encour-
age regulators to strategically implement environmental regulation, both leading to an excess
11The hypothesis of “pollution havens” is generally considered at the international level. According to this
hypothesis, in a world of free trade, the South, whose environmental regulations are less stringent, has a compar-
ative advantage in producing “dirty” goods. This can lead polluting industries to migrate from the North to the
South.
12Using data from the 2002 China Environment Yearbook, we calculate two indicators at the provincial level
to measure environmental stringency: the levy fees divided by the number of charged organizations and the share
of industrial pollution treatment investment in innovation investment. In each case, Inner Mongolia is the only
neighboring province with less stringent regulation than Hebei (see Appendix 6.A). Dean et al. (2009) obtain
the same ranking using the average collected levy per ton of wastewater as the indicator of de facto provincial
stringency.
13“Region” here refers to a U.S. state or a Chinese province.
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of pollution at borders. First of all, at borders, a region’s expenditure on pollution control does
not solely beneﬁt that region; it also beneﬁts neighboring ones (Sigman, 2002). Since regions
have limited ﬁnancial resources, they prefer investing funds where they can reap the highest
beneﬁt, that is to say, in interior counties. Secondly, at borders, some of a given ﬁrm’s pol-
lution impacts the neighboring region. Thus, in border counties, the population beneﬁts from
the overall positive economic advantages related to the presence of the ﬁrm (jobs and taxes)
and only suﬀers from part of the pollution generated (Helland and Whitford, 2003). On the
contrary, in interior counties, the population beneﬁts from job opportunities but must also bear
all the pollution generated. Thus, we would expect social discontent related to the establish-
ment of a polluting ﬁrm to be higher in interior counties. As a result, a regulator concerned
with political support14 and job promotion15 will be more likely to oppose the arrival of a pol-
luting ﬁrm and to apply more stringent environmental regulations in interior counties. This
free-riding phenomenon can explains why, in the U.S., plants whose pollution falls partly on the
population of neighboring states tend to pollute more (Gray and Shadbegian, 2004). The same
free-riding argument applies to coastal counties, explaining why emissions are much higher in
these counties (Helland and Whitford, 2003). It is worth noting that the free-riding eﬀect will
always lead polluting ﬁrms to concentrate in border counties, whatever the relative stringency
of Hebei’s environmental regulation. However, the magnitude of the eﬀect is reduced when the
neighboring state enforces stringent environmental regulation (Gray and Shadbegian, 2004).
Finally, the strategic implementation of environmental regulation (less stringent regulation
at borders) can also lead to an intra-provincial pollution havens eﬀect. Because of their less
stringent regulation, we would expect border counties to attract more polluting ﬁrms than
interior borders, leading to transboundary pollution.
14The Chinese authorities have to address a large and growing number of citizen complaints about pollution.
There were already 138495 letters of complaint in 1993 (Dasgupta and Wheeler, 1997). In 2002, 428626 letters
were sent to the authorities (State Environmental Protection Agency, 2003). In some extreme cases, local oﬃcials
lost their posts because of public pressure after environmental crises. For example, in 2009, in the wake of a
great amount of intense public pressure, numerous local oﬃcials were dismissed because of pollution accidents in
Hunan, Shaanxi and Inner Mongolia.
15The political promotion system in China has evolved over time. While promotion used to be based solely on
economic performance, since 2005 experiments have been conducted in some provinces where promotion depends
now both on economic and environmental performance.
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6.5 Description of the study area and data
6.5.1 Hebei province
This study is carried out in Hebei Province for several reasons. First of all, Hebei has been
industrialized for many decades, which makes it one of the most polluted provinces in the
country. According to the list published in 2010 by the Chinese government, which identiﬁes
the most polluting ﬁrms in China, 744 of the 9,833 top polluters in China are located in Hebei.
The province has the highest number of polluting ﬁrms just after Jiangsu (838) and Shandong
(774). According to Liu (2010), Hebei would also rank ﬁrst in the number of oﬃcially reported
“cancer villages”. In addition, Hebei shares borders with seven other provinces including the
provincial cities of Beijing and Tianjin (see Figure 6.1) and Hebei has already been involved in
several transboundary pollution conﬂicts, as stated in Section 6.4. Finally, Hebei is one of the
few provinces with the necessary data available to allow us to carry out our study.
Regarding the environmental protection (as measured by the levy fees per facility), in 2002
Hebei had an average charge of 7300 yuan, which was very similar to that of China (State
Environmental Protection Agency, 2003; Hebei Environmental Protection Bureau, 2003). How-
ever, in 2008 Hebei lags behind China as its average levy fees were only about 30,500 yuan
compared to the national level which was about 37,000 yuan (Ministry of Environmental Pro-
tection, 2009; Hebei Environmental Protection Bureau, 2009). However, this data highlights
that the environmental policy has been tightened over the period (see also Appendix 6.B).
6.5.2 Construction of the dependent variable and sample
The dependent variable of our model is the annual number of polluting ﬁrms births by county.
We constructed this variable from the lists published by the MEP and the EPB of Hebei16.
Since 2007, the MEP and EPBs of provinces annually publish lists (Guojia/Sheng zhongdian
jiankong qiye mingdan) that identify the most polluting ﬁrms in China17. These lists give
the name of each ﬁrm and the county in which it is located. Moreover, the lists classify each
ﬁrm as: “water polluting ﬁrm”, “air polluting ﬁrm” or “waste water treatment facility”. Waste
16To our knowledge, Ma (2010) is the ﬁrst to use this data list for Henan province.
17The lists identify the most polluting ﬁrms at national and provincial level in terms of air, water and sewage
pollution. More precisely, the ﬁrms identiﬁed produce 65% of total industrial emissions of SO2, NOx, COD, NH3-
N and heavy metals. As these pollutants can cross regional borders, this data enables us to test for transboundary
pollution. Note that there is a lag of two years between the census of ﬁrms in the list and their pollution. Thus,
the 2007 list contains the ﬁrms that polluted the most in 2005.
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Figure 6.1: Polluting ﬁrm births in Hebei province from 2002 to 2008
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water treatment facilities are always built close to population centers in order to treat municipal
waste. As they do not freely choose their location, we have excluded them from our analysis.
By contrast, both air and water pollutant ﬁrms freely choose their location and thus, take into
account environmental regulation when deciding where to locate. Thus, we consider both air
and water polluting ﬁrms when constructing our dependent variable.
However, the MEP and EPBs lists provide no information regarding a ﬁrm’s establishment
date or emissions level. So, these lists give the necessary information to estimate a model of
stock, in which the total number of ﬁrms in a county is regressed on a set of regional variables.
However, in this study we estimate a ﬂow model in which the number of ﬁrms created in a
county at year t is regressed on the characteristics of this county at year t. Indeed, on the one
hand, a ﬁrm decides to locate in a county at year t according to the current characteristics of
the county. In addition, some ﬁrms in the lists were created between 1953 and 1978. At this
period of time, the location choice of a ﬁrm did not depend on an economic rationale, unlike
that of recent ﬁrms (Wen, 2004). As a consequence, it would be impossible to explain with the
same model both the location of ﬁrms created before the 1980s and of recently established ﬁrms.
Finally and most importantly, there was no environmental policy in China before 1979. To test
the existence of border eﬀects and of the hardening of environmental regulation in urban areas,
we should take a sample of ﬁrms which have been recently created and which are therefore
sensitive to environmental regulation. In order to estimate a ﬂow model, we have collected
the creation dates of polluting ﬁrms from the oﬃcial website of the Industrial and Commercial
Bureau of Hebei province.
Once the creation dates were obtained, we selected ﬁrms created after 2002, year from
which we have data for the explanatory variables. In addition, the last list of polluting ﬁrms
was published in 2010; it lists the most polluting ﬁrms in 2008. Thus, our sample covers the
period of 2002-2008. In all, 253 air and water polluting ﬁrms were set up in Hebei province
between 2002 and 2008. We have managed to collect information on the economic sector for
219 ﬁrms. According to our research, a large number of polluting ﬁrms are engaged in the steel
industry (25.11%), are paper mills (21.92%), power stations (14.16%), in chemical industries
(8.68%) or are coking plants (7.76%). The rest of the polluting ﬁrms (22.37%) are involved in
various other industries such as textile, cement and pharmaceuticals.
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6.5.3 Testing for the eﬀect of urban proximity: market vs environmental
regulations
As explained in Section 6.3, more polluting ﬁrms are likely to locate close to cities in order to
avoid the stringent environmental regulation found in cities. The real challenge of the empirical
analysis is then to disentangle the eﬀect of the urban market from the eﬀect of environmental
regulation in cities. Indeed, it is widely accepted that ﬁrms are attracted to regions with high
market potential, i.e. markets of neighboring regions matter in ﬁrms’ location choices (Head
and Mayer, 2004). Thus, whatever the level of environmental regulation, more ﬁrms are likely
to settle close to cities in order to beneﬁt from the higher market potential opportunities that
urban proximity oﬀers.
To disentangle the eﬀect of urban market from the eﬀect of urban environmental regulation,
two spatial lag variables have been constructed. First, we have created an indicator of urban
market potential in order to capture the “pure urban market eﬀect” on polluting ﬁrms’ location
choices. As in the previous chapters, the urban market potential variable is a spatial lag variable
of the following form:
WGDPit =
J∑
j=1
GDPjt
DISTij
(6.1)
where i refers to the county (county, district or county-level city) and j the city (prefectural-level
or county-level city). DISTij is the number of kilometers from the centroid of county i to the
centroid of city j and GDPjt is the gross domestic product of city j at year t
18.
Second, to capture the eﬀect of environmental regulation in neighboring cities on the number
of ﬁrm births in a given region, we have created a spatially-lagged indicator of environmental
regulation. The indicator is calculated as follows:
WEnviRegit =
J∑
j=1
EnviRegjt
DISTij
(6.2)
where i refers to the county (county, district or county-level city) and j the city (prefectural-
level or county-level city). DISTij is the number of kilometers from the centroid of county
i to the centroid of city j and EnviRegjt is an indicator of environmental regulation of city
j. As the relocation of polluting ﬁrms primarily occurs within the provincial boundaries and
18Data on city GDP is from the 2003-2009 China City Statistical Yearbooks. Distance is calculated using the
latitude and longitude of each county and city using data available on the U.S. Geological Survey website.
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especially from cities to very nearby rural areas (Tianjie, 2008), we only consider the eﬀect
of cities within Hebei province (and not of cities located in nearby provinces) and we have
used 100km as the cut-oﬀ parameter for the weighting matrix. Several indicators have been
proposed to measure environmental regulation in China (He, 2006; Dean et al., 2009; He and
Wang, 2012). However, very few indicators are available at the city level, especially for the
city Urban Administrative Area. In the present study, we use two alternative indicators of
environmental stringency which are, to our knowledge the only two indicators available at the
city level: the control-zone designation and the share of environmental workers out of total
employees.
The Two Control Zones Policy
In 1998, the State Council oﬃcially launched the Two Control Zones Policy. A number
of cities and counties were designated as either a SO2 pollution control zone or as an acid
rain control zone. Localities were designated as a control zone according to their pollution
emissions or concentration levels in the preceding year19. Figure 6.2 represents the 175 county-
level localities designated as control zones20 (the designation was made at the county level).
Localities designated as SO2 pollution control zones are located in Northern China, where
the cold weather leads to a much more extensive use of heating, leading to much higher SO2
emissions. By contrast, acid rain control zones are concentrated in Southern China, where
climatic conditions (rain, heat and solar radiations) raise the atmospheric acidity of a given
level of SO2 emissions (Tanaka, 2010). For the speciﬁc case of Hebei province, eight prefecture-
level cities out of eleven and thirteen county-level cities out of twenty-two were designated as
control zones21. No county was designated as a control zone, which is due to the fact that poor
19Speciﬁcally, an area was designated as an SO2 control zone if: “(i) average annual ambient SO2 concentrations
exceed the Class II standard, (ii) daily average concentrations exceed the Class III standard, or (iii) high SO2
emissions are recorded”. On the other hand, a locality was designated as an acid rain control zone if: “(i)
average annual pH values for precipitation are less than or equal to 4.5, (ii) sulfate deposition is greater than
the critical load, or (iii) high SO2 emissions are recorded”. Class II and III refer to the Chinese National
Ambient Air Quality Standards. According to these standards, “Class I standard means the annual average
concentration level not exceeding 20 μg/m3, Class II ranges 20μg/m3 < SO2 < 60μg/m3, and Class III ranges
60μg/m3 < SO2 < 100μg/m3” (Tanaka, 2010). The list of the localities designated as control zones is given
in the “Oﬃcial Reply of the State Council Concerning Acid Rain Control Areas and Sulphur Dioxide Pollution
Control Areas” available on the Asian Legal Information Institute website
20The map is from the China Atlas of Population and Environment (1990-1999), available on the China Data
Online website.
21The urban districts of the following eight prefecture-level cities were designated as control zones: Shijiazhuang,
Handan, Xingtai, Baoding, Zhangjiakou, Chengde, Tangshan and Hengshui City. The following thirteen county-
level cities were classiﬁed as control zones: Xinji, Gaocheng, Jinzhou, Xinle, Luquan, Wu’an, Nangong, Shahe,
Zhuozhou, Dingzhou, Anguo, Gaobeidian and Zunhua.
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areas are not concerned with the regulation. Thus, the policy has led to the implementation of
more stringent environmental regulation in (a part of) urban Hebei than in rural Hebei.
The Two Control Zone Policy has led to the implementation of much more stringent en-
vironmental regulation in localities designated as control zones (hereafter, CZ localities). For
example, all ﬁrms using coal with more than 3% SO2 content have been closed or required to
reduce their SO2 content and new coal mines cannot locate in CZ localities if the SO2 content
of coal exceeds 3%. In addition, it is prohibited for new coal burning power plants to locate
in populated CZ localities (Tanaka, 2010). According to recent empirical analysis, the Two
Control Zone Policy has led to signiﬁcantly more stringent environmental regulation in CZ lo-
calities and thus, to a signiﬁcant reduction in pollution levels. For example, Tanaka (2010) has
estimated that the policy has signiﬁcantly improved air quality in CZ localities, leading to a
signiﬁcant reduction in infant mortality. Moreover, Poncet and Hering (2013) have estimated
that the implementation of the policy has led to a reduction in pollution intensive exports in CZ
localities. Interestingly, the authors point out that their result may arise both from a reduction
in the pollution content of exports (due for example to the use of cleaner technologies) and from
a relocation of activities from CZ to non-CZ localities. The present chapter sheds some light
on this issue by testing whether proximity to CZ localities signiﬁcantly increases the number of
polluting ﬁrms created in its own jurisdiction22.
22The authors also highlight that the Two Control Zone Policy has a signiﬁcant impact on private and foreign
ﬁrms but not on State Owned Enterprises. Unfortunately, we do not have data on ﬁrm ownership and thus, we
will be unable to control for this in our empirical speciﬁcation.
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In our opinion, using the control zone designation to measure environmental regulation in
our study is particularly relevant for the following reasons. First, as already stated, the control
zone policy has eﬀectively led to more stringent environmental regulation in CZ localities and
thus, is a good indicator of the level of environmental regulation. Second, in the 2000s speciﬁc
goals have been set for CZ localities23. Thus, the control zone policy should have played a
signiﬁcant role on the location choices of polluting ﬁrms during our sample period. Third, as
the designation of control zones was done at the county level, this indicator is available for all of
the county-level divisions in our sample. To our knowledge, this is the only indicator available
for every county-level division. Thus, using the control zone designation enables us both: (i) to
test for the eﬀect of city environmental regulation on nearby localities, and (ii) to control for the
level of environmental regulation of every county-level unit in our sample. Finally, as the policy
mostly targeted coal intensive industries, one may wonder whether every polluting ﬁrm in our
list is aﬀected by the Two Control Zone Policy. Indeed, if a large share of polluting ﬁrms in our
sample did not belong to coal intensive industries, this could raise concerns about the accuracy
of the indicator. As noted in Section 6.5.2, in our sample, the polluting ﬁrms are mainly engaged
in the steel industry (25.11%), are paper mills (21.92%), power stations (14.16%), in chemical
industries (8.68%) or are coking plants (7.76%). The rest of the polluting ﬁrms (22.37%) are
involved in various other industries such as textile, cement and pharmaceuticals. According to
Poncet and Hering (2013), who ranked 25 industrial sectors according to their coal intensity,
the manufacture of coke involves the highest coal intensity, followed by coal mining (2nd), the
manufacture of basic metals (4th), the manufacture of chemicals and chemical products (5th)
and the manufacture of paper and paper products (6th). On the whole, given the industrial
sectors of the polluting ﬁrms in our sample and the coal intensity of these sectors, the control
zone designation should signiﬁcantly aﬀect the location choices of polluting ﬁrms.
Environmental staﬀ
To check the robustness of our estimation results, we will use an additional indicator of
environmental regulation. Following He and Wang (2012), we will use the share of environmental
staﬀ out of total employees as a proxy for environmental regulation24. However, this indicator
23For example, the National 10th Year Plan for Environmental Protection (2001-2005) stated that annual SO2
emissions in CZ localities might be reduced by 20% from 2000 to 2005.
24He and Wang (2012) use the share of environmental staﬀ out of total government staﬀ over the period 1990-
2001. However, the total number of government staﬀ is not available for the period 2002-2008. As a result, we
have used the share of environmental staﬀ out of total employees.
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is only available for prefecture-level cities and thus, it is used only to ensure robustness of the
estimated impact of the environmental regulation of prefecture-level cities on nearby places.
Finally, as in the two previous chapters of the thesis, to test whether diﬀerent cities have dif-
ferent impacts, we have created diﬀerent spatial lagged variables according to the administrative
rank of the city (prefecture and county-level cities).
Table 6.1 provides descriptive statistics on the polluting ﬁrm births in rural Hebei according
to urban proximity. It appears that counties adjacent to a city attract more polluting ﬁrms (1.30
vs 1.18 creation of polluting ﬁrm in average per county). However, the diﬀerence is statistically
signiﬁcant only for counties adjacent to a prefecture-level city. In addition, counties adjacent to
a city designated as a control zone also have a higher number of polluting ﬁrms setting up there.
Once again, the number of polluting ﬁrms created is only statistically signiﬁcant for counties
adjacent to a prefecture-level city designated as a CZ.
Table 6.1: Polluting ﬁrms in rural Hebei: the role of urban proximity
N Nb. of births per county Test of diﬀerence between means
Diﬀerence t-statistic
All rural counties 114 1.18
Of which:
- Adjacent to a city 74 1.30 0.35 (0.930)
Of which:
- Adjacent to a prefecture-level city 28 2.07 1.19*** (2.969)
- Adjacent to a county-level city 61 1.13 -0.01 (-0.265)
- Adjacent to a city designated as CZ 54 1.44 0.51 (1.440)
Of which:
- Adjacent to pref. city designated as CZ 24 2.17 1.26*** (2.973)
- Adjacent to a county-level city designated as CZ 39 1.26 0.12 (0.327)
Note:* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
6.5.4 Testing for transboundary pollution
Three variables have been constructed to test for transboundary pollution. Firstly, we follow the
literature (Helland and Whitford, 2003; Kahn, 2004; Konisky and Woods, 2010) and construct a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the county shares a border with another province, or the sea, and 0
otherwise (Border 1). As explained in Section 6.4, the same free-riding phenomenon is expected
to take place in coastal counties. Thus, to capture the whole transboundary pollution eﬀect, we
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Table 6.2: Polluting ﬁrms in Hebei: border and non-border counties
(A) Stock of ﬁrms in 2001 and 2008
N Nb. of ﬁrms per county in 2001 Nb. of ﬁrms per county in 2008 % Evolution
All counties 172 5.00 6.47 29.40
Border counties 70 4.94 6.74 36.44
Non border counties 102 5.04 6.28 24.60
(B) Plant births from 2002 to 2008
N Total number of births Nb. births per county
All counties 172 253 1.47
Border counties 70 126 1.80
Non border counties 102 127 1.25
Test of diﬀ. between means (border vs non-border) 0.55*
(Ha: diﬀ > 0)
Note: * indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
create a variable including both coastal and other border counties. However, as can be seen in
Figure 6.1, some border counties share a very small part of their border with another province
while others share more than half of the total length of their border with another province. To
take into account the variability among border counties, we create a second variable equal to the
length of the common border with another province (or the sea) divided by the total length of
the county’s border (Border 2). The drawback of the ﬁrst two variables is that they do not take
into account the variability between non-border counties: while some counties are located at the
center of the province, others are very close to the borders. For this reason, we create a third
variable equal to the distance between the county seat and the closest border (Distance). These
variables have been constructed with GIS data, using ArcGis 9.2. If transboundary pollution
exists, we expect polluting ﬁrms to be more likely to set up near borders. Therefore, we would
expect the coeﬃcients associated with variables “Border 1” and “Border 2” to be positive and
the coeﬃcient associated with “Distance” to be negative.
Table 6.2 gives descriptive statistics on the polluting ﬁrms in our sample. Panel A of the
table gives the average stock of ﬁrms in 2001 and 2008 for all counties, border and non-border.
Interestingly, non-border counties had a slightly higher number of polluting ﬁrms than border
counties in 2001 whereas the opposite was true for 2008.
Panel B of the table gives data on ﬁrm births from 2002 to 2008. It clearly indicates that over
the recent period, polluting ﬁrms have located signiﬁcantly more frequently in border counties,
which tends to validate the transboundary pollution hypothesis. Moreover, the diﬀerences
observed in the stock of ﬁrms between non-border and border counties reﬂect an evolution
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in polluting ﬁrms’ location choices in China. Among the ﬁrms identiﬁed in the lists, some
were created before the 1980s. At that time, a ﬁrm’s location decision was not based on
economic rationale but rather arose from a strategy aimed at protecting industries from potential
destructive military conﬂicts. From 1965 to 1978, three principles determined the location choice
of industrial ﬁrms: “proximity to mountains, dispersion and concealment” (Wen, 2004). Thus,
industrial ﬁrms were located far away from the coast. Moreover, an environmental policy did
not yet exist in China. Therefore, it should not be a surprise that the stock of ﬁrms in 2001 was
not higher in border counties than in non-border counties. By contrast, newly created polluting
ﬁrms choose their location according to economic criteria and certainly take into account the
degree of environmental policy implementation. As a result, transboundary pollution is likely
to exist and this would explain why, nowadays, polluting ﬁrms would locate more in border
counties than previously.
Figure 6.1, which shows the positions25 of the polluting ﬁrms created between 2002 and
2008, also gives interesting insights about transboundary pollution. Indeed, ﬁrms seem to locate
more often in counties close to Tianjin, Shanxi, Henan, and to some extent, to Shandong. This
transboundary pollution eﬀect is reinforced by the fact that many ﬁrms locate in the capital
Shijiazhuang, which is close to the regional border. Surprisingly, Beijing does not appear to
signiﬁcantly attract polluting ﬁrms. This could be due to the fact that free-riding is reduced
when the neighboring state possesses stringent environmental regulation (Gray and Shadbegian,
2004). Interestingly, there are very few ﬁrm births close to Inner Mongolia. As explained
in Section 6.4, Inner Mongolia has less stringent environmental regulation than Hebei which,
according to the pollution haven hypothesis, would be expected to lead to fewer ﬁrm births in
counties bordering Inner Mongolia.
6.5.5 Other determinants in a polluting ﬁrm’s location choice
As control variables, we introduce the traditional determinants of a ﬁrm’s location, i.e. the
regional characteristics that may aﬀect the ﬁrm’s proﬁt. Firstly, a number of variables aﬀect a
ﬁrm’s revenue. On the one hand, ﬁrms are attracted to regions with agglomeration economies
(Arauzo-Carod et al., 2010), i.e. to counties where there is a strong spatial concentration of
25The lists published by the MEP and the EPB do not report the geographical coordinates of polluting ﬁrms.
Following Ma (2010) and Schoolman and Ma (2011), we have collected the geographical coordinates of polluting
ﬁrms.
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economic activity. This enables ﬁrms to beneﬁt from good access to intermediate inputs, from
market opportunities and from information. On the other hand, ﬁrms are more likely to set
up in regions that oﬀer signiﬁcant local market opportunities, measured by the GDP of the
own county-level division (Disdier and Mayer, 2004). Following Disdier and Mayer (2004),
we also introduce the GDP per capita of the county in order to control for the development
level26. Furthermore, as regions whose population is well educated are likely to attract ﬁrms, we
introduce an indicator of the level of education of the county population. We also control for the
presence of national and provincial-level Special Economic Zones (SEZ) as regions beneﬁting
from SEZ status attract signiﬁcantly more ﬁrms (Wu, 1999; Cheng and Stough, 2006). We also
introduce a dummy indicating whether the county has an international port, to control, to some
extent, for international market access.
Furthermore, ﬁrms are attracted by regions where production factors are cheap. Thus, we
introduce the real wage rate in industry and the population density as a proxy for labor and
land price respectively. Note that polluting ﬁrms would also prefer areas with low population
density where their pollution reaches less people and so, leads to less social discontent. We
also introduce a dummy indicating whether the county-level division has been designated as a
control-zone area to take into account the level of environmental regulation.
Finally, we introduce a set of indicators for natural endowments. First, the length of rivers
running through each county is introduced, given that many plants need to be located close to
freshwater (Ma, 2010). Second, as it may be more diﬃcult for a ﬁrm to locate in a mountainous
area, we control for the topography of the county. Note that the last two control variables
are particularly important given that borders are sometimes established by geographical dis-
continuities (rivers or mountains), which could bias our estimation of the transboundary eﬀect
(Holmes, 1998). Lastly, we introduce a dummy variable for districts and county to reﬂect the
nature of the administrative unit (county-level city is the reference category) and year dummies
in every speciﬁcation. All of this data comes from the Hebei Statistical Yearbooks (2003-2009);
the deﬁnition of variables and descriptive statistics are provided in Appendices 6.C and 6.D27.
26Introducing GDP per capita enables us to control for some variables for which we do not have any information
(for example, infrastructures).
27The province of Hebei contains 172 county level divisions: 36 districts, 22 county-level cities and 114 counties.
For the districts of the 11 prefecture cities where disaggregated data is not available, the districts of a prefecture
city are aggregated. Therefore, our sample is constituted of 147 units at the county level.
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6.6 Estimation strategy
To investigate the location choices of polluting ﬁrms in Hebei province, two types of estimates
may be carried out, depending on whether or not a time lag is introduced between the dependent
and explanatory variables. Firstly, the number of ﬁrms created at year t can be regress on the
values of the explanatory variables in t. Secondly, lagged explanatory variables can be used,
by regressing the number of ﬁrms created at year t on the values of the explanatory variables
in t − 1. In this case, the empirical analysis investigates the creations of polluting ﬁrms from
2003 to 2008 in Hebei, using explanatory variables from 2002 to 2007. Using lagged explanatory
variables is usually considered as more relevant because this enables both to reduce potential
endogeneity and to take into account the time dimension of the decision process28 (List, 2001;
Gabe and Bell, 2004). As a result, in this chapter we will carried out the empirical analysis using
lagged explanatory variables. Results obtained with contemporaneous are given in Appendices
6.G and 6.H.
The dependent variable of the model is the number of polluting ﬁrms created in county
i at year t. The special nature of the dependent variable (non-negative integers with a high
frequency of zeros) has led us to estimate a count-data model. This model estimates how much
a 1% change in an explanatory variable xi aﬀects the probability that a ﬁrm sets up in territory
i. The probability, Prob(yi), of a territory i to receive yi ﬁrms is based on a set of characteristics
xi of this territory:
Prob(yi) = f(xi) (6.3)
The most common way to model this probability function is to assume that the variable yi follows
a Poisson distribution. However, the Poisson model is restrictive because it assumes that the
conditional mean is equal to the conditional variance of yi (hypothesis of equi-dispersion). The
hypothesis of equi-dispersion is poorly respected with data on ﬁrms’ location choices, as the
conditional variance is often higher than the conditional mean, referred to as “overdispersion”.
Two phenomena can lead to overdispersion: (i) the presence of unobserved heterogeneity and
(ii) an excess of zeros.
Most of the time, overdispersion arises from unobserved heterogeneity. In this case, standard
deviations obtained are biased and therefore, statistical inferences are invalid. The standard
28Indeed, ﬁrms often locate at year t after having observed the county’s characteristics in the previous year.
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solution consists in assuming that the variable yi follows a negative binomial distribution instead
of a standard poisson distribution.
In addition, overdispersion can also arise from an excess of zeros (or “zero inﬂation”). This
is the case when the dependent variable yi takes the value zero more times than assumed by
the negative binomial distribution, leading to biased estimates. Zero inﬂation arises when two
separate processes lead the dependent variable to take the value zero. In the present study,
two processes are likely to explain why some counties did not attract any polluting ﬁrms from
2003 to 2008. On the one hand, some counties may not be suitable locations for ﬁrms and
thus, they will never attract any, whatever the period considered. This could be the case for
counties lacking a river, in mountainous areas and where there are no market opportunities. On
the other hand, some counties may be suitable locations for ﬁrms but did not attract any new
ﬁrms from 2003 to 2008. To distinguish between these two processes generating a zero outcome,
Greene (1994) proposes estimating a zero-inﬂated model which essentially consists in integrating
a binomial (logit or probit) model into the negative binomial regression model. Speciﬁcally, a
binomial model is ﬁrst estimated to distinguish those territories that will never attract any ﬁrms
from the others. In a second-step, the standard negative binomial is estimated. Appendix 6.E
proposes a detailed presentation of the mentioned count data models.
Table 6.3 gives some insight about the potential zero inﬂation problem in our sample. The
table represents the frequency and percentage of counties with 0, 1, 2, ... , creations of ﬁrms
from 2003 to 2008. According to the table, the dependent variable takes the value zero in about
86.17% of the cases. The frequency of zeros in our sample is comparable to those in List (2001)
and Roberto (2004) who estimate a zero-inﬂated model.
Table 6.3: Distribution of ﬁrms created
Number of creations 0 1 2 3 > 3
Frequency 760 89 19 7 7
Percentage 86.17 10.09 2.15 0.79 0.79
In terms of the testing procedure, as the negative binomial model and the zero-inﬂated
negative binomial model (ZINB model) are not nested, the Vuong (1989) test is used to test
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for zero-inﬂation. Asymptotically, the Vuong test statistic has a standard normal distribution
and hence, the test statistic obtained must be compared with the critical value of the normal
distribution. A value above 1.96 (below -1.96, respectively) rejects the standard model (zero-
inﬂated model) in favor of the zero-inﬂated model (standard model).
6.7 Estimation results
6.7.1 Testing for the appropriate model
To determine the model that best ﬁts our data, we (i) test the validity of the equi-dispersion
hypothesis and (ii) test for the presence of zero-inﬂation.
According to Appendix 6.D, the standard deviation of the dependent variable is more than
three times its mean, which indicates that the dependant variable suﬀers from overdispersion.
As a result, we test whether overdispersion also arises from an excess of zeros. As already
shown in Table 6.3, we are very likely to face a problem of zero-inﬂation, which could lead to
biased estimates. Thus, we further investigate the presence of zero inﬂation with the Vuong
test. The Vuong statistics are reported at the bottom of Table 6.4, which gives the estimation
results of the ZINB model using lagged explanatory variables29. In estimations (1), (2) and (3),
we have introduced a market potential variable for prefecture and county-level cities. Columns
(4), (5) and (6) present the estimation results when adding the spatially-lagged environmental
regulation variable. In each case, three diﬀerent equations are estimated, depending on the
variable introduced to test for transboundary pollution (Border1, Border2 and Distance). In
all cases, the Vuong test rejects the standard model in favor of the zero-inﬂated model, indicating
that zero inﬂation must be taken into account to obtain consistent estimates. As a consequence,
in this chapter, we carry out the analysis by estimating a ZINB model, which enables us to take
into account overdispersion arising both from unobserved heterogeneity and from an excess of
zeros.
29For convergence issues, and following Roberto (2004) and Konisky and Woods (2011), we introduce a subset
of the explanatory variables in the ﬁrst-stage model. Speciﬁcally, to diﬀerentiate between counties that are
unsuitable for ﬁrm location and counties that are suitable for ﬁrm location, we introduce the following variables
in the ﬁrst-stage model: environmental regulation of the county, agglomeration economy, education, local market,
topography and river. We carry out estimations with diﬀerent subsets of variables and obtain similar results.
Appendix 6.F further discusses the choice of speciﬁcation of the ﬁrst-step model and gives the estimation results.
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6.7.2 Baseline results
Table 6.4 presents the estimation results of the baseline model. First of all, the Envi.Reg.
variable has a signiﬁcantly negative impact, indicating that being designated as a control zone
signiﬁcantly reduces the number of ﬁrm births. This result is consistent with Tanaka (2010) and
Poncet and Hering (2013) who ﬁnd that the Two Control Zone Policy has led to a reduction
in pollution levels in CZ localities. Moreover, this indicates that polluting ﬁrms in China are
attracted by regions with less stringent environmental regulation. Thus, our results provide
evidence of a pollution haven phenomenon at the sub-provincial level in China. This ﬁnding
is complementary to Dean et al. (2009) who ﬁnd evidence of pollution haven behavior at the
provincial level. As polluting ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly attracted by low environmental regulations,
there is a high risk for rural areas, where environmental regulations are low and poorly enforced,
to suﬀer from increased levels of pollution.
Turning to the eﬀect of urban proximity, we ﬁnd that urban eﬀects vary according to the
type of cities. Indeed, proximity to a county-level city has no signiﬁcant impact on the number
of ﬁrm births whereas proximity to a prefecture-level city leads to a signiﬁcant increase in the
number of ﬁrm births. To disentangle whether this eﬀect arises from a simple urban market
potential eﬀect and/or from the eﬀect of more stringent environmental regulation in cities, we
add to the set of control variables the spatially-lagged environmental regulation indicators in
Columns (4), (5) and (6). Interestingly, the higher number of polluting ﬁrms setting up in
localities close to prefecture-level cities arise both from a market potential eﬀect and from the
eﬀect of environmental regulation. Thus, it appears that proximity to a prefecture-level city
leads to an increase in pollution not only because of a market potential eﬀect, but also because
the more stringent environmental regulation in cities may lead polluting ﬁrms to locate in nearby
localities in order to escape from the more stringent environmental regulation in prefecture-level
cities30. It should not be a surprise that prefecture-level cities have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on their
nearby localities while this is not the case for county-level cities. Indeed, prefecture-level cities
are bigger and more economically developed than county-level cities and therefore, proximity
to a prefecture-level city oﬀers a much larger market potential for ﬁrms than proximity to
30To explicitly test whether cities lead to a relocation of polluting ﬁrms to nearby rural areas, we have re-
estimated the model by adding an interactive term between the county dummy (County) and the spatially-lagged
indicators of environmental regulation (WEnvi.Reg.). However, the interactive term was not signiﬁcant, which
indicates that being close to a city with a stringent environmental regulation leads to a higher number of polluting
ﬁrm births not only (or not more signiﬁcantly) for rural county but more generally for every county-level division.
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Table 6.4: Baseline results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Border 1 Border 2 Distance Border 1 Border 2 Distance
Border 0.483** 0.016*** -0.225* 0.541** 0.017*** -0.250**
(0.045) (0.001) (0.061) (0.019) (0.000) (0.048)
Envi. Reg. -1.128** -0.956* -0.998** -1.405*** -1.208** -1.234***
(0.032) (0.051) (0.041) (0.005) (0.018) (0.010)
W GDP Pref. Cities 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.001 0.001**
(0.012) (0.018) (0.014) (0.033) (0.114) (0.038)
W GDP County-level Cities -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -3.94E-05 -7.89E-04
(0.382) (0.572) (0.411) (0.652) (0.987) (0.720)
W Envi. Reg. Pref. Cities 0.774** 0.771** 0.758**
(0.019) (0.016) (0.023)
W Envi. Reg. County-level cities -0.557* -0.648 -0.508
(0.099) (0.189) (0.140)
Agglo. Eco. -0.035 0.019 -0.014 -0.085 -0.002 -0.061
(0.787) (0.886) (0.913) (0.535) (0.996) (0.638)
Pop. Density -0.142 -0.204 -0.236 0.010 -0.051 -0.102
(0.575) (0.405) (0.320) (0.971) (0.849) (0.701)
Wage -1.290** -1.603*** -1.445** -1.123** -1.416** -1.300**
(0.023) (0.004) (0.012) (0.045) (0.030) (0.024)
Education 6.294 5.406 5.694 7.452 7.565 6.398
(0.283) (0.330) (0.308) (0.259) (0.427) (0.326)
Local market 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000)
GDP per capita 0.464 0.548* 0.438 0.505* 0.566 0.490
(0.144) (0.071) (0.184) (0.086) (0.180) (0.120)
SEZ -1.036 -0.967 -1.117 -1.260 -1.214 -1.394
(0.224) (0.253) (0.264) (0.193) (0.234) (0.271)
River 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Port -1.192 -1.329* -1.179 -1.232 -1.375 -1.236
(0.169) (0.100) (0.195) (0.182) (0.118) (0.237)
Topography -0.128 -0.062 -0.096 -0.084 -0.007 -0.052
(0.661) (0.822) (0.723) (0.757) (0.978) (0.849)
Districts 1.543*** 1.378** 1.488*** 1.820*** 1.664** 1.752***
(0.007) (0.018) (0.009) (0.005) (0.012) (0.006)
County -0.465 -0.436 -0.398 -0.707 -0.683 -0.614
(0.291) (0.256) (0.324) (0.123) (0.104) (0.152)
Constant 11.06* 14.26*** 15.57*** 8.292 11.13 13.42**
(0.051) (0.010) (0.009) (0.133) (0.123) (0.021)
lnalpha -2.678 -2.902 -3.003 -2.948 -3.555 -3.334
(0.109) (0.152) (0.163) (0.109) (0.340) (0.173)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 882 882 882 882 882 882
Log likelihood -388.304 -385.531 -388.481 -385.371 -382.402 -385.765
Vuong test 2.60 2.68 2.74 2.36 2.43 2.56
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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a county-level city. In addition, the diﬀerentiated impact of prefecture and county-level city
environmental regulation may arise from the fact that the control zone policy has been more
strictly implemented in prefecture-level than in county-level cities. For example, as raised in
Section 6.5.3, it is prohibited for new coal burning power plants to locate in the most populated
control zone prefecture-level cities. As a result, the more stringent implementation of the policy
in prefecture-level cities may have led polluting ﬁrms wishing to set up in control zone prefecture-
level cities to locate in the vicinity of prefecture-level cities in the absence of better options.
In addition, we ﬁnd robust evidence that polluting ﬁrms locate disproportionately in border
counties as the Border and Distance variables have the expected sign and are statistically
signiﬁcant in every case. Counties that share a (larger part of their) border with another
province or with the sea have a higher probability of polluting ﬁrms locating there. By the same
token, the farther the county seat is from the boundary, the lower the probability of polluting
ﬁrms settling there. These results provide evidence of transboundary pollution problems in
China. While this has already been demonstrated for the U.S. case, to our knowledge, we are
the ﬁrst to demonstrate this phenomenon in China.
Regarding the control variables, on the whole their signs are consistent and conﬁrm that the
location choices of Chinese ﬁrms nowadays are based on economic factors. For example, the
larger the local market, the higher the number of ﬁrm births. Conversely, the higher the labor
costs, the lower the number of ﬁrm births. Moreover, polluting ﬁrms locate more frequently in
counties where fresh water is available and in urban districts. On the other hand, education,
population density, agglomeration economies and topography do not signiﬁcantly impact the
location choices of polluting ﬁrms.
6.7.3 Robustness checks
To check the robustness of our results, we use the share of environmental staﬀ in total em-
ployees as our indicator of environmental regulation (instead of the control zone status) to
construct the spatially-lagged environmental regulation variable (WEnviReg). As this variable
is only available for prefecture-level cities, we have created a new spatially-lagged indicator of
environmental regulation only for prefecture-level cities (WEnvi.Reg.Pref.Cities). Thus, the
Envi.Reg. and WEnvi.Reg.County − levelCities variables are created using information on
control zones, as in the previous estimates. Results are reported in Columns (1), (2) and (3) of
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Table 6.5. According to these new estimates, while the market potential eﬀect of prefecture-level
cities remains signiﬁcant, the newly created spatially-lagged environmental regulation variable
is only signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Moreover, it is not signiﬁcant when using contemporaneous
variables (see Appendix 6.H).
In our opinion, while the lack of robustness of the impact of the WEnvi.Reg.Pref.Cities
variable may arise from a lack of robustness, it may also arise from the fact that the share
of environmental staﬀ out of total employees does not adequately capture the stringency of
environmental regulation. Indeed, as China’s environmental policy is decentralized, city gov-
ernments are not responsible for creating environmental standards but for enforcing them. In
this context, in CZ cities, where environmental standards are stringent, a higher share of en-
vironmental staﬀ is likely to lead to better enforcement of environmental standards. In this
case, the share of environmental staﬀ out of total employees may thus be considered as a good
proxy for environmental stringency. On the contrary, in non-CZ cities, where the environmen-
tal standards to be enforced are very low, environmental regulation will be low whatever the
share of environmental staﬀ out of total employees. In this case, the share of environmental
staﬀ out of total employees is not likely to be a good proxy for environmental stringency. As
a result, we expect that a higher share of environmental staﬀ in total employees will lead to
a higher level of environmental regulation only in CZ cities, which have high environmental
standards to enforce. To test for this, we have further disaggregated the spatially-lagged indi-
cator of environmental regulation for prefecture-level cities (WEnvi.Reg.Pref.Cities) into two
components: a spatially-lagged indicator for CZ cities and a spatially-lagged indicator for non-
CZ cities (respectively WEnvi.Reg.CZPref.Cities and WEnvi.Reg.Non − CZPref.Cities).
Results are reported in Columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table 6.5. According to our estimates, in
CZ prefecture-level cities, the higher the share of environmental staﬀ out of total employees, the
higher the number of polluting ﬁrms in nearby localities. On the other hand, consistently, the
number of environmental staﬀ in non-CZ prefecture-level cities has no impact on the number
of ﬁrm births in nearby localities. Moreover, this last result is robust when using as indicator
of environmental regulation the number of environmental staﬀ per inhabitant rather than the
share of environmental staﬀ out of total employees, as shown in Columns (7), (8) and (9).
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6.8 Conclusion
This chapter provides a comprehensive study of the eﬀect of proximity to cities and regional
borders on the location choices of polluting ﬁrms in China. To achieve this, we estimate whether
polluting ﬁrms are more likely to locate in counties close to cities and regional borders in Hebei
province. Our estimation results suggest that being close to a prefecture-level city signiﬁcantly
increases the probability of attracting polluting ﬁrms. Interestingly, this eﬀect arises both from
a “pure urban market eﬀect” and from the deliberate intention on the part of polluting ﬁrms
to avoid more stringent urban environmental regulations. In addition, the closer a county is to
the provincial border, the higher the probability of its attracting polluting ﬁrms. Thus, there
is a risk that people in counties close to cities and to regional borders suﬀer disproportionately
from pollution.
In our opinion, the present work contributes to the literature on urban eﬀects by going be-
yond the study of the simple economic impact of cities on nearby areas. In the literature, and
in the two previous chapters of this thesis, it has been found that urban proximity may enhance
economic performance in nearby rural places. On the other hand, the present chapter demon-
strates that urban proximity may also heavily deteriorate rural development by signiﬁcantly
increasing pollution.
The results obtained from this chapter may also lead us to discuss the relevance of a decen-
tralized environmental policy in China. Indeed, it seems that the decentralized environmental
policy may result in strong diﬀerences in the implementation of environmental laws across China,
leading some people to disproportionately suﬀer from pollution. If such problems are often put
forward by opponents of decentralization, our results do not suggest that a centralized policy
would be optimal. Indeed, a decentralized policy oﬀers compelling advantages for a country
as heterogeneous as China. While a centralized policy would consist in applying uniform rules
across the country, a decentralized policy allows for adaption to the local conditions and thus,
is more eﬃcient. It is unclear whether a decentralized or a centralized policy would lead to
higher social welfare in our case. Thus, as suggested by Sigman (2005) in the case of the United
States, the optimal policy might be to provide targeted solutions to transboundary pollution
problems within the framework of a decentralized policy. In the speciﬁc case of China, increas-
ing ﬁscal transfert towards poorest areas could help them in better enforcing environmental
laws. Moreover, the recent creation of the six major regional centers (see Section 6.2) could be
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a way to reduce transboundary pollution. For the moment, the creation of these centers is too
recent and their power is still too limited to have measurable impact. It could be interesting to
study the location choices of ﬁrms in the period to come, to test whether the creation of these
intermediate poles, between central government and regional governments, may oﬀer a solution
to the transboundary pollution problem.
Finally, some provinces have recently released data on pollution emissions for each facility
on the list published by the MEP and the provincial EPB. Thus, Schoolman and Ma (2011)
combine data on sources of pollution and pollution emissions data on every source for Jiangsu
province. It would be interesting to further test for transboundary pollution and for urban
proximity by using this actual pollution data rather than the counting of ﬁrms. This would
enable us to more precisely investigate whether population at borders are disproportionately
exposed to pollution.
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Appendix to Chapter 6
6.A Environmental regulation in Hebei province compared with
its neighbors
Table 6.6: Environmental regulation in Hebei province compared with its neighbors
Indicator 1† Indicator 2‡
Ranking of provinces Indicator value Ranking of provinces Indicator value
Inner Mongolia 196.51 Inner Mongolia 0.43
Hebei 262.06 Hebei 0.73
Liaoning 280.31 Tianjin 0.89
Henan 312.66 Shanxi 0.90
Beijing 315.42 Henan 0.92
Shanxi 417.77 Liaoning 1.11
Shandong 484.24 Shandong 1.47
Tianjin 610.59 Beijing 1.89
† Refers to the share of industrial pollution treatment investment in innovation
investment
‡ Refers to levy fees divided by the number of charged organizations
6.B Tightening of the environmental policy in Hebei and China
Figure 6.3: Tightening of the environmental policy in Hebei and China
Data source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Ministry of Environmental Protection
and Hebei Environmental Protection Bureau.
6.C Variables deﬁnitions
Table 6.7: Variables deﬁnitions
Variable Deﬁnition Unit
Creation of ﬁrms Number of creations of polluting ﬁrms Creation
Envi. Reg. Dummy equal to 1 if the county-level division has been
designated as a control zone, 0 otherwise
-
W GDP Real GDP (2002 prices) of neighboring cities weighted
by distance between the county-level division and
neighboring cities
-
W Env. Reg. Environmental regulation of neighboring cities
weighted by distance between the county-level
division and neighboring cities
-
Border 1 Dummy equal to 1 if the county-level division shares
a border with the sea or another province, 0 otherwise
-
Border 2 Length of the common border (with another province
or the sea) divided by the total length of the county-
level division’s border
%
Distance Distance between the county seat (county capital) and
the closest border (with another province or the sea).
The geographical coordinates of the county seat are
used to calculate the distance.
Meter
Agglo. Eco. Number of employees in industry per km2 Employees per km2
Population density Population per km2 Person per km2
Wage Average real wage in industry (2002 prices) Yuan
Education Share of secondary students in the total population %
Local market Real GDP (2002 prices) 100 million yuan
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita (2002 prices) 10,000 yuan
SEZ Number of Special Economic Zones (national level) SEZ
River Length of the rivers running through the county-level
division
Meters
Port Dummy equal to 1 if the county-level division has an
international port
-
Topography Variable equal to 1 if the county-level division is lo-
cated on a plain, 2 if in a hilly area and 3 if in a
mountainous area
-
District Dummy equal to 1 if district, 0 otherwise -
County Dummy equal to 1 if county, 0 otherwise -
6.D Descriptive statistics
Table 6.8: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Creation of ﬁrms 1029 0.25 0.86 0 17
Envi. Reg. 1029 0.14 0.35 0 1
W GDP Pref. Cities 1029 12.30 29.76 0 462.69
W GDP County-level Cities 1029 8.33 6.09 0 35.22
W Envi. Reg. Pref. Cities 1029 0.03 0.09 0 1.13
W Envi. Reg. County-level cities 1029 0.05 0.04 0 0.22
Border 1 1029 0.45 0.50 0 1
Border 2 1029 14.36 20.59 0 74.28
Distance 1029 40631.43 25710.47 354.40 110647.60
Agglo. Eco. 1029 29.18 97.09 0.05 694
Population density 1029 683.22 846.61 43.37 8890
Wage 1029 11634.60 3782.49 2624.00 31432.60
Education 1029 7.11 1.85 1.35 13.65
Local market 1029 67.73 111.15 4.12 1473.47
GDP per capita 1029 12210.33 7337.96 3775.31 37620.39
SEZ 1029 0.30 0.62 0 5
River 1029 42438.00 50765.16 0 327997.10
Port 1029 0.03 0.16 0 1
Topography 1029 1.50 0.79 1 3
District 1029 0.07 0.26 0 1
County 1029 0.78 0.42 0 1
6.E Count data models
The standard count data model is the Poisson model. In this case, the probability for a region
i to receive yi ﬁrms is given by:
Prob(Y = yi|xi) = e
−λiλyii
yi!
, y = 0, 1, 2, ..., n and ln(λi) = β
′Xi
The vector of coeﬃcients β is estimated by the method of the maximum likelihood.
In the case of overdispersion caused by unobserved heterogeneity, a negative binomial model
is usually estimated. It is obtained by introducing heterogeneity in the Poisson parameter:
ln(λi) = β
′Xi + εi
with εi following a gamma distribution with mean 1 and variance α. In this model, which is a
mixture of Poisson and Gamma distributions, the probability Prob(yi) of a territory i to receive
a number yi of ﬁrms is given by:
Prob(Y = yi) =
θθλyii
Γ(yi + 1)Γ(θ)
Γ(yi + θ)
(λi + θ)yi+θ
where Γ is the gamma function and θ = 1/α, with α the over-dispersion parameter. When
α = 0, there is equi-dispersion and the negative binomial model is equivalent to the Poisson
model (the two models are nested).
In addition, if overdispersion also arises from an excess of zeros, a zero-inﬂated negative
binomial model is estimated. Speciﬁcally, this two-regime model takes the following form:
yi = 0 with probability Pi
yi  negative binomial model with probability 1− Pi
Therefore, the overall probability of a zero outcome is:
Prob[Yi = 0] = Pi + [1− Pi]Ri(0)
and
Prob[Yi = yi|Y > 0] = [1− Pi]Ri(not 0)
where Pi is the state probability and Ri the negative binomial distribution for the variable yi.
The probability Pi can follow a normal or a logistic distribution.
6.F First-step results of the ZIP model
To deal with zero-inﬂation, the standard solution consists in estimating a zero-inﬂated model,
as suggested by Greene (1994). In our case however, as we have data on the stock of ﬁrms,
we have an alternative to the zero-inﬂated model. Given that we have stock data, we may be
able to diﬀerentiate between, on the one hand, counties that are unsuitable for ﬁrm’ locations
(stock = 0) and, on the other hand, counties suitable for ﬁrms’ location (stock > 0) but in
which no polluting ﬁrms were established during the sample period. Thus, an alternative to
the zero-inﬂated model could be to exclude from the analysis counties in which there are no
polluting ﬁrms at all (stock = 0). After that, we could run a standard count data model on the
remaining counties (for which stock > 0).
Between these two solutions, we have decided to estimate the zero-inﬂated model, which
is, in our view, much more ﬂexible than the other option. Indeed, we feel that the stock of
polluting ﬁrms does not provide fully accurate information necessary to determine whether or
not a county is a suitable location for ﬁrms (and thus, whether or not it should be excluded
from the analysis). This is due to two reasons.
Firstly, in 2002, there were no polluting ﬁrms at all in ﬁfteen counties (stock = 0). In 2008,
there were no polluting ﬁrms at all in only eleven counties. Thus, it is likely that in the following
years, new ﬁrms will locate in these eleven remaining counties. In this context, excluding them
from our analysis would be very restrictive.
Secondly, as detailed in Section 6.5.4, China’s industrial strategy has evolved over time.
Many ﬁrms on the list locate in counties during the 1950s-1960s. These counties, which were
mostly in mountainous and remote areas, were suitable location for ﬁrms when the country was
trying to protect industry from potential destructive military conﬂicts (Wen, 2004). Nowadays,
by contrast, these remote counties are no longer suitable locations for ﬁrms. Thus, it would be
an error to consider these counties as suitable locations, even if they have a positive stock of
polluting ﬁrms (stock > 0).
Because of these reasons, we have chosen not to use the stock criteria to exclude several
counties from the analysis. Instead, we have decided to estimate a zero-inﬂated model, which
oﬀers a much more ﬂexible way (thanks to the ﬁrst-step model) to diﬀerentiate between counties
that are unsuitable locations for ﬁrms from the others.
Table 6.9: Estimation results of the ﬁrst-step model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Border 1 Border 2 Distance Border 1 Border 2 Distance
Envi. Reg. -16.56*** -15.30*** -15.00*** -14.57*** -4.141 -14.72***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.583) (0.000)
Agglo. Eco. 0.168 0.228 0.231 0.239 0.596 0.299
(0.751) (0.662) (0.650) (0.628) (0.714) (0.527)
Education 19.99** 18.19* 18.85** 22.16** 21.75* 20.60**
(0.026) (0.060) (0.041) (0.013) (0.063) (0.034)
Local market -0.017 -0.021 -0.023 -0.016 -0.022 -0.022
(0.342) (0.269) (0.239) (0.298) (0.327) (0.222)
Topography -0.132 -0.018 -0.118 -0.178 -0.035 -0.144
(0.817) (0.975) (0.819) (0.746) (0.953) (0.775)
River 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.018** 0.017***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.029) (0.003)
Constant -3.264** -3.123* -2.822 -3.708** -3.852* -3.196*
(0.039) (0.083) (0.102) (0.019) (0.052) (0.084)
N 882 882 882 882 882 882
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
6.G Baseline results using contemporaneous variables
Table 6.10: Baseline results using contemporaneous variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Border 1 Border 2 Distance Border 1 Border 2 Distance
Border 0.358* 0.010** -0.185* 0.391** 0.011** -0.211*
(0.074) (0.042) (0.076) (0.048) (0.014) (0.053)
Envi. Reg. -0.902** -0.804** -0.830** -1.172*** -1.079*** -1.103***
(0.013) (0.028) (0.023) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006)
W GDP pref. cities 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001* 0.001**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.026) (0.052) (0.025)
W GDP county-level cities -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -8.45E-05 -6.35E-04
(0.553) (0.780) (0.572) (0.671) (0.960) (0.703)
W Envi. Reg. pref. cities 0.623** 0.658** 0.641**
(0.026) (0.016) (0.022)
W Envi. Reg. County-level cities -0.363 -0.407 -0.333
(0.164) (0.112) (0.199)
Agglo. Eco. 0.005 0.024 0.014 -0.020 0.001 -0.014
(0.965) (0.836) (0.903) (0.851) (0.991) (0.898)
Pop. Density -0.144 -0.192 -0.211 -0.032 -0.078 -0.106
(0.558) (0.445) (0.371) (0.898) (0.761) (0.667)
Wage -1.499*** -1.696*** -1.561*** -1.401*** -1.623*** -1.480***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Education 5.816 5.873 6.015 5.077 5.274 5.106
(0.135) (0.115) (0.106) (0.218) (0.174) (0.194)
Local market 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP per capita 0.548** 0.662*** 0.573** 0.607** 0.733*** 0.640**
(0.038) (0.010) (0.029) (0.020) (0.004) (0.014)
SEZ -0.957 -0.923 -1.085 -1.142 -1.150 -1.353
(0.146) (0.180) (0.169) (0.118) (0.148) (0.156)
River 0.007** 0.006** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007** 0.008***
(0.015) (0.036) (0.004) (0.006) (0.017) (0.001)
Port -0.893 -0.973* -0.941 -0.942 -1.035* -1.005
(0.102) (0.075) (0.118) (0.113) (0.081) (0.141)
Topography -0.007 -0.001 -0.008 0.022 0.034 0.015
(0.974) (0.998) (0.968) (0.918) (0.878) (0.943)
Districts 1.421*** 1.329*** 1.391*** 1.569*** 1.477*** 1.546***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
County -0.396 -0.352 -0.363 -0.607* -0.581 -0.584
(0.228) (0.269) (0.266) (0.096) (0.103) (0.110)
Constant 12.75*** 14.81*** 15.71*** 11.25*** 13.50*** 14.70***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002)
lnalpha -2.588* -2.495* -2.702 -2.931 -2.939 -3.290
(0.097) (0.089) (0.107) (0.151) (0.146) (0.231)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029
Log likelihood -490.570 -489.872 -490.524 -488.002 -486.890 -487.884
Vuong test 2.54 2.44 2.58 2.56 2.46 2.64
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
6
.H
R
o
b
u
st
n
e
ss
ch
e
ck
s
u
si
n
g
co
n
te
m
p
o
ra
n
e
o
u
s
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
T
ab
le
6.
11
:
R
ob
u
st
n
es
s
ch
ec
k
s
u
si
n
g
co
n
te
m
p
or
an
eo
u
s
va
ri
ab
le
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
%
e
n
v
i
st
a
ﬀ
in
e
m
p
lo
y
e
e
s
E
n
v
i.
S
ta
ﬀ
p
e
r
in
h
a
b
.
B
o
rd
e
r
1
B
o
rd
e
r
2
D
is
ta
n
c
e
B
o
rd
e
r
1
B
o
rd
e
r
2
D
is
ta
n
c
e
B
o
rd
e
r
1
B
o
rd
e
r
2
D
is
ta
n
c
e
B
o
rd
e
r
0
.3
4
1
*
0
.0
1
0
*
*
-0
.1
7
5
0
.3
7
1
*
0
.0
1
0
*
*
-0
.1
9
7
*
0
.3
6
3
*
0
.0
1
0
*
*
-0
.1
8
9
*
(0
.0
9
4
)
(0
.0
4
6
)
(0
.1
1
2
)
(0
.0
5
9
)
(0
.0
2
8
)
(0
.0
7
4
)
(0
.0
6
4
)
(0
.0
2
9
)
(0
.0
7
6
)
E
n
v
i.
R
e
g
.
-0
.8
9
6
*
*
-0
.8
0
1
*
*
-0
.8
2
6
*
*
-1
.0
9
5
*
*
*
-0
.9
9
3
*
*
*
-1
.0
2
2
*
*
*
-1
.0
8
3
*
*
*
-0
.9
7
9
*
*
-1
.0
0
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
4
)
(0
.0
2
8
)
(0
.0
2
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
W
G
D
P
p
re
f.
c
it
ie
s
0
.0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
*
*
0
.0
0
1
*
*
0
.0
0
1
*
*
0
.0
0
1
*
*
0
.0
0
1
*
*
0
.0
0
1
*
*
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
2
0
)
(0
.0
3
5
)
(0
.0
1
9
)
(0
.0
2
3
)
(0
.0
3
9
)
(0
.0
2
2
)
W
G
D
P
c
o
u
n
ty
-l
e
v
e
l
c
it
ie
s
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-8
.9
1
E
-0
5
-4
.7
8
E
-0
4
-0
.0
0
1
-3
.0
3
E
0
4
-0
.0
0
1
(0
.5
1
7
)
(0
.7
2
7
)
(0
.5
5
4
)
(0
.7
2
4
)
(0
.9
5
8
)
(0
.7
7
8
)
(0
.6
5
7
)
(0
.8
6
0
)
(0
.6
8
5
)
W
E
n
v
i.
R
e
g
.
p
re
f.
c
it
ie
s
0
.0
3
4
0
.0
4
2
0
.0
2
2
(0
.7
6
5
)
(0
.7
0
3
)
(0
.8
4
6
)
W
E
n
v
i.
R
e
g
.
C
Z
p
re
f.
c
it
ie
s
0
.3
3
4
*
0
.3
4
3
*
0
.3
2
3
*
0
.3
7
1
*
*
0
.3
8
6
*
*
0
.3
7
3
*
*
(0
.0
6
5
)
(0
.0
5
1
)
(0
.0
7
0
)
(0
.0
4
3
)
(0
.0
3
1
)
(0
.0
3
8
)
W
E
n
v
i.
R
e
g
.
N
o
n
-C
Z
p
re
f.
c
it
ie
s
-0
.0
1
7
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
3
1
0
.1
5
6
0
.2
7
5
0
.1
7
0
(0
.9
0
4
)
(0
.9
8
8
)
(0
.8
1
8
)
(0
.8
2
9
)
(0
.6
9
1
)
(0
.8
1
3
)
W
E
n
v
i.
R
e
g
.
C
o
u
n
ty
-l
e
v
e
l
c
it
ie
s
-0
.1
9
6
-0
.2
3
2
-0
.1
7
0
-0
.3
4
4
-0
.3
7
8
-0
.3
1
3
-0
.3
4
3
-0
.3
7
3
-0
.3
1
5
(0
.4
2
1
)
(0
.3
3
6
)
(0
.4
8
7
)
(0
.1
8
8
)
(0
.1
3
8
)
(0
.2
3
1
)
(0
.1
9
2
)
(0
.1
4
5
)
(0
.2
2
9
)
A
g
g
lo
.
E
c
o
.
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
2
2
0
.0
1
4
-0
.0
1
4
0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
2
0
-0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
1
2
(0
.9
6
9
)
(0
.8
5
3
)
(0
.8
9
7
)
(0
.8
9
6
)
(0
.9
7
5
)
(0
.9
6
1
)
(0
.8
5
4
)
(0
.9
7
4
)
(0
.9
0
7
)
P
o
p
.
D
e
n
si
ty
-0
.1
0
7
-0
.1
4
4
-0
.1
7
9
-0
.0
7
3
-0
.1
1
8
-0
.1
4
6
-0
.0
7
8
-0
.1
2
2
-0
.1
5
2
(0
.6
7
5
)
(0
.5
8
3
)
(0
.4
6
4
)
(0
.7
6
9
)
(0
.6
4
5
)
(0
.5
4
7
)
(0
.7
5
2
)
(0
.6
3
3
)
(0
.5
2
7
)
W
a
g
e
-1
.5
1
2
*
*
*
-1
.7
1
1
*
*
*
-1
.5
6
7
*
*
*
-1
.4
5
6
*
*
*
-1
.6
6
8
*
*
*
-1
.5
2
7
*
*
*
-1
.4
7
0
*
*
*
-1
.6
8
6
*
*
*
-1
.5
4
1
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
6
.4
9
1
6
.6
7
3
*
6
.5
5
1
*
6
.0
1
5
6
.2
9
3
*
6
.0
9
2
6
.1
4
0
6
.4
2
2
*
6
.2
6
9
*
(0
.1
0
2
)
(0
.0
7
8
)
(0
.0
8
4
)
(0
.1
2
8
)
(0
.0
9
0
)
(0
.1
0
3
)
(0
.1
1
8
)
(0
.0
8
2
)
(0
.0
9
3
)
L
o
c
a
l
m
a
rk
e
t
0
.0
0
3
*
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
G
D
P
p
e
r
c
a
p
it
a
0
.5
3
7
*
*
0
.6
4
0
*
*
0
.5
6
7
*
*
0
.5
5
3
*
*
0
.6
6
5
*
*
*
0
.5
7
9
*
*
0
.5
5
7
*
*
0
.6
6
9
*
*
*
0
.5
8
4
*
*
(0
.0
4
2
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
3
1
)
(0
.0
3
2
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
2
5
)
(0
.0
3
3
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
2
5
)
S
E
Z
-0
.9
3
8
-0
.9
1
4
-1
.0
5
8
-1
.1
0
5
-1
.0
9
2
-1
.2
9
2
-1
.0
8
3
-1
.0
6
6
-1
.2
4
6
(0
.1
5
9
)
(0
.1
9
0
)
(0
.1
8
3
)
(0
.1
2
5
)
(0
.1
5
8
)
(0
.1
5
9
)
(0
.1
3
2
)
(0
.1
6
4
)
(0
.1
6
3
)
R
iv
e
r
0
.0
0
7
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
*
0
.0
0
8
*
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
0
.0
0
7
*
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
0
.0
0
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
8
)
(0
.0
4
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
2
5
)
(0
.0
5
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
2
6
)
(0
.0
6
2
)
(0
.0
1
0
)
P
o
rt
-0
.9
3
4
*
-1
.0
2
3
*
-0
.9
7
6
-0
.9
2
3
-1
.0
0
3
*
-0
.9
8
1
-0
.9
2
1
-1
.0
0
6
*
-0
.9
7
4
(0
.0
9
4
)
(0
.0
6
6
)
(0
.1
1
1
)
(0
.1
1
8
)
(0
.0
8
8
)
(0
.1
4
4
)
(0
.1
1
6
)
(0
.0
8
3
)
(0
.1
3
9
)
T
o
p
o
g
ra
p
h
y
0
.0
3
5
0
.0
5
2
0
.0
2
6
0
.0
3
3
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
2
6
0
.0
3
2
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
2
5
(0
.8
7
0
)
(0
.8
1
3
)
(0
.9
0
2
)
(0
.8
7
7
)
(0
.8
3
4
)
(0
.9
0
1
)
(0
.8
8
1
)
(0
.8
3
7
)
(0
.9
0
6
)
D
is
tr
ic
ts
1
.4
3
6
*
*
*
1
.3
6
3
*
*
*
1
.3
9
1
*
*
*
1
.5
2
9
*
*
*
1
.4
5
8
*
*
*
1
.4
8
0
*
*
*
1
.5
9
4
*
*
*
1
.5
3
6
*
*
*
1
.5
6
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
C
o
u
n
ty
-0
.3
8
8
-0
.3
4
9
-0
.3
5
7
-0
.5
5
8
*
-0
.5
1
6
-0
.5
3
1
-0
.5
4
2
-0
.4
9
7
-0
.5
1
0
(0
.2
4
0
)
(0
.2
7
4
)
(0
.2
7
6
)
(0
.0
9
5
)
(0
.1
1
5
)
(0
.1
1
3
)
(0
.1
1
0
)
(0
.1
3
4
)
(0
.1
3
4
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
1
2
.5
5
*
*
*
1
4
.5
3
*
*
*
1
5
.3
8
*
*
*
1
2
.1
7
*
*
*
1
4
.3
1
*
*
*
1
5
.4
0
*
*
*
1
2
.2
9
*
*
*
1
4
.4
5
*
*
*
1
5
.4
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
ln
a
lp
h
a
-2
.5
5
0
*
-2
.4
8
0
*
-2
.6
4
6
*
-2
.6
0
0
*
*
-2
.5
7
1
*
*
-2
.8
0
5
*
*
-2
.5
2
1
*
*
-2
.4
9
0
*
*
-2
.6
7
5
*
*
(0
.0
8
5
)
(0
.0
8
5
)
(0
.0
9
4
)
(0
.0
3
1
)
(0
.0
3
4
)
(0
.0
4
3
)
(0
.0
2
4
)
(0
.0
2
5
)
(0
.0
2
8
)
Y
e
a
r
d
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
1
0
2
9
1
0
2
9
1
0
2
9
1
0
2
9
1
0
2
9
1
0
2
9
1
0
2
9
1
0
2
9
1
0
2
9
L
o
g
li
k
e
li
h
o
o
d
-4
9
0
.2
9
1
-4
8
9
.4
6
9
-4
9
0
.3
2
8
-4
8
7
.8
5
2
-4
8
7
.0
5
7
-4
8
7
.8
2
0
-4
8
7
.8
3
8
-4
8
6
.9
9
2
-4
8
7
.8
1
9
V
u
o
n
g
te
st
2
.5
2
2
.4
2
2
.5
4
2
.5
5
2
.4
2
2
.5
8
2
.5
2
2
.3
8
2
.5
5
N
o
te
:
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s.
*
p
<
0
.1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
.

Chapter 7
General Conclusion
What could be a good rural
development strategy for China?
250 Chapter 7. General Conclusion
Since the early 2000s, the Chinese government has deﬁned a series of measures to enhance ru-
ral development. Among the diﬀerent strategies implemented, one of them consists in promoting
cities as growth poles for nearby rural areas. Thus, “100 km economic zones” are progressively
appearing across the country in order to link rural areas to urban centers. The creation of these
economic zones has been accompanied by huge investments in rural infrastructures in order to
enhance linkages between urban and rural areas within the zones. However, while the number
of these economic zones is increasing, very little is known about the eﬀective impact of cities
on nearby rural areas in the speciﬁc Chinese context. Can cities enhance rural development or,
on the contrary, would it be preferable to rely on other strategies to develop rural areas? This
dissertation seeks to understand whether or not cities may enhance development in nearby rural
areas in China.
Main results
In Chapter 2, we have deﬁned what we mean by “urban” and “rural” areas in China. We
have explained why, because of the implementation of several administrative measures, the
“city” concept has progressively lost relevance over the reform period. While the “city” very
relevantly covered the city proper in the pre-reform era, nowadays the UAA of city is likely to
over-bound cities because recent increases in UAA reﬂect not only the urbanization process but
also administrative arrangements. In the light of this discussion, we have wondered about the
relevant scale of analysis to empirically assess urban inﬂuence on rural economic development
in China. We have concluded that the more relevant consisted in providing both county and
village-level analyses.
Chapter 3 contains a review of the literature on the role of cities in rural development. This
has enabled us to describe the diﬀerent potential mechanisms by which cities may enhance, or
on the contrary hinder, rural development. However, as most studies have been carried out in
the context of developed countries, we have also provided a critical analysis of this analytical
framework in order to examine the relevancy of the diﬀerent mechanisms in the Chinese context.
Thus, we have highlighted that, as for developed countries, cities may produce a number of
positive eﬀects on nearby rural areas. However, we have emphasized that cities may produce
additional negative eﬀects on rural areas in China, because the country is at a lower stage of
economic development and because of some speciﬁc institutional arrangements. As a result,
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while recent empirical studies on developed countries have often concluded that cities enhance
rural development, their impact is much more uncertain in China. Finally, we have wondered
about the relevant measure of urban proximity to empirically assess whether cities aﬀect rural
areas in China.
In the following three chapters of the dissertation, we carried out empirical analyses in order
to understand whether urban proximity had a positive or negative eﬀect on rural development.
Each chapter was conceived in order to shed light on a set of fundamental issues: to what
extent are cities and nearby rural areas interdependent? What is the eﬀect of urban areas on
the diﬀerent economic sectors of rural areas (agricultural and non-agricultural sectors)? Beyond
their economic impact, do cities enhance rural development? Are urban eﬀects on rural areas
homogeneous across Chinese regions? Do diﬀerent cities produce diﬀerent eﬀects on rural areas?
Chapter 4 began by testing the eﬀect of cities on the agricultural sector of rural counties.
While agriculture remains a key component of the rural economy, very few studies have in-
vestigated the impact of cities on the agricultural sector of nearby rural areas. Speciﬁcally,
we have tested whether urban proximity enhances the agricultural technical eﬃciency level of
nearby rural counties, which is a key determinant of long-term economic growth. Our empirical
analysis has provided three main results. First, it appears that cities signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
rural areas in China. As a result, it is not possible to understand rural development with-
out taking into account nearby urban centers. Studying rural development without taking the
surrounding regional economy into account would result in incorrect policy recommendations.
Second, we have found that cities strongly enhance the level of agricultural eﬃciency of nearby
counties in the most developed region, that is to say Eastern China. However, cities enhance
agricultural eﬃciency much less signiﬁcantly in the less developed Central region and have no
signiﬁcant eﬀect in Western provinces. Third, it appears that spillover eﬀects also vary across
the urban hierarchy. On the one hand, provincial-level cities, which are favored by the Cen-
tral government, are found to produce signiﬁcant backwash eﬀects on counties. On the other
hand, prefecture-level cities, and to some extent county-level ones, produce spread eﬀects on
counties in almost every region. Thus, this last result conﬁrmed our expectations: while cities
may enhance rural development in China, their eﬀect is much less positive than what is usually
estimated for developed countries.
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Chapter 5 has shed additional light on the role of urban centers in rural development by
investigating their impact on rural non-agricultural employment. Speciﬁcally, we have estimated
whether workers living in villages close to cities and towns get access to better paid non-
agricultural jobs. This issue is of utmost importance as non-agricultural earnings are a major
determinant of the level of earnings of rural households. By carrying out a micro-level analysis,
we have reached three potentially interesting conclusions. First, this study has conﬁrmed that
urban areas signiﬁcantly aﬀect rural development. In this chapter we have found that urban
areas have a particularly positive impact on the non-agricultural sector of nearby rural areas.
Indeed, it appears that rural workers close to cities not only beneﬁt from higher opportunities
to diversify locally but also from higher non-agricultural wages. Second, interestingly, we have
managed to disentangle the diﬀerent transmission channels at work. According to our estimates,
workers close to cities beneﬁt from higher wages thanks to the combined eﬀects of market
potential -resulting in higher wages in villages close to cities- and of commuting. Third, this
chapter has conﬁrmed that urban eﬀects vary a great deal according to regions and city type.
Once again, we have estimated that cities produce a signiﬁcantly more positive impact on rural
areas in Eastern China than in the less developed interior provinces. Moreover, we have found
that wages are the highest close to the largest cities, which is consistent with previous ﬁndings
on developed countries.
While the ﬁrst two empirical analyses have tested the impact of cities on the economic
performance of rural areas, Chapter 6 focused on a more developmental issue: environmental
quality. Speciﬁcally, we tested whether a higher number of polluting ﬁrms choose to establish
themselves in rural counties close to cities. Clearly, this issue has been largely ignored by
the literature on urban eﬀects which has overwhelmingly focused on the role of cities on rural
economic performance. In this last chapter, we have reached three main results. First, polluting
ﬁrms have a signiﬁcantly higher probability to settle in counties close to prefecture-level cities.
Thus, while cities may enhance rural economic performance, they may also seriously deteriorate
the quality of life. As a result, focusing exclusively on the role of cities on rural economic
performance may lead to over-estimate the positive impact of cities on rural areas. Second,
we estimated that polluting ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly more likely to establish themselves close to
prefecture-level cities for two reasons: (i) a “pure market eﬀect” and (ii) a deliberate intention
on the part of polluting ﬁrms to avoid more stringent urban environmental regulations. Finally,
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it appears that counties close to county-level cities do not suﬀer more from a higher level of
pollution. Thus, once again, this conﬁrms that urban eﬀects vary according to the city type.
Policy implications
The results of this dissertation naturally lead us to wonder what would be a good rural
development strategy for China.
A regional approach to rural development close to cities
The main result of this dissertation is that urban centers interact with their nearby rural
areas. Nowadays, there is a blurring of the boundaries between urban and rural areas and
thus, it does not seem relevant to implement separated policies in urban centers and in their
surrounding rural areas. In other words, the best policy for rural areas close to cities would be
a regional policy that explicitly recognizes that urban and rural areas are interdependent.
On the whole, we have found that cities enhance the economic performance of their neigh-
boring rural areas, both in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Previous studies on
developed countries have suggested implementing several diﬀerent policies in the case where
urban centers generate positive eﬀects on nearby rural areas. On the one hand, the best rural
development policy could consist in an urban policy promoting urban growth (Schmitt and
Henry, 2000; Partridge et al., 2007). However, in our opinion, such a recommendation cannot
be formulated for China where urban locations have been continuously favored for decades, at
the expense of rural areas. In other words, a good rural development strategy in China cannot
consist in favoring cities and waiting for urban growth to trickle down to rural areas. On the
other hand, enhancing urban and rural linkages through transportation and communication
policies, without favoring urban growth, could also be a good rural development strategy, as
it would result in increased urban spread eﬀects (Barkley et al., 1996; Henry et al., 1997; Par-
tridge et al., 2007). For example, developing the infrastructure network is expected to facilitate
commuting and the relocation of urban ﬁrms to nearby rural areas. In our opinion, this second
option seems much more viable in the Chinese context. Thus, a good development strategy for
rural areas surrounding urban centers could be a regional policy, consisting in leaving cities to
prosper while strengthening ties between prosperous urban areas and their surrounding nearby
rural areas.
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However, one additional result in this dissertation is that urban eﬀects vary a great deal
according to regions and city type. First, cities stimulate signiﬁcantly more rural economic
performance in Eastern China than in the rest of the country. Indeed, congestion costs have
appeared in Eastern cities and the service sector develops much more rapidly there, leading to
a signiﬁcant relocation of urban ﬁrms to nearby rural areas. On the contrary, in less developed
provinces, cities are at a lower stage of development and are more likely to compete with
nearby rural areas. Therefore, while enhancing urban-rural ties could be particularly eﬀective
in Eastern China, where spread eﬀects prevail, we can seriously question the eﬀectiveness of
this policy in the less developed provinces. Indeed, in less developed provinces, this policy
could result in increased competition between cities and their nearby rural areas, and thus in
backwash eﬀects. Secondly, we have found that diﬀerent cities produce diﬀerent eﬀects on their
nearby rural areas. In the speciﬁc case of agriculture, we have found that provincial cities have
a negative impact on their nearby rural areas. This result leads us to examine the relevance of
the current Chinese urban policy, which strongly favors higher-ranked cities. In addition, from
an empirical point of view, the high heterogeneity of urban eﬀects indicates that it is crucial to
distinguish the eﬀect of diﬀerent cities, in diﬀerent regions, when assessing their eﬀect on rural
development. Otherwise, this may lead to skewed and overly simplistic policy recommendations.
As highlighted by Partridge (2012), testing for urban eﬀects without taking into account the
potential heterogeneous eﬀect of diﬀerent cities may lead to wrongly state that urbanization,
and integration to urban areas, is “good for all”.
Finally, close to cities, a regional approach is desirable not only to enhance the positive
impact of cities on rural economic performance, but also to manage the negative eﬀects of cities
on rural areas, in terms of pollution for example. As estimated in this dissertation, while cities
may signiﬁcantly enhance the economic performance of nearby rural areas, they are also likely
to produce a signiﬁcant negative impact on the environmental quality of their neighboring rural
areas. Thus, a regional approach to rural development is necessary to plan and manage a
number of developmental issues, such as land issues or pollution, which occur at the level of the
city region. In other words, a regional approach is a necessary condition to create sustainable
regions (McGee, 2008).
Heterogeneity of rural policies and community-speciﬁc policies in remote areas
While strengthening urban and rural integration could be an eﬀective policy to enhance
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development close to cities, we can seriously question the eﬀectiveness of this approach in
isolated areas. According to the World Bank (2009), the most eﬃcient way to develop lagged
regions would be to enhance integration between lagged and dynamic regions, in particular
by liberalizing factors’ mobility so that resources may move from unproductive to productive
places. However, the actual eﬀects of this kind of policy on remote areas remain uncertain. In
fact, an increased integration can result in a greater marginalization of lagged regions. Indeed,
a number of empirical studies have highlighted that infrastructure investment in remote regions
often leads capital and workers to increasingly agglomerate in productive regions, widening the
regional development gap (Barca et al., 2012). Thus, while enhancing integration between urban
and rural areas may reinforce spread eﬀects close to cities, it may also reinforce backwash eﬀects
in remote areas (Barkley et al., 1996).
This leads us to conclude that heterogeneity is a major component of a good rural devel-
opment strategy for China. Indeed, it clearly appears that rural places face a diﬀerent regional
context, in particular according to their location: while cities generate positive economic bene-
ﬁts on their nearby rural areas, they have a much less positive impact on areas located further
away. As a result, a good rural development policy must take into account these diﬀerences and
thus, diﬀerent policies might be undertaken in diﬀerent contexts. While this recommendation
may seem quite trivial, it is of great importance in China, where diﬀerent local governments
tend to implement very similar development policies, a situation referred to as the“isomorphism
of local development policy” (Chien, 2008).
If increasing integration is not a good development strategy for remote areas, then what could
be a good development strategy for remote regions1? For remote areas, which do not beneﬁt
from positive urban eﬀects, the best solution could consist in implementing place-based policies,
as already pointed out in the literature on developed countries (Barkley et al., 1996; Roberts,
2000). For example, the government may provide tax incentives to industries to encourage
non-agricultural employment growth. It is worth noting that place-based policies have been
criticized, especially by the World Bank (2009). According to its detractors, the place-based
approach would divert resources from productive to unproductive places, undermining national
1As highlighted by Pole`se and Shearmur (2003) development strategies based on the growth pole theory can
be eﬀective in enhancing the development of all regions in countries such as France, where almost every area
is close to a city. However, given that urban eﬀects have a limited geographical scope, relying on cities is very
unlikely to stimulate development of peripheral regions in vast and sparsely populated territories such as Canada.
In our opinion, the same conclusion can be drawn for China: relying on cities cannot enhance development in
remote rural areas in China.
256 Chapter 7. General Conclusion
economic growth. However, these approaches often wrongly assume that economic development
is not possible in every territory. Yet, this is not supported by empirical works, as several studies
have highlighted that place-based policies targeting remote regions resulted in signiﬁcant growth,
both at the local and national levels (Barca et al., 2012). Indeed, place-based policies may be
particularly eﬀective to reduce rural poverty in remote areas (Partridge and Rickman, 2008).
Speciﬁcally, as commuting and migration to remote areas is very limited, local employment
growth in remote areas beneﬁt almost exclusively the local residents, resulting in a signiﬁcant
reduction in poverty. While this result has been found to be true for the U.S., we can reasonably
assume that place-based policies could be even more eﬀective in reducing poverty in Chinese
remote rural areas, given that mobility to remote areas is much more limited than in the U.S.
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